Vill. of Willow Springs v. Vill. of Lemont, 1-15-2670

• Citation: 70 N.E.3d 210,2016 IL App (1st) 152670
• Decision Date: 19 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1-15-2670,1-15-2670
• Parties: The VILLAGE OF WILLOW SPRINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The VILLAGE OF LEMONT, a Municipal Corporation; Route 83 Properties LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company; Route 83 Properties Ii LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company; Grant Road, LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company; Robert Bily and Louis Dineff, Individually and as Beneficial Owners of a Chicago Land Trust Dated 6/3/09; Gold Coast Distributing Company, an Illinois Corporation and as Beneficial Owner of a Chicago Land Trust Dated 6/3/09; and Chicago Title Land Trust Company, Under the Trust Dated 6/3/09 and Known as Trust No. 8002353226, Defendants, (The Village of Lemont, Route 83 Properties LLC, and Route 83 Properties II LLC, Defendants-Appellees).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2016 IL App (1st) 152670

70 N.E.3d 210

The VILLAGE OF WILLOW SPRINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.The VILLAGE OF LEMONT, a Municipal Corporation; Route 83 Properties LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company; Route 83 Properties Ii LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company; Grant Road, LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company; Robert Bily and Louis Dineff, Individually and as Beneficial Owners of a Chicago Land Trust Dated 6/3/09; Gold Coast Distributing Company, an Illinois Corporation and as Beneficial Owner of a Chicago Land Trust Dated 6/3/09; and Chicago Title Land Trust Company, Under the Trust Dated 6/3/09 and Known as Trust No. 8002353226, Defendants,

(The Village of Lemont, Route 83 Properties LLC, and Route 83 Properties II LLC, Defendants-Appellees).

No. 1-15-2670

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIRST DIVISION.

December 19, 2016

Odelson & Sterk, Ltd., of Evergreen Park (Michael McGrath, Matthew Byrne, and Mary Ryan Norwell, of counsel), for appellant.

Tressler LLP, of Chicago (Jeffrey M. Stein and Andrew S. Paine, of counsel), for appellee Village of Lemont.

Di Monte & Lizak, LLC, of Park Ridge (Alan L. Stefaniak, Paul A. Greco, and Jordan A. Finfer, of counsel), for other appellees.

OPINION

JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This is an appeal from the circuit court's dismissal of a complaint in which one village, Willow Springs, sought to enjoin its neighboring village, Lemont, from approving a zoning reclassification and a proposed property development. Willow Springs also sued the owners and proposed developers. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Willow Springs lacked standing to contest the zoning reclassification, which had been approved by the time of the circuit court's ruling, and lacked standing "at th [at] time" to challenge the remainder of the development application which Lemont had not yet approved. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The proposed development is located at 13011 Grant Road in Lemont, Illinois (Grant Road property). Willow Springs filed a complaint against Lemont and those individuals and entities that had applied to Lemont for the rezoning and development of the Grant Road property (collectively applicants), including the property owners (Grant Road, LLC, and the beneficiaries of Chicago Title Company Trust No. 8002353226 (Robert Bily, Louis Dineff, and Gold Coast Distributing Company)) and prospective buyers of the property (Route 83 Properties LLC and Route 83 Properties II LLC (collectively Route 83 entities)).

¶ 4 In its complaint, Willow Springs alleged that "[t]he Village of Lemont and the Village of Willow Springs are adjacent to each other" and that the Grant Road property—"the vacant area located near Route 83 and Archer Avenue"—"is located in close proximity to the Village of Willow Springs and borders Cook County Forest Preserve Property." According to Willow Springs, the applicants "intend[ed] to develop the [s]ubject [p]roperty as a heavy industrial development[,] including concrete crushing/recycling, [a] contractor [']s office, semi-truck parking, [a] concrete batching plant, construction demolition debris recycling, and other related uses." Willow Springs alleged that, in accordance with this plan, the applicants "submitted an application to the Village of Lemont for rezoning [of the property] from R-1 Single-Family Residential District to M-3 Heavy Manufacturing District," along with a "preliminary plat of [the] subdivision and a [proposed] special use for a Preliminary Planned Unit Development" to use the property as a heavy industrial development. Willow Springs further alleged that the applicants' proposed rezoning and development of the subject property was "inconsistent with the zoning of the surrounding area," which it described as "light industrial, outdoor recreation and open space," and would "result in substantial negative impacts for the surrounding area[,] including but not limited to noise, traffic, and increased hazardous and unwanted debris."

¶ 5 Willow Springs asserted two claims for injunctive relief: count I, against Lemont and the property owners, asserted that Lemont's approval of the application for rezoning, the preliminary plat of the subdivision, and a special use for the Preliminary Planned Unit Development would be "arbitrary unreasonable and capricious," would "bear no substantial relation to public health, safety or welfare[,] and would result in special injury and damage to the Plaintiff in its corporate capacity." Although Willow Springs did not label it as such, this is a constitutional challenge to a zoning change under the " La Salle " factors, as set out by the Illinois Supreme Court in La Salle National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook , 12 Ill.2d 40, 46–47, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957). Count I also alleged that Lemont's approval of the application "constitutes a public nuisance." Count II was brought against all of the applicants and alleged that the "proposed development constitutes a common law public nuisance."

¶ 6 Willow Springs alleged, on information and belief, "that unless restrained or enjoined by order of th[e] court, the Village of Lemont and Owners will proceed with the application and proposed development." Willow Springs further alleged that it had a "real interest in the proposed development and development area," that approval of the application "is injurious to Willow Springs in that, among other things, it negatively affects the quality of life by the Village residents, property values within its borders, and the Village's growth and development," and that approval of the application "will result in irreparable harm to Willow Springs" because "the proposed development is inconsistent with the character of the adjoining area [,] * * * property values in [Willow Springs] will diminish[,] municipal property tax revenue will be lost[,] * * * roads will be more congested resulting in safety hazards[, and] the development will result in the degradation of air quality."

¶ 7 On April 8, 2015, Lemont moved to dismiss that portion of count I that sought to enjoin the zoning reclassification pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2014) ). Lemont argued that dismissal was proper under section 2615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014) ) because Willow Springs failed to allege either facts supporting a right to the requested injunctive relief or facts demonstrating that approval of the rezoning request would be unreasonable and arbitrary. Lemont also contended that dismissal of Willow Springs's challenge to the zoning reclassification was proper under subsection 2619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014)) for lack of standing because Willow Springs "ha[d] not and c[ould] not allege that it own[ed] or control[led] any property contiguous to or even near the [s]ubject [p]roperty" and was therefore required to "allege and eventually prove that the rezoning would have a substantial, direct and adverse injury [on its] ‘corporate capacity,’ " which it had not done. Finally, Lemont argued that dismissal was proper, pursuant to subsection 2-619(a)(1) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2014)), because the parties' dispute was not ripe for resolution since Lemont had yet to give its approval to the proposed zoning change.

¶ 8 Lemont attached to its motion to dismiss Cook County zoning records showing that, prior to Lemont's annexation of the Grant Road property, a majority of the parcels comprising it were zoned by Cook County as I-3, Intensive Industrial District. It also attached a nine-page report prepared by its planning and economic development department (PEDD), which described the characteristics of the Grant Road property, discussed the history of its zoning and the zoning of nearby properties, summarized the proposed zoning change and plan of development, and analyzed the plan's potential impact. The PEDD made clear in its report that the proposed development should not be approved as it was originally submitted; significant further studies would first need to be conducted and appropriate changes or improvements made to the plan.

¶ 9 One of the property owners, Grant Road, LLC, filed a separate motion to dismiss counts I and II in their entirety. Grant Road adopted the arguments made by Lemont with respect to the approval of the zoning reclassification in count I and further argued that "[t]he allegation that a party is merely attempting to have a property rezoned * * * does not state a cause of action for [the] violation of [a] zoning ordinance." Grant Road also argued that count II should be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code because Willow Springs failed to either allege facts supporting a right to injunctive relief or state a cause of action for a public nuisance. Grant Road also sought dismissal pursuant to subsection 2-619(a)(1) of the Code because the claim was "based upon an alleged nuisance that might occur at a future date and therefore [wa]s not ripe." The Route 83 entities filed a motion to dismiss count II, adopting Grant Road's arguments.

¶ 10 In its responses to the motions to dismiss, Willow Springs emphasized that it sought to challenge the "entire development application," not just the proposed zoning reclassification. According to Willow Springs, approval of the application would cause it to suffer the sort of injury recognized by Illinois courts as conferring standing on a municipality to challenge the zoning ordinances of other municipalities: "a direct, substantial, and adverse effect upon the * * * performance of [its] corporate obligations." Willow Springs maintained that its claims were ripe for decision because they related to a specific proposed development, such that there was "no uncertainty as to the type of development that [wa]s proposed" and "the threatened harm" to it "present[ed] a known threat"...