700 Fed.Appx. 865 (10th Cir. 2017), 16-3007, GCIU-Employer Retirement Fund v. Coleridge Fine Arts
|Citation:||700 Fed.Appx. 865|
|Opinion Judge:||Michael R. Murphy, Circuit Judge|
|Party Name:||GCIU-EMPLOYER RETIREMENT FUND and Board of Trustees of The GCIU-Employer Retirement Fund, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COLERIDGE FINE ARTS; Jelniki Limited, Defendants-Appellees.|
|Attorney:||Michael E. Amash, Carol Ann Krstulic, Blake & Uhlig, Kansas City, KS, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Jill M. Borgonzi, Robert John Hingula, Kansas City, MO, William E. Quirk, Esq., Polsinelli, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants-Appellees.|
|Judge Panel:||Before KELLY, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.|
|Case Date:||August 16, 2017|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit|
UNPUBLISHED OPINION (See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. See also U.S.Ct. of App. 10th Cir. Rule 32.1.)
District of Kansas, (D.C. No. 2:14-CV-02303-EFM-GLR)
Michael E. Amash, Carol Ann Krstulic, Blake & Uhlig, Kansas City, KS, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Jill M. Borgonzi, Robert John Hingula, Kansas City, MO, William E. Quirk, Esq., Polsinelli, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before KELLY, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT[*]
Michael R. Murphy, Circuit Judge
Plaintiffs GCIU-Employer Retirement Fund and the Board of Trustees of the GCIU-Employer Retirement Fund (collectively the " Fund" ) appeal from the dismissal of their action against Defendants, Coleridge Fine Arts (" Coleridge" ) and Jelniki Limited (" Jelniki" ). The suit was filed pursuant to the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (the " MPPAA" ), 29 U.S.C. § § 1381-1461, and involved the Funds attempt to collect withdrawal liability from Coleridge and Jelniki. The dismissal was based on the district courts conclusion it lacked personal jurisdiction over Coleridge and Jelniki, both of which are corporations domiciled in the Republic of Ireland.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court reverses the dismissal of the Funds suit and remands the matter for further proceedings.
The Fund is a multiemployer pension plan within the meaning of the MPPAA. Greystone Graphics, Inc. (" Greystone" ), a Kansas corporation wholly owned by Coleridge, made contributions to the Fund pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. In February 2011, Greystone ceased doing business, effectuating a complete withdrawal from the Fund. The Fund obtained a default judgment against, inter alia, Greystone and Coleridge based on allegations Greystones cessation of business gave rise to withdrawal liability under the MPPAA. See 29 U.S.C. § § 1381, 1383, 1391 (providing that an employer who completely withdraws from a multiemployer plan is liable for an amount sufficient to cover the employers share of unfunded vested benefits). The Fund initiated the instant action against Coleridge and Jelniki, arguing they are jointly and severally liable for the withdrawal liability because they are members of Greystones control group.1 See 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).
Coleridge and Jelniki moved to dismiss the Funds suit on the basis the federal district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The district court granted the motion, rejecting the Funds argument that specific jurisdiction existed because Defendants purposefully directed their activities at the United States. The court also denied the Funds request for jurisdictional discovery. This appeal followed.
A. Legal Standards
Where, as here, the district court grants a pre-trial motion to dismiss without conducting an evidentiary hearing, this court reviews the district courts ruling de novo and accepts as true the uncontroverted factual allegations in the complaint. Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff can satisfy his burden to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant by making a prima facie showing that jurisdiction is proper. Id.
When a plaintiffs claims arise under federal law and the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of any states court of general jurisdiction,
Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for federal long-arm jurisdiction if the plaintiff can show that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.2 Holland Am. Line Inc. v. W ä rtsilä N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 461 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, Defendants concede the Funds claims arise under federal law and no state court in the United States has jurisdiction over them. See id. (joining three other circuit courts of appeals in holding " a defendant who wants to preclude use of Rule 4(k)(2) has only to name some other state in which the suit could proceed" (quotation and alteration omitted)). Thus, the only question at issue is whether the exercise of federal jurisdiction satisfies Fifth Amendment due process standards. Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2000). To resolve this issue, we must determine whether Defendants have had minimum contacts with the United States. See Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 942-43 (7th Cir. 2000). Consistent with the minimum contacts standard, a federal court may exercise specific jurisdiction3 over a foreign defendant if the defendant purposefully directed its activities at the forum and the plaintiffs injuries arose from the defendants forum-related activities. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071 (quotations omitted).
Relying on a case from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Fund argues...
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