700 Fed.Appx. 947 (11th Cir. 2017), 16-17402, United States v. Harrison
|Citation:||700 Fed.Appx. 947|
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM:|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sefton Carl HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant.|
|Attorney:||John C. Shipley, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Emily M. Smachetti, Francis Viamontes, U.S. Attorneys Office, Miami, FL, Robert Benjamin Cornell, U.S. Attorneys Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee Timothy Cone, Richard C. Klugh, PA, Washington, DC, Daryl Elliott Wil...|
|Judge Panel:||Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||July 06, 2017|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|
DO NOT PUBLISH. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 32.1. See also U.S.Ct. of App. 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 0:16-cr-60114-WPD-1
John C. Shipley, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Emily M. Smachetti, Francis Viamontes, U.S. Attorneys Office, Miami, FL, Robert Benjamin Cornell, U.S. Attorneys Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Timothy Cone, Richard C. Klugh, PA, Washington, DC, Daryl Elliott Wilcox, Federal Public Defenders Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defenders Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Sefton Carl Harrison appeals his convictions for possessing with intent to distribute
and for importing a detectable amount of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § § 841, 960(b)(3). Harrison argues that there was no " evidence of [his] active efforts to avoid knowing that his suitcase contained cocaine" to support a jury instruction on deliberate ignorance. We affirm.
Harrison acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 1993). In Stone, we held that an error in giving an instruction on deliberate ignorance is harmless if the instruction " clearly stated the proper legal standards for the jury to apply, ... by its terms the instruction did not apply if there was insufficient evidence to prove deliberate ignorance beyond a reasonable doubt," and there was sufficient evidence of actual knowledge. Id. at 941; see United States v. Kennard, 472 F.3d 851, 858 (11th Cir. 2006). The district court instructed the jury that " you may find that [Harrison] knew about the possession of a controlled substance if you determine beyond a reasonable doubt that [Harrison], one, actually...
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