State v. Compton

Decision Date08 October 1997
Citation701 A.2d 468,304 N.J.Super. 477
PartiesSTATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David T. COMPTON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender, for appellant (Thomas J. Largey, Designated Counsel, Sea Bright, on the brief).

Peter Verniero, Attorney General, for respondent (Wendy Alice Way, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges HAVEY, KESTIN and EICHEN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

KESTIN, J.A.D.

Defendant was charged with the murder of his four-and-one-half-month-old son, Ronald, and with second degree endangering the welfare of the child. He was convicted of lesser-included first degree aggravated manslaughter and of endangering as charged. After defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to R. 3:18-2 was denied, he was sentenced to the presumptive twenty-year term for the manslaughter conviction, N.J.S.A 2C:44-1f(1)(a), along with a concurrent presumptive term of seven years for the endangering conviction, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(1)(c).

On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:

POINT I THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED "OTHER CRIMES" EVIDENCE & THEREBY CAUSED THE DEFENDANT TO SUFFER UNDUE PREJUDICE AND UNJUST CONVICTIONS.

POINT II THE COURT'S LIMITING INSTRUCTION RELATING TO THE INTRODUCTION OF "OTHER CRIMES" EVIDENCE WAS PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO PREVENT THE JURY FROM USING THAT EVIDENCE FOR AN IMPROPER PURPOSE--PROOF OF DEFENDANT'S DISPOSITION TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE HE WAS TRIED FOR. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

SUBPOINT (A) THE COURT'S LIMITING INSTRUCTION REGARDING "OTHER CRIMES" WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC & THEREBY FAILED TO PREVENT THE JURY FROM CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS DISPOSED TO COMMIT THE OFFENSES HE WAS CHARGED WITH. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

SUBPOINT (B) THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO PROVIDE LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS AT THE TIME THE PERTINENT EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED AT TRIAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

POINT III IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ADMIT TESTIMONY THAT CAUSED THE DEFENDANT UNDUE PREJUDICE & PREVENTED HIM FROM RECEIVING A FAIR TRIAL & RESULTED IN A MANIFEST INJUSTICE--HIS UNWARRANTED CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER AND ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

SUBPOINT (A) THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED EXPERT TESTIMONY FROM DR. SINQUEE ON THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

SUBPOINT (B) DR. SINQUEE WAS NOT PROPERLY QUALIFIED BY THE COURT TO OFFER HER PURPORTED EXPERT OPINION ON THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME--WHICH CAUSED DEFENDANT'S UNJUST CONVICTION. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

SUBPOINT (C) THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED DR. SINQUEE TO OFFER HER PURPORTED EXPERT OPINION ON THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME WITHOUT HAVING FIRST ESTABLISHED ITS GENERAL ACCEPTANCE WITHIN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY & ITS RELIABILITY. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

SUBPOINT (D) THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED TWO EXPERTS TO OFFER OPINIONS THAT INCLUDED BOTH DIRECT & IMPLICIT DETERMINATIONS OF THE DEFENDANT'S GUILT. (PARTIALLY RAISED BELOW).

POINT IV [Withdrawn by motion granted.]

POINT V DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS & EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE U.S. CONST. AMENDS. VI AND XIX [sic] AND BY THE N.J. CONST. ART 1, PARA. 10 AND PARA. 1 (NOT RAISED BELOW). [PARTIALLY WITHDRAWN AS RELATING TO POINT IV.]

POINT VI THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S R. 3:18-2 MOTION SINCE THE JURY'S VERDICTS THAT FOUND THE DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY OF RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER BUT GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER WERE INCONSISTENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

POINT VII THE COURT IMPOSED SENTENCES THAT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE GUIDELINES AND WERE BOTH EXCESSIVE & SHOCKING TO THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE.

SUBPOINT (A) THE COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES WHEN IT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY & INDIVIDUALLY BALANCE & CORRELATE ITS FINDINGS OF SENTENCING FACTORS TO THE SEVERITY OF THE OFFENSES DEFENDANT STOOD CONVICTED OF.

SUBPOINT (B) THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS OUTWEIGHED THE MITIGATING FACTORS WAS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS & WAS ALSO APPARENTLY CONTRADICTED BY ITS OWN OBSERVATIONS.

SUBPOINT (C) THE COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED THE STATUTORY ELEMENT OF "HARM TO THE VICTIM" AS AN AGGRAVATING SENTENCING FACTOR.

SUBPOINT (D) THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND MITIGATING FACTORS N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(1), (4) & (9).

SUBPOINT (E) THE COURT'S IMPOSITION OF A TERM OF 20 YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER & A TERM OF 7 YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD WAS NOT ONLY EXCESSIVE BUT WAS ALSO SHOCKING TO THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE.

Ronald died from injuries incurred while he was in defendant's sole care. When the infant's mother, defendant's wife, left Ronald in defendant's care while she ran some errands, the child was in normal condition. Shortly after she returned home, defendant left. Mrs. Compton heard a noise from Ronald and attempted to pick him up. He was limp and "[h]is eyes were in the back of his head." She called 911. A police officer who arrived with the ambulance noticed that "the child was making squealing noises and twitching his arms and his hands, and feet. I took his blood pressure and pulse, and I found them to be low."

Ronald was taken to one hospital and, within hours, was transferred to another with a pediatric intensive care unit. After tests were conducted, the treating physician, Dr. Sinquee, diagnosed Shaken Baby Syndrome. Following four days of extensive treatment, brain death was established and life support was halted.

Dr. Sinquee, testifying at trial as an expert witness offered by the State, gave details of the brain injuries she diagnosed as Shaken Baby Syndrome which, in her opinion, had caused Ronald's death. A forensic pathologist employed by the State Medical Examiner's Office testified, also as an expert witness for the State, that he had performed an autopsy on the child and had concluded that the cause of death was "traumatic internal hemorrhages" in the brain from an external force or forces. He disagreed that shaking had been the cause of those injuries, however.

Evidence was received over defendant's objection that, on three previous occasions, Ronald had sustained injuries when left in defendant's care. The trial court ruled that the evidence was probative and relevant with respect to the issue of whether the child's death had been accidental, and was, therefore, permissibly part of the State's effort to rebut defendant's claim of accident. There was also evidence from Mrs. Compton and two detectives, all of whom had participated in telephone conversations with defendant in which he admitted that he had squeezed and shaken Ronald on a number of occasions, including on the day in question. After defendant was in custody, he told his wife during a jail visit that, on the day at issue, he had thrown Ronald up in the air; that the infant went through his hands and he dropped the child. Defendant claimed that Ronald looked as if he had passed out, and that he shook the infant in an attempt to revive him.

The trial court's ruling admitting the evidence of prior occurrences of harm to the child while in defendant's care was correct. It was relevant to a material issue, i.e., whether the child's death was accidental as claimed by defendant, and it met the other standards governing admissibility under N.J.R.E. 404(b). State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 337-39, 605 A.2d 230 (1992); State v Moorman, 286 N.J.Super. 648, 660-63, 670 A.2d 81 (App.Div.1996).

The remaining issues before us bearing upon the conduct of the trial and rulings made therein were not raised during trial. They are, therefore, subject to R. 2:10-2. We dispose of them without reference to plain error considerations, however.

We regard the trial judge's limiting instruction in the general charge to the jury, relating to defendant's prior conduct with the infant victim, to have been adequate. Although it would have been better to have given that instruction when the evidence was first offered, as well as in the general charge, State v. Johnson, 65 N.J. 388, 394, 323 A.2d 450 (1974) (Pashman, J., concurring), the omission to do so was not prejudicial. State v. Hummel, 132 N.J.Super. 412, 424, 334 A.2d 52 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 67 N.J. 102, 335 A.2d 54 (1975). Juries have a responsibility faithfully to follow the judge's instructions whenever given, and we presume that they discharge that duty. State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 270, 255 A.2d 193 (1969).

It is also clear that the trial court committed no error in admitting Dr. Sinquee's testimony on Shaken Baby Syndrome. Defendant argues that, with the factual testimony of Mrs. Compton and others concerning the events surrounding Ronald's death, and the expert testimony of the pathologist that the death was caused by "traumatic internal hemorrhages," additional expert testimony from Dr. Sinquee that Shaken Baby Syndrome was the cause of death, was surplusage and, because unnecessary, was unduly prejudicial. Defendant also contends that Dr. Sinquee was not qualified to offer an expert opinion on Shaken Baby Syndrome, and that no adequate foundation had been established for the reliability of her observations and conclusions. Defendant argues further that the general acceptance of Shaken Baby Syndrome within the scientific community, and its reliability as an explanation for the death of the victim, had not been established.

With respect to the first of these related arguments, we note only that the State was in no way limited from offering evidence of alternative causes of death reflecting its investigations and meeting the explanations advanced by defendant for the injuries that caused the victim's death. See State v. Moorman, supra, 286 N.J.Super. at 660, 670 A.2d 81. We are aware of no rule that requires the State to choose a single theory upon which to build its case. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 341-42, ...

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6 cases
  • State v. P.Z
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 26 Noviembre 1997
    ...been violently shaken may become severely brain-damaged or permanently blind. Some die. Ibid.; see also State v. Compton, 304 N.J.Super. 477, 485-87, 701 A.2d 468 (App.Div.1997) (discussing recognition of Shaken Baby Syndrome in "medical ... literature" and caselaw). C.Z. suffered from both......
  • Smith v. Hastings
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • 30 Diciembre 2016
    ...The judge gave such a charge, and members of a jury are duty-bound to follow the court's instructions faithfully. State v. Compton, 304 N.J.Super. 477, 483 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 51 (1998). In the absence of contrary evidence, an appellate court must assume that the jury f......
  • State v. Pleasant
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 24 Junio 1998
    ...instructions given to them by the trial judge. State v. Manley, supra, 54 N.J. at 270-271, 255 A.2d 193; State v. Compton, 304 N.J.Super. 477, 483, 701 A.2d 468 (App.Div.1997). The instructions here were sufficiently clear, unambiguous and helpful to the jury. They did not have the capacity......
  • State v. Brinson, DOCKET NO. A-2124-17T4
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 31 Enero 2019
    ...disagree. The same error was made by the juries in State v. Myers, 239 N.J. Super. 158, 170 (App. Div. 1990) and State v. Compton, 304 N.J. Super. 477, 488 (App. Div. 1997). However, in Myers, "[T]he jury was not told whether or not to continue voting if it found defendant guilty of aggrava......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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