Coley v. Camden Associates, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15738,15738
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Orville COLEY v. CAMDEN ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.

Page 1180

702 A.2d 1180

243 Conn. 311

Orville COLEY v. CAMDEN ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.

No. 15738.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 30, 1997.

Decided Nov. 25, 1997.

Michelle D. Truglia, Assistant Attorney General, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, William J. McCullough, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant (defendant second injury fund).

William C. Brown, Vernon, for appellee (defendant Eastern Casualty Insurance Company).

Albert B. Harper, Hartford, filed a brief for appellee (plaintiff).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant second injury fund (fund) from a decision of the workers' compensation review board (board) that Public Acts 1995, No. 95-277, § 9(f) (P.A. 95-277, § 9[f] ), now codified at General Statutes § 31-301(f), ¹ applies prospectively only. The board determined that the fund, rather than the claimant's employer or the employer's insurer, was liable for the payment of workers' compensation benefits to the claimant during the pendency of a previous appeal. The previous appeal was brought by the claimant's employer and the employer's insurer from a decision of the workers' compensation commissioner for the first district holding them liable for the payment of benefits to the claimant. The sole issue on appeal to this court is whether P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), should be applied retroactively or prospectively only.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On June 29, 1995, the legislature enacted P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), as an amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act. General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. The amendment eliminated the fund's responsibility for the payment of workers' compensation and disability benefits to a claimant during the pendency of an appeal from an award of those benefits ² and shifted this obligation to the claimant's employer or the employer's insurer. The amendment became effective on July 1, 1995.

On June 30, 1995, one day prior to the effective date of P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), the plaintiff, Orville Coley (claimant), was injured in the course of his employment by exposure to toxic chemicals. He thereafter brought a claim for workers' compensation benefits against his employer, the defendant Camden Associates, Inc. (employer), and its insurer, the defendant Eastern Casualty Insurance Company (insurer). ³ The workers' compensation commissioner for the first district rendered a finding and award in favor of the claimant. The claimant's employer and its insurer both appealed from that decision to the board, and that appeal is currently pending. ⁴

Subsequent to the filing of the appeal in the underlying action, the claimant moved for payment of benefits pending appeal pursuant to § 31-301(f). The workers' compensation commissioner for the second district (commissioner) concluded that P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), should be applied prospectively only and ordered the fund to pay the claimant's benefits until the appeal was resolved. The fund appealed from the commissioner's decision to the board, asserting that adoption of P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), precluded a finding of liability on the part of the fund for payment of benefits during the pendency of the appeal. The fund argued that because P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), is procedural, it applies retroactively to all cases not transferred to the fund before its effective date, regardless of the date of the underlying injury. The board, relying on the "date of injury rule," ⁵ rejected the fund's argument and affirmed the decision of the commissioner, concluding that P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), has prospective effect only. The fund appealed from the decision of the board to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). ⁶

On appeal, the fund asserts that the legislature intended P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), to have retroactive effect and that the board improperly concluded that it applies prospectively only. The insurer denies that the legislature intended that P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), have retroactive effect, and contends that the law as it existed on the date of the claimant's injury is controlling. We conclude that the date of injury rule is not applicable, and, furthermore, that the legislature intended P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), to be given retroactive effect. ⁷

Whether to apply a statute retroactively or prospectively depends upon the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. See, e.g., State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 284, 528 A.2d 760 (1987). In order to determine the legislative intent, we utilize well established rules of statutory construction. "Our point of departure is General Statutes § 55-3, which states: 'No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have retrospective effect.' The 'obligations' referred to in the statute are those of substantive law.... Thus, we have uniformly interpreted § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rice v. Vermilyn Brown, Inc., 232 Conn. 780, 786, 657 A.2d 616 (1995). To determine if P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), should be applied retroactively or prospectively, therefore, we must first decide whether the statute is substantive or procedural in nature.

The issue of retroactive application of a workers' compensation statute is generally governed by the date of injury rule, which "functions as a presumption of legislative intent within the workers' compensation context, similar to the general presumption against retroactive application of a statute." Gil v. Courthouse One, 239 Conn. 676, 686, 687 A.2d 146 (1997). A review of the cases addressing the date of injury rule indicates that, in accordance with the general rules regarding retroactivity, the date of injury rule applies only to those cases in which the legislation has affected a substantive right. See, e.g., Civardi v. Norwich, 231 Conn. 287, 293 n. 8, 649 A.2d 523 (1994); Kluttz v. Howard, 228 Conn. 401, 404, 636 A.2d 816 (1994); Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., 169 Conn. 646, 650, 363 A.2d 1085 (1975). "By contrast, procedural statutes generally are applied retroactively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary." Rice v. Vermilyn Brown, Inc., supra, 232 Conn. at 786 n. 12, 657 A.2d 616; see Miano v. Thorne, 218 Conn. 170, 175, 588 A.2d 189 (1991) ("we have presumed that procedural or remedial statutes are intended to apply retroactively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary"); Citizens Against Pollution Northwest, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 217 Conn. 143, 151, 584 A.2d 1183 (1991); Mulrooney v. Wambolt, 215 Conn. 211, 216-17, 575 A.2d 996 (1990) ("[p]rocedural statutes ... ordinarily apply 'retroactively to all actions whether pending or not at the time the statute ... became effective, in the absence of any expressed intent to the contrary' "); Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 467-68, 556 A.2d 145 (1989); Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., supra, 169 Conn. at 650, 363 A.2d 1085 ("[t]he method of appeal from the compensation commissioner ... is not controlled by the statute in effect on the day of the injury"). Thus, if a workers' compensation statute is procedural in nature, the date of injury rule and its presumption against retroactivity are inapplicable. We must determine initially, therefore, whether P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), effects a change in the substantive rights of the parties. We conclude that it does not.

Public Act 95-277, § 9(f), switches the obligation to pay benefits to a claimant during the pendency of an appeal from the fund to an insurer. If eventually it is determined that a claimant is not entitled to the benefits he or she has received, the claimant is obligated to reimburse the insurer, just as the claimant or insurer, depending on the outcome of the appeal, was required to reimburse the fund prior to the amendment of § 31-301(f). The method chosen by the legislature of accelerating payment to a claimant does not affect a substantive right of the insurer because a claimant is statutorily obligated to repay, with interest, all benefits received by the claimant to which it is found the claimant was not entitled. The statutory scheme affects only "the remedy by which the payment of compensation is assured"; Everett v. Ingraham, 150 Conn. 153, 157, 186 A.2d 798 (1962); and is not substantive. See id. Because P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), is procedural in nature, we must presume that it is applied retroactively unless the legislature clearly expressed an intention that it should be given prospective effect only. Miano v. Thorne, supra, 218 Conn. at 175, 588 A.2d 189; see Rice v. Vermilyn Brown, Inc., supra, 232 Conn. at 786 n. 12, 657 A.2d 616. The insurer has not met its burden of rebutting that presumption.

The legislature's lack of a clear expression of an intention that the date of injury rule apply, or that P.A. 95-277, § 9(f), should be applied prospectively, is not the sole source of our determination of the legislature's intent. Other principles of statutory interpretation lead us to conclude that the act has retroactive application. "Statutory construction is a question of law and therefore our review is plenary." Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995). "Our fundamental objective when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law...