Griffin v. U.S., 82-2373
Citation | 703 F.2d 321 |
Decision Date | 01 April 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82-2373,82-2373 |
Parties | Hollis Dale GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
George S. Murray, III, Charles C. Shafer, Jr., A Professional Corp., Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.
Robert G. Ulrich, U.S. Atty., Mark J. Zimmermann, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.
Before HEANEY, McMILLIAN and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
Hollis Griffin sued the United States to recover damages incurred as a result of a back injury he allegedly received while employed by the United States Postal Service. Griffin brought suit pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671 et seq. The district court 1 dismissed on the grounds that Griffin's sole remedy is the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8101 et seq. Griffin v. United States, No. 82-3145-CV-S-2 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 8, 1982) (order). We affirm.
The FECA explicitly provides that it is the exclusive remedy for a federal employee injured on the job. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8116(c). 2 Griffin admits that his injury occurred when he was at work. However, he argues that because the FECA does not compensate employees for back injuries, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8101(19), he should be able to recover under the FTCA. Griffin cites Reep v. United States, 557 F.2d 204 (9th Cir.1977), in support of his argument.
In Reep, the plaintiff, a federal employee working on a military base, was struck by a truck driven by an enlisted serviceman. The accident occurred on the base, some thirty-five minutes before the plaintiff was to report to work. The plaintiff sued under the FTCA, but the district court dismissed on the grounds that the FECA was his sole remedy. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that Id. at 207.
Griffin claims that because there is no question that his back injury is not covered by the FECA, he may sue under the FTCA pursuant to Reep.
Griffin misconstrues the problem Reep addressed. In Reep, and in a number of other cases applying or discussing a similar "exception," the issue was whether the injury had occurred while the employee was on the job. Reep v. United States, 557 F.2d at 207; see Wallace v. United States, 669 F.2d 947 (4th Cir.1982); Hudiburgh v. United States, 626 F.2d 813 (10th Cir.1980); Avasthi v. United States, 608 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.1979). The FECA only applies to a federal employee injured on the job. If the injury occurs when the employee is not on the job, then the FECA is not the exclusive remedy--or even the appropriate remedy. Cf. Wallace v. United States, 669 F.2d at 954 ( ). But if the personal injury did occur on the job--as concededly Griffin's did--then FECA is the exclusive remedy. 5 U.S.C. Secs. 8102(a), 8116(c). That the FECA does not compensate an employee with Griffin's particular injury is a question of scope of coverage, not coverage in and of itself. 3 Avasthi v. United States, 608 F.2d at 1061; Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732, 734 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867, 100 S.Ct. 141, 62 L.Ed.2d 92 (1979). Thus, Reep does not apply.
Because Griffin's injury occurred in the performance of his duties as a federal employee, the FECA is his exclusive remedy. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
1 The Honorable William R. Collinson, United States Senior District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
2 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8116(c) reads as follows:
(c) The liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof under this subchapter or any extension thereof with respect to the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States or the instrumentality to the employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States or the instrumentality because of the injury or death in a direct judicial proceeding, in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under a workmen's compensation statute or under a...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Hightower v. U.S.
...is made by the Secretary of Labor or his designee and his finding is final and not subject to judicial review." Griffin v. United States, 703 F.2d 321, 321-22 (8th Cir.1983). Defendants correctly note that when there is a substantial question of FECA coverage, for example, whether an injury......
-
Johle v. United States
...within thecoverage of FECA, its remedies are exclusive and no other claims can be entertained by the court."); Griffin v. United States, 703 F.2d 321, 322 (8th Cir. 1983)("Because [the] injury occurred in the performance of his duties as a federal employee, FECA is his exclusive remedy."). ......
-
Coffey v. US, CV 95-1091.
...by subchapter I of Chapter 81 of title 5, relating to compensation for work injuries. 39 U.S.C. § 1005(c); see e.g. Griffin v. United States, 703 F.2d 321 (8th Cir.1983) (holding that FECA is the sole remedy for the back injury sustained on the job by a U.S. Postal Service The complaint in ......
-
Pritchett v. Johnson, CIV 05-10135BC.
...is subject, some covered by FECA and some not."); see also Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir.1992); Griffin v. United States, 703 F.2d 321, 322 (8th Cir.1983). Moreover, there is no intentional tort exception to FECA exclusivity. See McDaniel v. United States, 970 F.2d 194, ......