Haynes v. Marshall, C-1-84-1305.
| Decision Date | 09 September 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. C-1-84-1305.,C-1-84-1305. |
| Citation | 704 F. Supp. 788 |
| Parties | Edna M. HAYNES, Individually as Mother of Jimmy J. Haynes, deceased, and as administratrix of the estate of Jimmy J. Haynes, Plaintiff, v. Ronald MARSHALL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Elinor R. Alger, American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Columbus, Ohio, Robert L. Gensler, Novato, Cal., for plaintiff.
Allen P. Adler, Wendy Wonnell, Asst. Attys. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, for defendants.
This matter is before the Court pursuant to plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (doc. no. 105), defendants' Motion to Reconsider (doc. no. 106) and defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. no. 107). In sum, both parties have requested this Court to revisit its Order entered April 3, 1987 (doc. no. 103).
This case is primarily an action seeking redress from the defendants for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent and son, Jimmy J. Haynes. On February 9, 1984, Mr. Haynes was housed in the infirmary at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility ("SOCF"). In the afternoon, he began to act out, doing injury to himself and disrupting the activities of others. Certain of the defendants who were on the scene determined that he needed medication, however, they were not authorized to administer the necessary medication. If the medication had been given to Mr. Haynes, none of the following tragic events would have occurred. Unfortunately, the attempts to obtain authorization to administer the medication were unsuccessful. As a result of this failure, it was determined that it was necessary to move Mr. Haynes to a strip cell for his safety. He violently resisted the move and force was used. There is evidence, if believed, that while Mr. Haynes was shackled and on the floor he was beaten with clubs about the body and head, taken to the strip cell, fatally injured and left there unattended to die. Brown, Ginn, Harrison, Warren, Gilley, Turner, McAllister, Holbrook, Schramm, Bowman, Heatherly, Aldrich, Keaton, Kelly, Shaw, Green, Apel and Stephenson were present during the incident.
The federal issues in this case are concerned with whether any of these defendants wantonly inflicted unnecessary pain and suffering upon Mr. Haynes and whether any defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. There is an issue of fact as to whether these defendants were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Haynes' serious medical needs. Defendants have not requested summary judgment on this issue. Rather, defendants have requested partial summary judgment only on the issue of excessive force.
This is a trial court. Its paramount function is to justly settle disputes. The primary tools it has to accomplish this purpose are hearings, trials and making a complete record. As this case must go to trial against all defendants except Horn on the federal issue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Court was firmly convinced that all real issues concerning these parties should be presented for trial as federal issues.
Defendants dispute that plaintiff can prove that Mr. Haynes was beaten to death, but they argue that even if plaintiff does prove that defendants beat Haynes to death, such actions did not violate any objective test for a clearly established statutory or constitutional right since no standard exists to measure the reasonableness of the amount of force or adequacy of training for correction officers. Defendants refer us to Thomas v. Kline, Case No. C84-2414-A (N.D.Ohio, April 13, 1987), (copy of opinion attached to doc. no. 107), to support their argument.
Significantly, the Thomas case went to trial on the merits of the issue of excessive use of force. The allegations in that case were that the defendant pushed plaintiff's face into the handle area of a steel mesh door causing a knot on his forehead, a cut lip and facial bruises. Later, these injuries allegedly caused vision problems and severe headaches. If those allegations were sufficient to cause a trial in the Thomas case, certainly the allegations made by this plaintiff justify a trial on the issue of excessive use of force.
The Thomas court stated that plaintiff's version that he was subjected to unnecessary force was substantiated by others who witnessed the event. Certainly the alleged facts before this Court cry out for trial. If the facts favoring plaintiff's position are not credible, as it was determined in Thomas, then plaintiff fails to establish her case; but plaintiff fails only after having her day in court on the issue of excessive use of force.
The Court accepts defendants' position that the eighth amendment is the primary source of protection to plaintiff. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). Beating a prisoner to near death and leaving him to die violates the eighth amendment; the Court holds that this is an objective standard that is established in the law. See, Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir.1986); see also, Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom., John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973). Additionally, defendants were prohibited from using deadly force by Ohio Administrative Code 5120-9-01E effective December 10, 1979 which states:
"The superintendent, administrator or staff member of a correctional institution is authorized to use force other than deadly force when and to the extent he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to enforce the lawful rules and regulations of the institution and to control violent behavior." (Emphasis added).
While defendants have a full opportunity to defend on the basis that they acted reasonably, they are not entitled to immunity from suit on the excessive use of force issue. (See doc. no. 24).
On the other hand, as pointed out by defendants in their present motion, defendants are entitled to immunity from suit on plaintiff's federal claim for deprivation of familial association. Whether a right exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this regard is an issue of first impression and it is clear that an issue of first impression cannot involve a question of clearly established law, see, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139, reh. den. 468 U.S. 1226, 105 S.Ct. 26, 82 L.Ed.2d 919 (1984), or a question of clearly established right, see, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
Significantly, defendants' motions are only for partial summary judgment, thus a trial will be required in this case regardless of this Court's ruling on this present matter. This Court is firmly convinced that as a general rule, federal claims, not pendent state claims, should be tried in federal courts. To achieve justice in this case, however, it is necessary not only to consider plaintiff's federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but it is also necessary to consider her claim for her personal loss and damages, if any, resulting from the alleged wrongful death of her son.
This Court believed that by recognizing her federal claim for deprivation of familial association, it could address all real issues concerning these parties in one trial under federal law. Defendants have correctly insisted otherwise. To do justice in this case, this Court must now address plaintiff's wrongful death claim under state law in this forum so that all of the real issues may be addressed by this Court in one trial.
Further, in light of the long delay in this case, and considering that plaintiff states she is not proceeding against the defendants on her wrongful death claim on the basis of negligence but rather on the basis of an intentional, deliberate and callous act, this Court will not be required to charge the jury on the issue of simple negligence on the wrongful death issue; therefore, the degree of culpability in both the § 1983 claim and the wrongful death claim will be basically the same and there will be little, if any, confusion created in the minds of the jury on the type of conduct required to establish either of plaintiff's claims.
For this reason and for the reasons presented by plaintiff in her memoranda (doc. nos. 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 117 and 118), this Court has reconsidered the dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful death claim and finds that under the particular circumstances of this case, justice compels the Court to exercise its discretion to accept pendent jurisdiction of this claim. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
It is the intent of this Court to try to a jury plaintiff's first and third causes of action and defendants' counterclaims in one trial so that all of the real claims of the parties will be resolved.
In plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider, she specifically requests that this Court address its ruling on the issue of negligence (doc. no. 68), the issues involving defendant John Horn (doc. nos. 70 and 87), its ruling as to the state law claims (doc. no. 74), and its position concerning supervisory liability.
As to the issue of negligence, this Court modifies its Order so that summary judgment is granted only on the issue of negligence. It is this Court's opinion that the term "gross negligence" must be defined as wantonness before a tort gives rise to a constitutional violation.
In a quixotic effort to emphasize that wantonness, not negligence, is the cornerstone on which the constitutional violation rests, the Court confused the record. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.1988). Plaintiff has properly alleged and presented facts which support the necessary concept of wantonness, thus, summary judgment was denied defendants on this issue. Admittedly, the term "gross negligence" is considered sufficient to trigger a constitutional violation in this Circuit. Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1987). It is the belief of this Court, however,...
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Haynes v. Marshall, 88-3969
...that order, he refused to accept pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state-based claim, a position he reversed upon reconsideration. 704 F.Supp. 788. II. Defendants ask us to reverse the district court's denial of their motions for summary judgment seeking immunity from plaintiff's sect......