Beagen v. State
| Citation | 705 A.2d 173 |
| Decision Date | 13 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-615-C,96-615-C |
| Parties | Andrew BEAGEN v. STATE. A. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Judith Crowell, Providence, Andrew Beagen, for Plaintiff.
Andrea J. Mendes, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Defendant.
Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURICER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.
This case came before the Supreme Court on December 1, 1997, pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not be summarily decided. The applicant, Andrew Beagen (Beagen or applicant) appealed from a Superior Court order denying his application for postconviction relief pursuant to G.L.1956 chapter 9.1 of title 10. After hearing the arguments of counsel for the parties and reviewing their memoranda, this Court concludes that cause has not been shown, and the case will be decided at this time.
In December of 1989, applicant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by the Rhode Island State Police narcotics unit. Cocaine was found in the car, and Beagen was charged with possession of one ounce to one kilogram of a controlled substance. The applicant was able to negotiate a plea agreement with the state, according to which he pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of possession of less than one ounce of cocaine with the intent to deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Beagen received a four-year suspended sentence with supervised probation.
On December 12, 1994, while still on probation, applicant was arrested for conspiracy and intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). After conviction of the offense in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Beagen was advised that under federal sentencing guidelines, he was subject to a mandatory sentence of twenty years' incarceration because he had been on probation at the time of his arrest. The federal district court judge granted applicant leave to seek postconviction relief of his 1991 conviction in the state court prior to his federal sentencing. Beagen was advised that if he were able to reduce his term of probation nunc pro tunc or to withdraw his plea, he would no longer be subject to the enhanced sentence mandated by the federal statute. Beagen's application for postconviction relief was heard and denied in the Superior Court on July 2, 1996, and this appeal followed.
The signal issue at a hearing for postconviction relief is whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea. State v. Dufresne, 436 A.2d 720, 722 (R.I.1981). In his application for relief, Beagen asserted that he had not entered his 1991 plea knowingly and voluntarily because he had been inadequately advised about the consequences of his plea. His primary issue on appeal is that relief should have been granted because neither the court nor his counsel had advised him that his plea of nolo contendere could subject him to enhanced jail penalties under federal sentencing guidelines if he were to be convicted of a federal crime while on probation.
As our past cases have made clear, "[a] defendant need only be made aware of the direct consequences of his plea for it to be valid." State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 499 (R.I.1994) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760 (1970)). A consequence is deemed collateral, rather than direct, if its imposition "is controlled by an agency which operates beyond the direct authority of the trial judge." Figueroa, 639 A.2d at 499 (quoting Sanchez v. United States, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir.1977) (per curiam)). It is axiomatic that the federal criminal justice system is outside the authority or control of a Superior Court justice, or any other agent of the State of Rhode Island. The possibility that applicant could face a stiffer sentence in the federal courts in the future was a collateral consequence of his nolo plea. His alleged ignorance of this possibility at the time he pleaded nolo contendere in no way rendered his plea invalid inasmuch as the trial justice's admonition at the time of applicant's plea adequately...
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