Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.

Decision Date28 January 2013
Docket NumberNo. 11–60654.,11–60654.
Citation705 F.3d 531
PartiesJohn L. BROWN, Plaintiff–Appellant v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Rogen K. Chhabra, Esq., Chhabra & Gibbs, P.A., Precious Tyrone Martin, Sr., Esq., Precious Martin, Sr. & Associates, P.L.L.C., Jackson, MS, Jonathan Peeples Barrett, Pat M. Barrett, Jr., Don Barrett, P.A., Lexington, MS, for PlaintiffAppellant.

George Howard Ritter, Esq., Jeremy Luke Birdsall, Esq., Wise Carter Child & Caraway, P.A., Jackson, MS, for DefendantAppellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

In May 2008, an Amtrak passenger train struck the appellant, John Brown, as he drove his garbage truck across railroad tracks owned and maintained by Illinois Central Railroad Company (Illinois Central). Brown sued, claiming that Illinois Central failed to signalize the crossing properly. The district court awarded summary judgment to Illinois Central. We affirm.

I.

On an afternoon, John Brown was driving his Mack garbage truck south along County Line Road on his usual route in Copiah County, Mississippi. Robert Purnell, Brown's assistant, was riding on the rear of the truck. Not far behind Brown, a southbound Amtrak passenger train cruised down tracks parallel to County Line Road, tracks that Illinois Central then owned and maintained.

As he had for years, Brown turned right onto Hartley Lane, bearing west toward the railroad tracks about 56 feet ahead. An advance warning sign stood 22 feet from the tracks, followed by a “railroad crossbuck” sign 15 feet from the tracks. About nine seconds after Brown turned onto Hartley Lane, the southbound Amtrak train struck his truck broadside, throwing Brown and Purnell from the truck and tearing it to pieces. Both men sustained serious injuries, the Amtrak train derailed, and a number of passengers suffered minor injury.

Amtrak engineer Mervill Cheatwood and foreman Mark Burris were operating the train at the time of the accident. Both men testified that they saw Brown turn off of County Line Road ahead of them, and that the view between the train and the truck was unobstructed as the truck turned onto Hartley Lane and until impact.1 Both men also testified that Brown never stopped before he entered the crossing. As soon as Cheatwood realized a collision was inevitable, he applied the train's emergency brake. The train's event data recorder indicates that Cheatwood triggered the brake some 232 to 239 feet from impact. It is undisputed that the Amtrak train was within the federally mandated speed limit at the time of the collision.2

George Lewis saw the crash while driving south down County Line Road. Lewis testified that he watched Brown turn onto Hartley Lane ahead of him. Lewis also testified that he heard the Amtrak train blow its horn as it emerged from a tree line well before the Hartley Lane crossing, and that Brown turned onto Hartley Lane and drove onto the tracks without ever stopping.

An accident reconstruction team engaged by Illinois Central prepared photographs that attempt to reproduce Brown's view to the north after he turned onto Hartley Lane. The images show that a motorist approaching the crossing has a clear view of oncoming southbound trains and suggest that Brown should have been able to see the approaching Amtrak train at least 43 feet before he reached the tracks.3 Illinois Central's accident reconstruction expert testified that when Brown was 62 feet from impact, his sight distance along the tracks was 1200 feet, and that by the time Brown reached the advance warning sign 22 feet from the tracks, his line of sight increased to more than 2600 feet. Brown's liability expert confirmed that at a point on Hartley Lane 25 feet to the east of the crossing, visibility to the north exceeds 2000 feet. Moreover, Brown's accident reconstruction expert testified that the Amtrak train was about 1145 feet from the crossing nine seconds before impact (when Brown began his turn onto Hartley Lane), and that Brown should have been able to see the oncoming train from the advance warning sign.

Nine local residents testified that visibility at the Hartley Lane crossing was adequate to negotiate the tracks safely. Brown himself testified that he had regularly traversed the crossing for years, admitting that “you can see a long way” up the tracks. When Illinois Central's attorney asked Brown why he had not requested his assistant, Purnell, to flag the crossing for him, Brown appeared incredulous:

Q: If you've got a helper with you, such as Mr. Purnell ... and you need his assistance directing you, flagging you to back up, go forward, or whatever, do you ask him and use him for that?

A: Yes, sir, I would.

* * *

Q: If you felt like you needed his assistance flagging across the railroad tracks, would you ask him?

A: No sir. Because to go across railroad tracks forward, why would I—why would I ask him to flag me?

* * *

Q: Did you—you're saying you did not need his assistance for going forward across the tracks, correct?

A: No, sir. In the couple years I've been down there, I haven't had—haven't needed anybody to go forward to go across the railroad tracks.

Q: Because you can see?

A: Yes, sir.

Brown and Purnell sued Amtrak and Illinois Central in the Southern District of Mississippi, invoking diversity. Before the district court, Brown and Purnell claimed that (1) Amtrak breached its statutory duty to blow the train's horn continuously within 900 feet of the crossing,4 and (2) Illinois Central breached its common law duty to make an extrahazardous railroad crossing reasonably safe by installing active signaling devices. In support of their signalization claim against Illinois Central, Brown and Purnell sought to admit testimony from Dr. Gary Long, who intended to testify that the Hartley Lane crossing was extrahazardous and needed active signals.

Amtrak and Illinois Central moved for summary judgment. Illinois Central also moved to exclude Dr. Long's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The district judge granted both of Illinois Central's motions but denied Amtrak's motion for summary judgment.5 Brown's horn claim against Amtrak proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict in Amtrak's favor. Brown has accepted the jury verdict and appeals only his signalization claim against Illinois Central. Purnell does not appeal.

II.

Brown claims that the district court erred by excluding Dr. Long's testimony under Rule 702, complaining that the district court made “no assessment whatsoever ... in regards to Expert Long's qualifications to testify that the crossing was extrahazardous.”

We review a trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion.6 “A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” 7 As read by Daubert,Rule 702 requires trial courts to ensure that proffered expert testimony is “not only relevant, but reliable.” 8 To determine whether proffered testimony is reliable, the trial court must make “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is ... valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” 9 Ultimately, the trial court must also find an “adequate fit between the data and the opinion proffered.” 10

Dr. Long's preliminary report to the district court concluded that the Hartley Lane crossing is “extraordinarily hazardous or ultrahazardous” and “needs active warning devices.” First, Long observed, the crossing is “extremely narrow, only about 16'–7? wide.” Second, the 115–degree angle of the intersection is “dangerous[ly] skewed.” Third, “the crossing surface [is] not smooth” because of “loose gravel or ballast” scattered on the pavement. Fourth, the roadway leading up to the crossing is on a “steep incline [ ],” rising over 2.5 feet in elevation [w]ithin the short space of 55 feet.” Finally, Long suggested, the crossing fails to satisfy the sight-distance guidelines promulgated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (“USDOT”). However, during cross-examination at the subsequent Daubert hearing, Long admitted that visibility from the advance warning and crossbuck signs exceeded the value specified in the guidelines. When counsel for Illinois Central asked Long “why ... anybody in this courtroom [should] think that [his] testimony about [the] extra-hazardous nature of the crossing and sight distance and all is reliable,” Long responded that “it's based on obviously education and experience.”

The district court granted Illinois Central's Daubert motion, concluding that Long had failed to articulate a credible methodology to sustain his conclusions.11 We agree. To establish reliability under Daubert, an expert bears the burden of furnishing “some objective, independent validation of [his] methodology.” 12 “The expert's assurances that he has utilized generally accepted [principles] is insufficient.” 13 In this case, Long professed to base his findings on the standards and customs of the transportation engineering profession. To that end, his preliminary report mentioned a variety of public and private guidelines and publications on roadway design and traffic control devices. 14 However, the report failed to explain how any of these authorities support Long's conclusions relating to the “narrow” pavement, “skewed” angle, “rough” surface, and “steep” incline of the Hartley Lane crossing.15 Indeed, the USDOT's sight-distance guidelines suggest that visibility at the Hartley Lane crossing was more than adequate.16 Apparently recognizing the lack of objective support for his findings, Long emphasized his own “educationand experience,” urging that [c]ontrary to some thinking, standards related to safety do...

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