United States v. Dysart, 81-2251.
| Decision Date | 11 April 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-2251.,81-2251. |
| Citation | 705 F.2d 1247 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Douglas Jackson DYSART, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Mary G. Allen, Allen, Foreman & Mueller, Denver, Colo., for defendant-appellant.
Richard J. Smith, Asst. U.S. Atty., Albuquerque, N.M. (William L. Lutz, U.S. Atty., Albuquerque, N.M., was on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, and HOLLOWAY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-appellant Douglas Dysart appeals from his conviction for threatening to take the life of the President of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871. Dysart was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The only contested factual issue at trial was Dysart's sanity at the time of the offense, or as his counsel stresses, "all mens rea issues" pertaining to defendant's conduct.
For reversal, Dysart argues that (1) the testimony of a Government witness was improperly admitted (a) since the trial court permitted the witness, a doctor of osteopathy, to state his opinion on the defendant's competency without first ruling on his qualification to testify as an expert, (b) since the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a doctor of osteopathy to testify as an expert in psychiatry, and (c) since the witness was allowed to testify as to statements made by Dysart during the course of examination of him as to competency to stand trial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244; (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that § 871 requires proof that Dysart intended his threat to be taken as a threat and by refusing to instruct the jury that evidence as to insanity might be considered in determining whether Dysart was capable of forming the requisite specific intent, and (3) that the court erred by admitting testimony concerning alleged prior threats against the President by the defendant.
Viewing all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Government as we must on this appeal from a guilty verdict, United States v. Twilligear, 460 F.2d 79, 81-82 (10th Cir.), the evidence tended to show the following facts.
On May 4, 1981, Lou Culbraith, an employee of the United States Postal Service in the White House, opened an envelope addressed to the White House (Pl.Ex. 1)1 which contained the following handwritten message (Pl.Ex. 2):
Dysart stipulated to the authorship and mailing of the letter as well as a second handwritten letter received in the White House mail room two days later which read as follows (Pl.Ex. 3):
The letters were turned over to the Secret Service and Dysart was arrested in May 1981. Immediately after his arrest Dysart signed a statement indicating that on April 9, 1981, he wrote a letter to President Reagan threatening him with assassination and another letter on April 14, 1981, apologizing for the first letter.2
On the Government's motion, the district court ordered that Dysart be examined by a qualified psychiatrist pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4244 in order to determine "whether the defendant was insane or otherwise so mentally incapacitated as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or to properly assist in his own defense...." (I R. 5). Dr. James R. Leach, Chief of Forensic Psychiatry at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, found that Dysart was mentally competent to stand trial. Defense counsel then moved for another evaluation pursuant to § 4244 claiming, inter alia, that fairness required that Dysart "be examined by independent, disinterested experts." (I R. 9). The trial court granted the motion, ordered that Dysart be examined by Dr. Henry W. Blake, a qualified psychiatrist, and Dr. Blake also found Dysart competent to assist in his own defense. (I R. 12).3
Subsequently the court conducted a competency hearing in September 1981. The only witness testifying at the hearing was Dr. Leach. Vigorous objections were made to his qualifications to testify as an expert.4 The objections were overruled, the court allowed Dr. Leach to testify as an expert, and the trial court found defendant Dysart competent to stand trial. (II R. 22). This finding and the procedure leading to it are not challenged on appeal, although strenuous arguments are made on the issue of competency at the time of the offense, which will be treated later.
Before trial defendant Dysart notified the Government and the court of his intention to assert the defense of insanity or lack of mental capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. See Rule 12.2(a), F.R.Crim.P. The Government responded by a motion pursuant to Rule 12.2(c) that Dysart "be examined by a psychiatrist for purposes of determining his mental condition at the time of the alleged offense charged ...." (I R. 19). The trial court then ordered that Dysart be examined by Dr. Thomas C. Thompson in order to determine Dysart's mental state at the time of the offense. (I R. 21). Dr. Thompson's findings were favorable to the defendant and he testified at trial for Dysart. Dr. Thompson testified that Dysart had a long chaotic history of inability to function, characterized by an underlying thought disorder, described as basically a chronic schizophrenic, paranoid in nature. He said that at the writing of the April 9, 1981, letter Dysart did not have the capacity to understand and appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and did not have the capacity to form the specific intent to convey a threat to the President. (II R. 128, 136-37).
In addition, there was testimony by a licensed practical nurse who served as the county medical officer for Dona Ana County, James West. West testified that Dysart had been committed some eleven times during the past twelve years to the Las Vegas medical hospital. He described several episodes of bizarre conduct while Dysart was in the jail in January 1981 and while in jail in connection with the instant charge, including inter alia, removing his clothes, exhibiting himself to jailers and matrons, relieving himself into the main hallway, throwing lighted paper at people, smearing food on himself and his cell, and smearing feces in the cell. (II R. 116-18).
Dr. Leach also testified at trial for the Government and the content of his testimony was substantially similar to that during the competency hearing. After he detailed his education and qualifications, defense counsel again objected to his qualifications, stating (II R. 82):
And the trial court responded (id.):
"Fine, he may go ahead."
Dr. Leach testified that he and the Springfield staff examined Dysart starting on May 14, 1981. He diagnosed Dysart as an alcoholic. However Dr. Leach said that he did not see any evidence of Dysart's having a paranoid schizophrenic personality disorder. He concluded that on April 9 (the date of the first letter to President Reagan), Dysart was mentally capable of knowing what he was doing, was mentally capable of knowing it was wrong, and was mentally capable of controlling his conduct. (II R. 92, 94, 104).
Further evidence will be detailed as necessary in discussing Dysart's appellate contentions.
Dysart contends that the admission of the testimony of Dr. Leach constituted reversible error due to the trial court's failure to determine whether the witness was qualified to testify as an expert before admitting his testimony on the issue of Dysart's sanity at the time the letters were written, citing Rules 104(a) and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Brief of Appellant at 11-12).
We cannot agree. Rule 104(a) provides that "preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness ... shall be determined by the court." The court's responsibility to determine these preliminary questions of qualification to testify is greatly reduced by Rule 601 which, with exceptions inapplicable to the present case, makes all witnesses competent.5 "The judge, however, does retain his power to decide preliminary questions with regard to the qualification of expert witnesses under Rule 702." 1 Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 10403.6 Neither Rule 702 nor any other rule or precedent, however, sets forth a specific method by which the trial judge must determine the qualification of an expert. The court's statement that the witness might "go ahead," after hearing the objection to his qualifications, in no way violated any procedural rule.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Dysart's contention that the trial court did not make...
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...competency of witnesses, the court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privilege. United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1983). “The qualifications of an individual to testify as an expert witness are within the power of the trial judge to decide pr......
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...competency of witnesses, the court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privilege. United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1983). “The qualiications of an individual to testify as an expert witness are within the power of the trial judge to decide pre......
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Trial Proceedings and Motions
...competency of witnesses, the court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privilege. United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1983). “The qualifications of an individual to testify as an expert witness are within the power of the trial judge to decide pr......
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Trial proceedings and motions
...competency of witnesses, the court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privilege. United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1983). “The qualiications of an individual to testify as an expert witness are within the power of the trial judge to decide pre......