Schanzenbach v. Town of La Barge

• Decision Date: 07 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–8014.,12–8014.
• Citation: 706 F.3d 1277
• Parties: Roger SCHANZENBACH, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. TOWN OF LA BARGE, Wyoming, a Wyoming municipal corporation; Diane Sakai; Vicky Jacobson; Jennifer Decker; Larry Stepp; Lereta Walton, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

706 F.3d 1277

Roger SCHANZENBACH, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.TOWN OF LA BARGE, Wyoming, a Wyoming municipal corporation; Diane Sakai; Vicky Jacobson; Jennifer Decker; Larry Stepp; Lereta Walton, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–8014.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Feb. 7, 2013.

Eric P. Lee (Kathleen E. McDonald and Stephen C. Clark, pro hac vice, on the briefs), Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough PC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Richard Rideout, Law Offices of Richard Rideout, PC, Cheyenne, WY, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Roger Schanzenbach sought to install mobile manufactured homes on two properties he owned in the town of LaBarge, Wyoming. The town council initially granted him a building permit for one property but revoked it about two weeks later and then enacted an ordinance that included a provision banning the installation of any manufactured home older than 10 years at the time of the relevant permit application (the 10–Year Rule). Both of Schanzenbach's manufactured homes were more than 10 years old. The town council denied Schanzenbach's later applications for a building permit, a variance, and a conditional-use permit to enable him to install the homes despite the 10–Year Rule.

Schanzenbach brought an action against LaBarge and its town council in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. He asserted a variety of constitutional claims as well as a claim that the 10–Year Rule was preempted by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (the Manufactured Housing Act). The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants. Schanzenbach's appeal raises arguments regarding the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, procedural due process, preemption, municipal authority to enact the 10–Year Rule, and attorney fees. We hold that the takings claim is unripe, the due-process claim fails because Schanzenbach did not have a protected property interest, the 10–Year Rule was not preempted, the town had authority to enact the rule, and the attorney-fee issue is moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Schanzenbach owned two properties in LaBarge referred to as the Groves Addition lot and the Piper's Way lot. In June 2006 he bought a mobile manufactured home to place on the Groves Addition lot and a similar home to place on the Piper's Way lot. Both homes were more than 10 years old. On November 14, 2006, Schanzenbach, through his agent, filed an application with LaBarge for a building permit to install one of the homes on the Groves Addition lot. The application form stated that the permit “may be suspended or revoked if issued in error or on the basis of incorrect information supplied by the applicant.” Aplt.App. at 43. The LaBarge town council approved the building permit at its regular meeting the next day.

Less than two weeks later, the town council held a special meeting. The attendees noted that Schanzenbach was attempting to install a manufactured home in an area zoned R–2 and that his proposed use required him to obtain a conditional-use permit rather than the normal building permit that he had been issued. The day after the meeting, in a letter dated November 28, 2006, Defendant Diane Sakai, in her capacity as mayor, sent Schanzenbach's agent a letter advising him that the building permit for the Groves Addition lot had been revoked. Sakai's letter explained the decision as follows:

LaBarge town council met in quorum last night, Monday, November 27, 2006, regarding planning and zoning issues. During that meeting, we discussed your building permit for the Schazenbach [sic] property Lot 10, Block 3, Groves addition. It was brought to our attention that this would be the only singlewide trailer in that block. In consideration of that fact, we have decided to revoke your permit.

As this subdivision has been purchased by the town, and the design from the start has been to protect property values of current home owners. With that, it has been decided not to allow this singlewide trailer to become a part of that subdivision. As you know, mobile homes are not a permitted use in R–2 zoning. To allow this use would require a conditional use permit, which we believe is not in the best interest of the surrounding property owners.

Id. at 69. Neither Schanzenbach nor his agent was given notice before the town's revocation of the building permit. Schanzenbach admits that in the two-week period between issuance of the building permit and its revocation he made no expenditures with respect to the Groves Addition lot.

Also during the Fall of 2006, the town council enacted Ordinance 2006–16. The ordinance was passed and approved on first reading on October 18, on second reading on November 27, and on third and final reading on December 13. The ordinance contains the 10–Year Rule, which requires buildings brought into LaBarge to be no more than 10 years old at the time of the permit application. The Rule provides:

Any building moved into the town to be placed on any lot or space, to be used with or without a permanent foundation, shall be no more than ten (10) years of age at the time of application. Construction or manufactured date of the building must be ten (10) years or less from the time of application for placement in the town. Proof of construction or manufactured date must be provided at time of application.

Id. at 71. The ordinance took effect on December 23, 2006.

Following the enactment of Ordinance 2006–16, Schanzenbach applied for a building permit to install one of his manufactured homes on the Piper's Way lot. His application was denied. Schanzenbach says that the 10–Year Rule was the reason for this denial. He also filed applications for a variance and a conditional-use permit to install a manufactured home on the Groves Addition lot, both of which were denied as well.

In March 2011 Schanzenbach filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, naming as defendants the Town of LaBarge, Mayor Sakai, and four other members of the town council (collectively, Defendants). He is suing the individual Defendants only in their official capacities. Schanzenbach's complaint claims (1) that the revocation of his building permit without compensation was an unconstitutional taking; (2) that by adopting Ordinance 2006–16 the town violated his constitutional rights under the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause; (3) that the ordinance was preempted by the Manufactured Housing Act, see42 U.S.C. §§ 5401–5426; and (4) that the town had intentionally interfered with his economic relations with the prospective renters of the manufactured homes. He sought damages, attorney fees, and declaratory and injunctive relief.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, and Schanzenbach filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court held that Schanzenbach could not prevail on his takings or due-process claims because under Wyoming law he had acquired no vested property interest in the building permit. It further held that Ordinance 2006–16 did not place an excessive burden on interstate commerce and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause because it did not discriminate against nonresidents and had been applied evenhandedly. As for Schanzenbach's claim that Ordinance 2006–16 was preempted by the Manufactured Housing Act, the court held that the 10–Year Rule was not preempted because the record contained no evidence that the rule related to anything other than “the aesthetic quality of the community and preservation of surrounding property values, which have nothing to do with safety or construction.” Aplt.App. at 14 (footnote omitted). Finally, the court ruled that the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, seeWyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1–39–101 to –121 (2012), had not waived the town's immunity from state-law tort claims for interference with economic relations.

Schanzenbach raises four arguments on appeal: (1) that the district court erred in holding that he had no vested property right in the building permit, making summary judgment on his takings and due-process claims inappropriate; (2) that the court erred in holding that the Manufactured Housing Act does not preempt the 10–Year Rule; (3) that the town lacked authority under state law to enact the 10–Year Rule; and (4) that the court erred in awarding attorney fees.

II. DISCUSSIONA. Takings

Schanzenbach argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his takings claim. The court held that the claim could not succeed as a matter of law because Schanzenbach had failed to establish that he had a protected property interest in the building permit for the Groves Addition lot before the town council revoked it in November 2006. We do not address the takings claim on the merits, however, because it is not ripe.

The doctrine of ripeness “prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Morgan v. McCotter, 365 F.3d 882, 890 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). It “asks whether the challenged harm has been sufficiently realized at the time of trial.” Id. Although similar to standing, ripeness “focuses not on whether the plaintiff was in fact harmed, but rather [on] whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ripeness “is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993). “Accordingly, [it] can be raised at any time, even by the court sua sponte for the first time on appeal.” Utah v. U.S....