Fitzgerald v. Santoro

• Decision Date: 07 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1487.,12–1487.
• Citation: 707 F.3d 725
• Parties: Karen FITZGERALD, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Officer M. SANTORO, Officer B. Cram, Paramedic D. Ashcroft, and Unknown Officers and Paramedics of the Village of Schaumburg, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

707 F.3d 725

Karen FITZGERALD, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Officer M. SANTORO, Officer B. Cram, Paramedic D. Ashcroft, and Unknown Officers and Paramedics of the Village of Schaumburg, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–1487.

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 19, 2012.

Decided Feb. 7, 2013.

Richard R. Mottweiler, Mark F. Smolens (argued), Attorneys, Inverness, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Michael D. Bersani (argued), Charles E. Hervas, Attorneys, Hervas, Condon & Bersani, Itasca, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before BAUER, KANNE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

On February 5, 2010, Karen Fitzgerald had a few drinks to help her unwind from a stressful day, mistakenly phoned a local police dispatch line, and, due to what the officer interpreted as suicidal statements, was eventually taken to a local hospital against her will. The events of the evening left her with a severely broken wrist that required multiple surgeries to repair. She brought this lawsuit against various police officers and paramedics who were with her that night, in an attempt to recoup some measure of damages for what she feels were their unconstitutionally unreasonable actions. The district court concluded otherwise and granted summary judgment to the judgment to the defendants. Because we find that the defendants were indeed entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.

I. Background

February 5, 2010 was an exhausting day for Karen Fitzgerald, and it came in the midst of what seems to have been a troublesome period for her in general. She had not eaten since the previous day and had not slept in three days. (R. at 121.) Then, on top of it all, Fitzgerald's telephone and internet service went out. AT & T was called, and a repairman dispatched. In a display of customer service that seems admirable in hindsight, but was no doubt tiresome at the time, the repairman stayed in Fitzgerald's condominium until after midnight to resolve the problem. After the repairman finally left, Fitzgerald tried to relax by drinking some wine. Feeling “down,” (Appellant's Br. at 4), and “very aggravated by a number of things,” (R. at 120), Fitzgerald attempted to call a help line at the Northwest Community Hospital that “allows you to speak to somebody for 45 minutes,” (R. at 120.)

Rather than calling the help line, however, Fitzgerald called the non-emergency number for the Palatine, Illinois Police Department. And, instead of reaching somebody “to talk about [the] silly things that [were] aggravating” her, (R. at 120–21), Fitzgerald found herself talking to the Palatine P.D.'s late-night desk officer. She proceeded to talk to the desk officer anyway. Though Fitzgerald denied suicidal thought or intention, the desk officer contacted the Schaumburg Police Department (in whose jurisdiction Fitzgerald lived) and described a “very depressed,” possibly suicidal, intoxicated female caller. (Dispatch Radio Transmission audio recording.) Officers Bruce Cram and Marc Santoro, and Paramedics David Ashcroft and Tom Blair,¹ were swiftly dispatched to Fitzgerald's condominium. During the dispatch, the Palatine officer—who was still on the phone with Fitzgerald—stayed on the line with Schaumburg as well. The Schaumburg dispatcher informed the officers that Fitzgerald had recently miscarried and that Fitzgerald had made suicidal statements to the Palatine desk officer. As the officers approached the building, Fitzgerald abruptly hung up on the Palatine desk officer. This information was quickly relayed to the officers.

The specifics of the officers' entry are disputed, but, at this stage of the proceedings, we must presume that Fitzgerald's description of a warrantless, forced entry is accurate. Sutherland v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 632 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir.2011). Upon entering the apartment, the officers and paramedics encountered a Fitzgerald they described as unsteady on her feet and slurring her words. Seeing a used wine glass nearby, they concluded that Fitzgerald was intoxicated.² Over the course of the next thirty minutes, the officers and paramedics spoke with Fitzgerald on her couch. She denied wanting to harm herself, but admitted to being upset and told them that she had been taking anti-depressants. At some point during this discussion, Officer Santoro left the condo to call the dispatcher back and confirm what Fitzgerald had said to the Palatine desk officer. The dispatcher confirmed that Fitzgerald had made suicidal statements. At this point, the officers and paramedics decided that Fitzgerald was a potential harm to herself. They, along with Fitzgerald, unsuccessfully attempted to contact several of Fitzgerald's friends who could have stayed with her. The decision was then made to take Fitzgerald to the hospital.

Fitzgerald resisted this decision and made it clear to the officers that she would not go to the hospital voluntarily. As the officers tried to take her to the gurney, she “scream[ed] at the top of [her] lungs” and physically resisted. (R. at 131.) Fitzgerald described being grabbed “forcefully” by three people and dragged from her home while she tried to pull away from them and “free [her]self.” (R. at 130.) Officer Cram used a technique called an “arm bar” and Officer Santoro used a “wrist lock” in attempts to de-escalate the situation and move Fitzgerald to the gurney.³ Eventually, the officers and paramedics lifted Fitzgerald onto the stretcher; once there, they handcuffed her right hand to the stretcher. Fitzgerald complained that the cuff was too tight, and Officer Santoro loosened it. They then wheeled her to the ambulance.

Inside the ambulance, Fitzgerald's resistance continued. She attempted to wrest her hand out of the handcuff and to get out of the safety straps. She apparently had some measure of success. Officer Cram attempted to secure her again by using a wrist lock on her right wrist. Fitzgerald also remembers another hand grabbing her right arm further up. At that point, Fitzgerald used her left hand to attempt to free her right arm from Officer Cram's hold. ⁴ What followed has been variously described by the individuals in the ambulance as a “snapping sound,” (R. at 250) or “two crunches,” (R. at 141), coming from Fitzgerald's right wrist. Her active resistence ceased, and Fitzgerald was given ice for her wrist. Once at the hospital, Fitzgerald was diagnosed with fractures of both her right radius and ulna. Multiple surgeries, as well as various rods and pins, were required to repair the injury.

Fitzgerald presented three potential wrongs to the district court for which she argued she deserved to be compensated: (1) the defendants' warrantless entry into her apartment; (2) her unreasonable seizure at the defendants' hands; and (3) the defendants' use of excessive force in effectuating that seizure. This third claim can be separated further into the force used in her building and the force used in the ambulance. Fitzgerald couched her claims under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and Fitzgerald timely filed this appeal. We address her claims in order below.

II. Analysis

“We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences and viewing all facts in favor of the non-moving party.” Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.2012). “However, our favor toward the nonmoving party does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture.” Harper v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir.2012) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Thus, to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must establish some genuine issue for trial “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict” in her favor. Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir.2011) ( quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

A. Warrantless Entry

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “It is axiomatic that the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, generally speaking, warrantless searches and seizures “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); accord United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir.2008). One of these “well-delineated exceptions” is the existence of exigent circumstances; “warrantless entry by criminal law enforcement officials may be legal when there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978); United States v. Fiasche, 520 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir.2008). Reasonable fear for the safety of a person inside a premises is one such exigent circumstance. United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Arch, 7 F.3d 1300, 1303 (7th Cir.1993). The watchword in the preceding sentence is “reasonable.” “A police officer's subjective belief that exigent circumstances exist is insufficient to justify a warrantless search[;] ... [i]nstead[,] ... this Court conducts an objective review ... [and] we ask whether a reasonable...