Donatelli v. National Hockey League, Civ. A. No. 88-0594 L.

• Decision Date: 13 March 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 88-0594 L.
• Citation: 708 F. Supp. 31
• Parties: John Clark DONATELLI v. NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, and Pocklington Amalgamated Sports Corp. d/b/a Edmonton Oilers.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

708 F. Supp. 31

John Clark DONATELLI v. NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, and Pocklington Amalgamated Sports Corp. d/b/a Edmonton Oilers.

Civ. A. No. 88-0594 L.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

March 13, 1989.

John B. Harwood, McKinnon & Harwood, Pawtucket, R.I., Martin W. Aisenberg, Providence, R.I., for plaintiff.

Christopher Little and John Voorhees, Tillinghast Collins & Graham, Providence, R.I., Herbert Dym, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAGUEUX, District Judge.

The present dispute arose out of contract negotiations between a Rhode Island hockey player, John Clark Donatelli, ("Donatelli"), and a Canadian professional hockey team, the Edmonton Oilers Hockey Corp. ("Edmonton"). After initial, unsatisfactory negotiation attempts with Edmonton, Donatelli sought to be declared a free agent by the National Hockey League ("NHL"). The NHL ruled that Donatelli was still the property of Edmonton and was not free to negotiate with any other NHL teams. Subsequently, an arbitrator reached the same conclusion and Donatelli filed the instant suit against Edmonton and the NHL.

This matter is presently before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction over the NHL and Edmonton. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Opposing the motion, Donatelli contends that both the NHL and Edmonton have the necessary minimum contacts with Rhode Island to subject them to this forum's jurisdiction. Further, Donatelli argues that the NHL, as an unincorporated association, is subject to the general jurisdiction of every court having general in personam jurisdiction over a member of the league. Donatelli maintains that this Court has jurisdiction over several NHL teams and, through them, over the NHL itself.

The issues thus presented for resolution in this opinion are: (1) has Edmonton established the necessary contacts with Rhode Island to subject it to this Court's general in personam jurisdiction; (2) has the NHL, viewed as an entity, established the necessary contacts with Rhode Island to subject it to this Court's general in personam jurisdiction; and (3) is an unincorporated association subject to the general in personam jurisdiction of every court having general in personam jurisdiction over one of its members.

BACKGROUND

The background facts in this dispute, as described in Donatelli's complaint, are as follows. John Clark Donatelli is an ice hockey player. In 1984 the New York Rangers ("Rangers") chose Donatelli in the annual NHL player draft. At that time, Donatelli chose to remain at Boston University where he played collegiate hockey during the 1984-85, 1985-86, and 1987-88 seasons. Then Donatelli opted to forego his senior year of college hockey to play on the 1988 United States Olympic Hockey Team.

Pursuant to NHL rules, the Rangers organization carried Donatelli on its reserve list as an unsigned draft choice. On or about October 24, 1986, the Rangers organization traded its rights in Donatelli to Edmonton which also carried him as an unsigned draft choice.

On or about July 15, 1987, Donatelli, through counsel, sent a letter to Edmonton advising that he was "interested in playing professional hockey once the 1988 Olympic hockey schedule was finished." Section 16B.5(b) of the NHL by-laws apparently provides that an unsigned draft choice "may at any time by notice in writing delivered to the claiming club, with copy to the NHL Central Registry, declare his desire to be tendered a standard Player's Contract with that club." Donatelli's counsel neglected to send a copy of his letter to the Central Registry.

On or about August 3, 1987, Donatelli sent a contract proposal to Edmonton. However, Donatelli's counsel again neglected to send a copy of his missive to the Central Registry. Finally, in early October of 1987, Edmonton sent Donatelli a letter acknowledging the July 15 communication and requesting a contract proposal. In response, on or about November 9, 1987, Donatelli sent Edmonton a copy of his August 3 proposal, but again did not send a copy to the Central Registry. Edmonton failed to respond.

On or about January 11, 1988, Donatelli's counsel sent a letter to the NHL Central Registry, enclosing copies of his correspondence with Edmonton, in which he asserted that Donatelli was a free agent. Donatelli's counsel relied on section 16B.5(b) of the NHL by-laws which (it is alleged) provides that if "the claiming club fails to tender to the claimed player a contract within thirty days of filing of the notice by the claimed player in the Central Registry," then the claimed player becomes a free agent if he is over twenty years old. Donatelli relied on a similar case involving another hockey player-turned free agent, who also failed to satisfy the notification requirements of the by-laws, to excuse his failure to deliver copies of his contract solicitations to the Central Registry.

The NHL and Edmonton failed to declare Donatelli a free agent. Instead, on or about January 20, 1988, Edmonton sent Donatelli a contract proposal. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the NHL and the NHL Players' Association, Donatelli sought arbitration of his dispute before the league's president. The president, in a decision issued September 15, 1988, denied Donatelli's bid to be released from Edmonton's reserve list. The president ruled that Donatelli's counsel's failure to transmit copies of his 1987 letters to the Central Registry meant that the 30 day response period did not begin to run until counsel's first notification of the Central Registry in January of 1988. Since Edmonton responded within thirty days of that notification, Donatelli was still their property.

In response, Donatelli filed a five-count complaint in Rhode Island Superior Court on October 5, 1988 against the NHL and Edmonton's predecessor corporation, Pocklington Amalgamated Sports Corp. Counts I and II are contract claims alleging bad faith contractual breaches by the NHL. Count III is a tort claim against the NHL and Edmonton alleging tortious interference with prospective business relations. Count IV is a state antitrust claim against the NHL and Edmonton alleging that they, in combination with each other and other NHL clubs, have engaged in an illegal group boycott or concerted refusal to deal in violation of Rhode Island General Laws § 6-36-4. Finally, Count V is a motion to vacate the arbitration award. Donatelli seeks injunctive relief and money damages, including treble damages and attorney fees, in his complaint.

On October 12, 1988, defendants filed a petition for removal to federal court. Then, on October 18, 1988, defendants filed the instant Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Donatelli filed an opposition to this motion. Thereafter, the parties engaged in limited, jurisdictional discovery concerning the contacts that Edmonton and the NHL have with Rhode Island.

On December 1, 1988, the parties engaged in oral argument before this Court. During that argument, the Court raised the possibility that the NHL, as an unincorporated association, might be subject to this forum's general in personam jurisdiction if one or more of its members were subject to general in personam jurisdiction here. Both parties agreed that little authority exists on this point; however, the NHL claimed that the answer is "no". To the contrary, Donatelli alleged that NHL member teams, the Boston Bruins ("Bruins") and perhaps the Hartford Whalers ("Whalers"), are subject to this forum's general in personam jurisdiction, and that, therefore, this Court automatically has general personal jurisdiction over the NHL.

The Court took this matter under advisement and invited the parties to submit additional memoranda on the issue of personal jurisdiction over an unincorporated association. In their supplemental memorandum, defendants did not challenge the claim that the Bruins and Whalers are subject to this Court's general personal jurisdiction, but instead treated the issue as irrelevant. They claim that jurisdiction over members of an unincorporated association does not create jurisdiction over the association itself. Instead, defendants contend that only the contacts of the NHL itself, as distinct from those of its member clubs, should be considered in jurisdictional determinations.

The matter is now in order for decision.

DISCUSSION

The burden of proving in personam jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff. Since this suit does not arise out of defendants' contacts with Rhode Island, personal jurisdiction, if it exists at all, must be general rather than specific. Though allowed to conduct jurisdictional discovery, Donatelli has failed to show that Edmonton has the necessary level of minimum contacts with this forum to subject it to this Court's jurisdiction. In fact, Donatelli has not demonstrated that Edmonton has any Rhode Island contacts. Moreover, the contacts of the NHL itself, in contradistinction to those of its member teams, are not sufficient to give this Court general personal jurisdiction over it. However, this Court holds that an unincorporated association is subject to the personal jurisdiction of every forum having general in personam jurisdiction over one or more of its members. Since Donatelli has alleged and the NHL has not contested the proposition that the Bruins corporation has established the necessary minimum level of contacts with Rhode Island to subject it to this Court's general in personam jurisdiction, and therefore the allegation must be accepted as true for purposes of this motion, this Court has general personal jurisdiction over the NHL through the Bruins. Therefore, the motion to dismiss must be granted as to Edmonton, but denied as to the NHL.

In the past, this Court has frequently addressed the issue of when it has personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Wood v. Angel, 707 F.Supp. 81 (D.R.I. 1989); ...