Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 11 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–3486.,12–3486.
• Citation: 709 F.3d 595
• Parties: Norman RUDISILL and Karen Rudisill, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

709 F.3d 595

Norman RUDISILL and Karen Rudisill, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–3486.

United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 23, 2013.

Decided and Filed: March 11, 2013.

ARGUED:Christopher Holecek, Wegman, Hessler & Vanderburg, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Paul D. Hudson, Miller Canfield Paddock and Stone, PLC, Kalamazoo, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Christopher Holecek, Angela M. Lavin, Wegman, Hessler & Vanderburg, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Kip T. Bollin, Elizabeth B. Wright, Barbara A. Lum, Thompson Hine LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: CLAY, GILMAN, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

After receiving workers' compensation benefits for serious injuries sustained while working at Ford Motor Company's Cleveland Casting Plant (the Plant) in Brook Park, Ohio, Norman Rudisill sued Ford for committing an intentional tort against him. His wife, Karen Rudisill, asserted a derivative claim of loss of consortium in the same complaint. The district court granted summary judgment for Ford, holding that Rudisill had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ford deliberately intended to injure him. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The incident

The facts surrounding Rudisill's employment at Ford and the incident that gave rise to this action are not in dispute. Rudisill began working for Ford in 1994 as a general laborer. He rose through the ranks to become a Team Leader by the time of the events at issue in this case. The position of Team Leader is, according to Rudisill, “one step below management.” As a Team Leader, Rudisill was responsible for ensuring the continued operation of Mold Line 2 at the Plant.

Mold Line 2 is one of three mold lines where engine blocks are cast in molten metal. The mold-line process is described in detail by the district court as follows:

The mold line process employs a system of hooks, pulleys and rails suspended over an open pit. Along the rail system runs a chain of flat iron carts called “cartops.” On top of each cartop sits a heavy iron crate-like fixture called a “drag flask.”

The cartops and drag flasks cycle around the mold line together. At the beginning of the mold line, the drag flask is filled with compacted sand that is pressed in the shape of an engine block. This forms the bottom half of the mold for the engine block. An “engine core,” which contains the internal components of the engine block, is placed onto the molded sand and is covered by a “cope flask.” The cope flask is the top half of the mold for the engine block. Through an automated process, molten iron is poured into the mold (i.e. between the drag flask and cope flask). The molten iron surrounds the engine core and hardens into the engine block. Once the engine block is formed, it is removed at a section of the mold line called the “hooking station.” A chain hooked to an overhead conveyor system is attached to the engine block and lifts it off the drag flask, carrying the engine block away from the mold line. The drag flask remains on the cartop and circles back to the beginning of the mold line to be used to make another engine block.

Occasionally, iron runs out of the drag flask on to the cartop. This over-pour of molten steel is referred to as a “hot-head.” At one of the final stops along the mold line, an employee known as the “rake-off man” uses a long metal pole to remove hot-heads and sand from the top of the drag flask, scraping them into a conveyor system running in the subfloor five feet below the mold line. The conveyor system collects the semi-molten hot-heads and hot sand into a “shaker pan.” The shaker pan system carries these materials to another part of the plant for disposal. This final process of separating the engine block from the drag flask, raking hot sand and semi-molten hot-heads off the drag flask into the shaker pan system, preparing the drag flask for another round of molding, occurs at the “pick-off station.” The pick-off station is where the rake-off man works. This is the location where Mr. Rudisill's accident occurred.

Sometimes, during the process of pouring the molten metal into the mold, some molten metal spills out (a “run-out”) and cools onto the rim of the drag flask before it reaches the rake-off station. These run-outs must be removed from the drag flask before it can be used again for another engine mold. To make this repair, the mold line is shut down and the drag flask is pulled off the line by an overhead crane and hoist. Mr. Rudisill testified that this is a routine process which he [had] performed hundreds of times.

In order to remove the drag flask from the mold line, employees first have to remove two sections of removable wall (“guard rails”) from the outer edge of the mold line. This exposes the pit containing the sub-floor conveyor system and shaker pan with semi-molten materials being carried away for disposal. At the time of Mr. Rudisill's accident, the guard rails constituted the only barrier between the employees at the pick-off station and the open pit beneath the mold line. This pit measures 28 inches by 68 inches with a depth of 59 inches.

Once the guard rails are removed, a hoist is attached to the drag flask to lift it off the cartop. To do this, employees stand near the edge of the pit and secure the hoist clamps to the drag flask. The clamp that is attached to the far side of the drag flask has to be slung over the drag flask and then pulled taut to catch on the lip of the drag flask. Once the hoist is attached, the drag flask is moved to the Plant floor where it is picked up by a forklift and taken to a different area for repair. The guard rails are then replaced and production resumes.

On February 2, 2007, Rudisill was informed that a drag flask had to be taken off the mold line for run-out removal. He was assisted in accomplishing this task by Willie Daniel, a drag-flask repairman, and Scott O'Neill, another employee. After they moved the drag flask over the pit and had it suspended above the floor, Rudisill began hitting the flask with a sledgehammer to dislodge the cooled run-out. As Rudisill hit the drag flask, sand started slipping out. The flask then tipped due to the imbalance, which caused one of the clamps to slip off and hit Rudisill in the face. Rudisill was knocked back against a wall, fell to the floor, and rolled forward through the floor opening into the hot pit below. He lay there unconscious, being burned by the hot-heads in the shaker pan.

Seeing the trouble that Rudisill was in, coworker Ernest McClanahan jumped down to the rescue. McClanahan, assisted by Ford emergency personnel, eventually managed to get Rudisill out of the pit. Rudisill had gained consciousness by this time and was screaming in pain.

As a result of the incident, Rudisill sustained a head injury that required several staples to close. He was also burned on both arms, both legs, the abdomen, and the left hand. Rudisill continues to experience pain, dizzy spells, ringing in the ears, and memory problems. He has had numerous surgeries to treat his injuries, and has undergone physical and occupational therapy.

After conducting a safety review immediately following the incident, Ford decided to modify the flask-removal process. Now, when preparing for flask removal, Ford employees slide metal grates over the pit before removing the guard rails. These grates are added to ensure that any person who might otherwise fall through the floor opening would instead fall onto the grates.

B. This action

Rudisill and his wife filed a complaint against Ford in Ohio state court in September 2008. The complaint alleges an intentional tort under both Ohio Revised Code § 2745.01 and common law on behalf of Rudisill, as well as a derivative claim of loss of consortium on behalf of his wife. Ford removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The case was subsequently stayed pending the Ohio Supreme Court's determination of whether § 2745.01 is in conflict with the Ohio Constitution, and was reopened when that court upheld the statute. Ford then filed a motion for summary judgment, which Rudisill opposed. In March 2012, the district court granted Ford's motion for summary judgment.

The district court began its analysis by examining the structure of Ohio Revised Code § 2745.01. Under the statute, an employee may recover for workplace torts only upon a showing that the employer acted with the deliberate intent to injure. Ohio Rev.Code § 2745.01(A)–(B). Removing equipment safety guards creates a presumption of intent to injure, but the employer may rebut the presumption by showing that it did not in fact intend to injure the employee. Id. § 2745.01(C).

The district court's analysis proceeded in two steps. First, the court held that, assuming a presumption of intent to injure arose from the guard rails' removal, Ford had successfully rebutted that presumption by introducing evidence showing the lack of an intent to injure Rudisill. The court then held that, in the absence of the presumption, Rudisill had not submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to Ford's intent to injure. Finding no genuine dispute of material fact, the court granted summary judgment for Ford on the intentional-tort claim and dismissed the loss-of-consortium claim as derivative.

On appeal, Rudisill attacks both steps of the district court's analysis. He first contends that the question of whether Ford successfully rebutted the intent-to-injure presumption should have gone to the jury. Second, he argues that, even without the presumption, there was sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Ford committed an intentional tort.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

We review de...