United States v. Uribe

Citation709 F.3d 646
Decision Date13 February 2013
Docket NumberNo. 11–3590.,11–3590.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Jesus URIBE, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

William L. McCoskey (argued), Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Michael J. Donahoe (argued), Attorney, Indiana Federal Community Defenders, Inc., Indianapolis, IN, for DefendantAppellee.

Before WOOD, WILLIAMS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Early one morning, Jesus Uribe was driving along Interstate 70 in Indiana. Apparently, he was not speeding or driving too slowly, weaving recklessly across lanes, crossing the dividing line, or giving any indication that he was intoxicated. Nor is there evidence that Uribe's vehicle, a blue Nissan Altima with Utah plates, was in violation of any of Indiana's numerous vehicle requirements—no malfunctioning brake lights, improperly tinted window, visibly altered muffler, or expired license plate. Only one aspect of Uribe's travel was interesting: the blue Nissan he was driving had a registration number that traced back to a white Nissan. Although this color discrepancy alone is not unlawful either in Indiana, where Uribe was driving, or in Utah, where the car was registered, the deputy following Uribe's car initiated a traffic stop “to check for registration compliance.” That stop led to a search of the vehicle, nearly a pound of heroin, and a federal indictment.

Uribe filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained following the stop, contending that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment because the deputy had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain him. Although the government offered no evidence to support its objection to the motion, it argued that there was reasonable suspicion that the car was stolen and that its driver was violating Indiana law by operating a vehicle displaying a different car's registration number. The district court granted Uribe's motion, finding the government's explanations insufficient to establish that at the time of the stop the deputy had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Uribe was engaged in criminal activity.

In this interlocutory appeal, we must determine whether one lawful act in isolation—driving a car of one color with a registration number attached to a car of a different color—gives rise to reasonable suspicion that a driver is engaged in criminal activity. Because on this record, investigatory stops based on color discrepancies alone are insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Shortly after two o'clock in the morning on July 14, 2010, Deputy Dwight Simmons of the Putnam County (Indiana) Sheriff's Department was working traffic enforcement and driving behind a blue Nissan Altima traveling eastbound on Interstate 70. When Deputy Simmons performed a Bureau of Motor Vehicles registration inquiry on the car's Utah license plate number, he received information for a white 2002 Nissan. In his narrative arrest report, Deputy Simmons stated that he initiatedan enforcement stop of the vehicle “to check for registration compliance.” That report did not include any other description of the vehicle, and it did not mention the driver's pre-stop behavior.1

After Deputy Simmons pulled the car over, he observed that the driver, Jesus Uribe, appeared nervous. Eventually, another officer arrived with a canine, which gave a positive alert. Uribe gave Deputy Simmons permission to search the vehicle, and the officer with Deputy Simmons found two packages containing nearly a pound of heroin. Uribe was indicted for possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(i).

Uribe moved to suppress the heroin, arguing that Deputy Simmons did not have reasonable suspicion to perform the traffic stop based on the color of the car alone. He also argued that no Indiana or Utah law requires car owners to amend their vehicle registration information to reflect a change in car color. So, according to Uribe, there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. Uribe did not challenge the execution of the search or the validity of his consent to it.

The government did not request an evidentiary hearing or submit an affidavit to put Deputy Simmons's additional observations, suspicions, and experience in the record. (Uribe attached Deputy Simmons's post-arrest narrative to the motion to suppress.) Nonetheless, the government responded to Uribe's arguments by contending that Deputy Simmons's twelve years of experience taught him that stolen cars are often repainted to evade detection. The government also argued that because Indiana prohibits operating a vehicle with a registration number belonging to any other vehicle, Deputy Simmons could have reasonably suspected that Uribe was committing a registration violation.

The district court granted Uribe's motion to suppress, finding that the record did not support Deputy Simmons's alleged knowledge that stolen cars are painted different colors. The court also concluded that the Indiana traffic code provision the government cited only applied to vehicles registered to Indiana residents. The district court denied the government's motion for reconsideration and its belated request for an evidentiary hearing, deciding that the government was not entitled to a second chance after failing to meet its burden on the motion to suppress. This interlocutory appeal under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3731 followed.

II. ANALYSIS

When reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress, we consider questions of law de novo, the district court's determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause de novo, and questions of fact for clear error. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 589, 591–92 (7th Cir.2000).

An investigatory stop complies with the Fourth Amendment if the brief detention is based on reasonable suspicion that the detained individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); United States v. Grogg, 534 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir.2008). An officer initiating an investigatory stop must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts” that suggest criminality so that he is not basing his actions on a mere hunch. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868;see also United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 532 (7th Cir.1997) ([I]n reviewing a reasonable suspicion determination, we require law enforcement authorities to articulate the specific characteristics exhibited by the person or object to be detained which aroused the authorities' suspicion in the particular case before us....”). We evaluate reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time the stop is made. United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir.2008). However, [t]he officer's subjective motivations for stopping and detaining a suspect are not relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.” United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir.2011). The government bears the burden of establishing reasonable suspicion by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411, 418 (7th Cir.1985).

Deputy Simmons's post-arrest narrative seems to identify only one fact that led him to conduct the investigatory stop: a discrepancy between the observed color of the car Uribe was driving and the color indicated on the car's registration. Both parties acknowledge that the color discrepancy itself was lawful, because neither Indiana nor Utah requires a driver to update his vehicle registration when he changes the color of his car.

In addition to the color discrepancy, the government argues that the timing of the stop—just after two o'clock in the morning—raises the level of suspicion.2 The government did not present any evidence of Deputy Simmons's experience and expertise or of any officer's belief that the context of the stop made its timing suspicious.

From the record, we conclude that the timing of the stop in this context does not raise suspicion. Uribe's vehicle 3 was not, for example, exiting a scene following gunfire via the only available street, nor was Uribe acting suspiciously in an area known for criminal activity. See United States v. Brewer, 561 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir.2009) (finding the timing of a stop suspicious because it “reinforced the suspicion [that the vehicle was connected to reported gunfire] since few people are on the road at 2:30 a.m. and ... there was no other traffic” leaving the apartment complex immediately after the gunfire); see also United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257–58 (10th Cir.2011) (finding reasonable suspicion based on an early-morning detention in an area known for criminal activity, information from an armed private security officer and a police dispatcher that the defendants were suspected of having a weapon in their vehicle, and a report from the security guard about the defendants' suspicious behavior prior to the detention); United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir.1993) (finding reasonable suspicion when officers observed the defendant appearing to engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction in a known drug area at 1:00 a.m.). Rather, Uribe was in an out-of-state vehicle traveling on an interstate highway in Indiana at two o'clock in the morning—apparently without committing any traffic infractions. So, while we consider timing a part of the history of the detention decision, it does not raise the level of suspicion attached to the color discrepancy.

Uribe's motion to suppress presents an issue of first impression in this circuit and, apparently, in the federal courts: whether a discrepancy between the observed color of a car and the color listed on its registration alone is sufficient...

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