Schneyder v. Smith, Civil Action No. 06-4986.

• Citation: 709 F.Supp.2d 368
• Decision Date: 26 April 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 06-4986.
• Parties: Nicole SCHNEYDER, Plaintiff,v.Gina SMITH, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff,v.Laura Davis, Esquire, and the Defender Association of Philadelphia, Third-Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

709 F.Supp.2d 368

Nicole SCHNEYDER, Plaintiff,
v.
Gina SMITH, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
Laura Davis, Esquire, and the Defender Association of Philadelphia, Third-Party Defendants.

Civil Action No. 06-4986.

United States District Court,
E.D. Pennsylvania.

April 26, 2010.

709 F.Supp.2d 369

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

709 F.Supp.2d 370

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

709 F.Supp.2d 371

Daniel Silverman, Law Offices Daniel Silverman & Assoc., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Sarah V. Hart, Jennifer Marie Albright, Pamela E. Cole, Peter Carr, District Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff.

Joseph Goldberg, Michael B. Pullano, Weber Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Third-Party Defendants. MEMORANDUMDuBOIS, District Judge.

709 F.Supp.2d 372

I. Introduction

This case arises out of the detention of plaintiff Nicole Schneyder as a material witness in a Pennsylvania homicide prosecution, Commonwealth v. Michael Overby (CP No. 9501-0580 2/3). In the Complaint, plaintiff asserts a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Gina Smith, Esq., who was the prosecutor in the Overby homicide case. Specifically, plaintiff alleges in a two-count Complaint that she was detained as a material witness without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Count One), and that her detention deprived her of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Two).

Presently before the Court is defendant Smith's Second Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). For the reasons set forth below, defendant's Motion is denied.

II. Factual Background

The relevant facts of this case are stated in detail in the Court's Memorandum and Order of January 9, 2007, Schneyder v. Smith, No. 06-CV-4986, 2007 WL 119955, at *1-*2 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 9, 2007), and in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's Precedential Opinion of August 4, 2008, Schneyder v. Smith, 538 F.3d 202, 205-08 (3d Cir.2008).¹ Accordingly, this Memorandum sets forth only the factual and procedural background necessary to resolve the Motion presently before the Court. Unless noted otherwise, the facts are undisputed.

Plaintiff “was a reluctant but essential witness in three attempts by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to convict Michael Overby of first-degree murder.” Id. at 205. During the first two trials against Overby, plaintiff did not appear, leading the court to declare her unavailable and admit her sworn statement into evidence. Id. Defendant Smith, Philadelphia Assistant District Attorney, who was assigned to prosecute Overby for the third time, ²

709 F.Supp.2d 373

secured a material witness warrant for plaintiff's arrest on January 26, 2005, which was signed by Judge Rayford Means of the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County Schneyder, 2007 WL 119955, at *1. Before the hearing on the material witness petition on January 27, 2005, Judge Means met with defendant and public defender Laura Davis, who was representing plaintiff for the purposes of the hearing, in his robing room. (Mot. 5, ¶ 11.) Among other things, Judge Means instructed defendant to inform him if the case was continued, and would not commence as planned on February 2, 2005. ³ ( Id.) At the hearing, Judge Means found plaintiff to be a “flight risk” and set bail for her at $300,000. (Bail Hr'g Tr., Jan. 27, 2005, Ex. 1 to Mot. 19:5-8, 21:8.) Plaintiff did not post bail and was detained. Schneyder, 538 F.3d at 205; Schneyder, 2007 WL 119955, at *1.

At the bail hearing, Judge Means articulated his dislike for “setting bail on people who are not accused of a crime.” (Bail Hr'g Tr. 21:12-13.) In open court, he told plaintiff, “[i]f the case breaks down, let me know early and I'll let you out.” He continued,

I only intend to keep you on this bail until you testify or the trial is concluded. If you did have it on February 2nd and the Commonwealth says, we don't need you anymore, we're done with you, okay, then I will want them to come back to me and say, look, we don't have any need for her. If they make a decision at some point on January 31st, we changed our mind, we don't even need this lady, come back to me so I can bring her down and remove this.

( Id. 22:1-11.) Finally, Judge Means set a status date of February 14, 2005-two days after the trial was to be concluded-for the parties “to come down and see me” in case the trial was still ongoing. ( Id. 21:4-7).

On February 2, 2005, the Overby trial was continued until May 25, 2005. Schneyder, 2007 WL 119955, at *1. However, defendant never informed Judge Means that the trial was continued,⁴ and plaintiff was not released. Id. Plaintiff alleges that “[b]etween February 2, 2005 ... and March 21, when Judge Means finally released plaintiff, [her] mother and sister telephoned the defendant approximately 25 times ... inquiring why plaintiff was still in jail and wondering when she would be released, explaining that plaintiff's father was gravely ill, and asking the defendant to call them back to discuss these matters.” (Pl.'s Resp. 32; see Decl. of Mary-Anne Schneyder, Ex. 21 to Pl.'s Resp.; Decl. of Tamyra Schneyder, Ex. 22 to Pl.'s Resp.)

Upon the death of plaintiff's father on February 28, 2005, plaintiff's sister hired attorney Paul Conway, who obtained a court order allowing plaintiff to attend, for only a few minutes, her father's funeral. Schneyder, 2007 WL 119955, at *2; Schneyder, 538 F.3d at 206. Thereafter, Conway learned that Judge Means had instructed defendant to notify him of the Overby continuance. Schneyder, 2007 WL 119955, at *2; Schneyder, 538 F.3d at 206. Conway subsequently informed Judge Means of the continuance.

709 F.Supp.2d 374

Schneyder, 2007 WL 119955, at *2; Schneyder, 538 F.3d at 206. Judge Means immediately ordered plaintiff's release, and plaintiff was released on March 21, 2005, “54 days after she was first detained and 48 days after the Overby case was continued.” Schneyder, 2007 WL 119955, at *2; Schneyder, 538 F.3d at 206.
III. Procedural History

On November 13, 2006, plaintiff filed a three-count Complaint against defendants Smith and the Office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia (“ODA”). In Count One, plaintiff alleged against both defendants detention without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-37.) Count One also alleged that the ODA was liable for its failure to supervise defendant Smith and monitor plaintiff's status as a detained witness. ( Id. ¶ 34.) In Counts Two and Three, plaintiff alleged pendent state law claims of false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress against both defendants. ( Id. ¶¶ 38-41.)

On December 12, 2006, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). By Memorandum and Order of January 9, 2007, this Court: (1) granted defendants' motion with regard to plaintiff's § 1983 claim against defendant Smith on the ground the defendant Smith was entitled to absolute immunity; ⁵ (2) denied defendants' motion with regard to plaintiff's § 1983 claim against defendant ODA; and (3) granted defendants' motion with regard to plaintiff's state law claims against both defendants on the ground that defendant Smith was absolutely immune from liability for state law claims and that defendant ODA was immune as a municipal agency under § 8451 of the Tort Claims Act. Schneyder, 2007 WL 119955, at *2-*7.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider Decision Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to Individual Defendant Gina Smith on January 12, 2007, which the Court denied by Order dated January 23, 2007. Schneyder v. Smith, No. 06-CV-4986 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 23, 2007). Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Withdraw Claim Against Office of District Attorney, seeking to withdraw her remaining § 1983 claim against the ODA in order to appeal the Court's decision on the Motion to Dismiss. The Court granted plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Withdraw and dismissed plaintiff's claims against ODA with prejudice. Schneyder v. Smith, No. 06-CV-4986 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 9, 2007).

Plaintiff appealed this Court's Memorandum and Order of January 9, 2007, on the issue whether defendant Smith was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for her failure to report the Overby continuance to Judge Means. Schneyder, 538 F.3d at 205. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity did not extend to defendant Smith's omission because her obligation to report to Judge Means was

709 F.Supp.2d 375

an administrative, non-discretionary task. Id. at 217.

On October 21, 2008, when the case was before this Court on remand, defendant filed a third-party complaint against Laura Davis, the Assistant Public Defender appointed by Judge Means to represent plaintiff as a material witness in the Overby case, and the Defender Association of Philadelphia (“Defender Association”). (Third-Party Compl. ¶¶ 28-37.)

On December 9, 2008, Defendant Smith sought leave to file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity before completion of discovery. By Order dated December 9, 2008, the Court granted that request and directed that the motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity be filed on or before December 17, 2008. Schneyder v. Smith, No. 06-CV-4986 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 9, 2008). In that Order, the Court also provided plaintiff an opportunity to request depositions or other discovery before responding to the motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(2). Id. ¶ 2.

On December 17, 2008, defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Judgment on the Pleadings. In responding to this Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff stated that she required...