St. Mary's Hospital v. Scanlon, 9848.

• Citation: 71 F.2d 739
• Decision Date: 12 June 1934
• Docket Number: No. 9848.,9848.
• Parties: ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL v. SCANLON.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

71 F.2d 739 (1934)

ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL v. SCANLON.

No. 9848.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

June 12, 1934.

Paul J. McGough and Nathan A. Cobb, both of Minneapolis, Minn. (Cobb, Hoke, Benson, Krause & Faegre and S. S. Larson, all of Minneapolis, Minn., on the brief), for appellant.

T. Frank Quinn and Anson B. Jackson, Jr., both of St. Paul, Minn. (Thomas H. McMeekin, of Minneapolis, Minn., and McMeekin & Quinn and Barrows, Stewart, Jackson & Junkin, all of St. Paul, Minn., on the brief), for appellee.

Before GARDNER, WOODROUGH, and VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judges.

GARDNER, Circuit Judge.

This is a personal injury action in which appellee as plaintiff below recovered judgment for $6,500 on account of injuries sustained by her in falling from a second story window of a room in the maids' home maintained as an adjunct of appellant's hospital.

We shall refer to the parties as they appeared in the lower court.

The negligence relied upon is (1) that defendant negligently discharged plaintiff as a patient from its hospital when she was sick and in a condition requiring care; and (2) that it negligently caused her to remain in room No. 3 in the maids' home maintained by defendant, with unguarded windows, when it knew, or should have known, that she had a propensity to walk in her sleep.

At the close of all the testimony defendant moved for a directed verdict, which motion was denied, and the case was sent to the jury on instructions to which defendant took numerous exceptions.

On this appeal it is in substance urged (1) that the court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict; and (2) that the court erred in its instructions and in denying instructions requested by defendant. There are other alleged errors, but in our view of the issues the substantial questions presented are embodied in the foregoing contentions.

The denial of the motion for a directed verdict presents to this court the question as to whether or not there was any substantial evidence to sustain the alleged acts of negligence. We shall first consider the charge that the defendant negligently discharged plaintiff as a patient from its hospital.

Plaintiff had been employed by the defendant not as a nurse, but as one of its maids, from January 26, 1932, to April 8, 1932. On one occasion during that period she had been a patient at the hospital for a few days because of a lysol burn, but had been discharged and resumed her duties. The only materiality of this incident is that during her stay at the hospital on this occasion, on February 9, 1932, she was observed walking in her sleep. She was put back to bed by an attending nurse, and told the nurse that she often walked in her sleep. Thereafter, however, she slept all night during the remaining nights she was in the hospital, without doing any sleep walking.

On being discharged, she returned to room No. 3 in the maids' home, where she continued to live for two months, during which time she continued in the employ of the defendant as a maid. Later, being ill, she went privately to Dr. H. B. Sweetser, Jr., who treated her as a private patient. During his treatment of plaintiff, and on April 9, 1932, he requested plaintiff to enter the hospital for the purpose of enabling him better to diagnose her ailment, but she did not enter for treatment. The defendant did not know until plaintiff entered the hospital that she was being treated by Dr. Sweetser, and she had asked him not to notify defendant that she had consulted him. For purpose of diagnosis, she was subjected to an exploratory spinal operation, which involved the puncture of the spinal column and the taking of a sample of fluid therefrom. This operation was performed with the assistance of other surgeons.

At noon, on April 11, 1932, she was discharged by her physician, after being examined not only by Dr. Sweetser, but by a specialist in neurology. These doctors diagnosed her ailment as progressive encephalitis. In discharging her, Dr. Sweetser noted on the hospital records that her physical condition when she was discharged was the same as when she entered the hospital. During the time she was in the hospital for diagnosis and observation, her sleep was normal, she did no sleep walking, and the doctors felt that, although she was ill, she did not need to remain in a hospital; that she was able to go to bed, get up, and generally take care of herself from day to day. The specialist, Dr. Hamilton, testified that:

"Her condition, while not absolutely, was almost certainly, permanent. * * * It would not respond to hospital care. There was nothing in particular that anybody could do for her. The girl was more or less disabled and I believe somebody had to take care of her but I do not think she needed hospital care as such."

Dr. Sweetser had no financial interest in the hospital, and he was neither an employee nor an agent of the defendant; in fact, the court instructed the jury that the defendant could not be held liable for any acts or omissions of Dr. Sweetser. He was not in charge of the hospital, but by arrangement took his patients there for such hospital care as they might require during his treatment of them. While plaintiff was in the defendant's hospital as Dr. Sweetser's patient, it was not treating her either directly nor through Dr. Sweetser. The duty of determining when plaintiff should be discharged from the hospital was that of her physician and not of the defendant. The hospital may have owed her a duty in relation to the administrative conduct of the hospital while she was a patient, but no such negligence is charged nor claimed. We conclude, therefore, that there was no substantial evidence sustaining the first charge of negligence.

There was submitted to the jury the following interrogatories:

Interrogatory No. 1: "Was defendant negligent in releasing the plaintiff as a patient on April 11, 1932?"

Interrogatory No. 2: "Did the injuries that plaintiff sustained on April 12, 1932, proximately result from such negligence?"

Both these interrogatories were answered in the affirmative.

There is no substantial evidence to sustain the finding that the defendant was negligent in releasing plaintiff as a patient. This might not be fatal to the judgment were it not for the fact that, in answer to interrogatory No. 2, the jury found that plaintiff's injuries proximately resulted from defendant's negligence in releasing plaintiff as a patient. The jury's verdict was therefore based on the finding that plaintiff's injuries resulted from acts for which the defendant was not responsible, and hence the judgment cannot stand.

As a new trial must be granted, we shall consider the second ground of alleged negligence.

When the doctor discharged plaintiff, he spoke to the party in charge of the hospital, advising that he would arrange with plaintiff's cousin to have her returned to relatives in New York. The doctor then requested that she be allowed to remain in room No. 3 in the maids' home, where she had lived for two and a half months preceding, until these arrangements could be perfected. She was therefore permitted to return to this room. She dressed herself, walked downstairs twice, and then walked from the hospital half a block over to the maids' home, where she went to bed. At 5 o'clock on the evening of the same day, she walked half a block to the employees' dining room and had supper, and then returned to the maids' home. Later she walked over to the main office of the hospital to get the money due her for her past services. She had spells of vomiting, and was nervous and incidentally depressed, but not physically disabled.

The room which she was occupying in the maids'...