Driscoll v. Delo

Decision Date01 February 1996
Docket NumberNos. 94-2993,94-3266,s. 94-2993
Citation71 F.3d 701
PartiesRobert DRISCOLL, Appellee, v. Paul DELO, Appellant. Robert DRISCOLL, Appellant, v. Paul DELO, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Stephen David Hawke, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, Missouri, argued, for appellant.

Bruce Dayton Livingston, St. Louis, Missouri, argued, for appellee.

Before HANSEN, HEANEY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

The State of Missouri appeals and petitioner Robert Driscoll, a/k/a Albert Eugene Johnson, cross-appeals from the district court's order granting Driscoll's 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons stated below, we agree that a writ of habeas corpus should issue on three independent bases: (1) Driscoll was denied the effective counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment because his lawyer allowed the jury to retire with the factually inaccurate impression that the victim's blood was possibly on Driscoll's knife; (2) his trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to impeach a state eyewitness using his prior inconsistent statements; and (3) Driscoll's sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because the prosecutor made repeated statements to the jury that diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for its sentence of death.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Driscoll is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Potosi Correctional Center in Mineral Point, Missouri. On December 5, 1984, a jury found Driscoll guilty of capital murder in violation of Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 565.001 (1978) (repealed effective October 1, 1984) in connection with the stabbing death of a corrections officer, Thomas Jackson, during a prison disturbance. 1 On December 6, 1984, the jury recommended that Driscoll be sentenced to death; thereafter, on February 7, 1985, the state court sentenced him to death by lethal gas. The Missouri State Supreme Court affirmed Driscoll's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. Driscoll, 711 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922, 107 S.Ct. 329, 93 L.Ed.2d 301 (1986). Driscoll subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief in state court pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26 (repealed effective January 1, 1988), which the trial court denied after an evidentiary hearing. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion. Driscoll v. State, 767 S.W.2d 5 (Mo.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 210, 107 L.Ed.2d 163 (1989).

On October 6, 1989, Driscoll filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The court appointed counsel to assist Driscoll and on October 22, 1990, Driscoll filed an amended petition asserting the following general claims for relief: (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because of multiple alleged errors on the part of his trial counsel; (2) he was denied due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment as a result of multiple trial court errors; (3) Driscoll's grand and petit jury pools did not represent fair cross sections of the community in violation of due process; (4) the Missouri death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it affords the prosecuting attorney unbridled discretion to seek the death penalty in a discriminatory manner; and (5) numerous other claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The district court referred all pretrial matters to the magistrate judge. After conducting a de novo review of the record, including consideration of the parties' objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court adopted the report of the magistrate judge and granted Driscoll's habeas corpus petition on July 8, 1994.

The district court found seven distinct bases on which it granted petitioner habeas corpus relief: four instances of ineffective assistance of counsel and three instances of due process violations. 2 The court determined that Driscoll received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel (1) did not adequately prepare for the introduction of blood identification evidence at trial and failed to adequately cross-examine the state's serology expert on the crucial issue of blood identification testing methodology, (2) failed to adequately cross-examine a state eyewitness regarding prior inconsistent statements, (3) failed to object to repeated statements by the prosecutor to the jury that minimized the jury's sense of responsibility in recommending a sentence of death, and (4) did not request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of second degree felony murder. In addition, the court determined that a writ of habeas corpus was warranted because Driscoll's trial was tainted by the following due process violations: (1) the court's failure to curtail, sua sponte, the prosecutor's repeated statements to the jury that minimized the jury's sense of responsibility for recommending a sentence of death; (2) the court's failure to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser-included offense of second degree felony murder; and (3) allowing the state to offer improper rebuttal testimony.

We will consider each of these grounds in turn after a recitation of the factual background necessary to reach our determination.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Driscoll was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his role in the stabbing death of Officer Tom Jackson at the Missouri Training Center for Men (MTCM) in Moberly, Missouri on July 3, 1983. Driscoll was one of the 459 prisoners housed in Unit 2, an X-shaped building consisting of four cell wings (designated "A" through "D") branching from a central rotunda where guards monitored security from a circular desk called the control center. Reinforced glass doors secured the rotunda from the housing wings and provided the only entrance to and from each cell wing. Because MTCM is a medium-security institution, each inmate is permitted to keep a key to his cell and can generally move freely within his wing.

Beginning during the day of July 3, 1983 and continuing into the night, inmates in Unit 2B were drinking homemade alcohol and smuggled, store-bought whisky. The center of this activity, cell 2B-410, housed Driscoll and his cellmate, Jimmie Jenkins. Officer Jackson was one of three guards assigned to monitor security in Unit 2 that night. By regulation, Jackson was unarmed. By nighttime, Jenkins had become exceedingly disruptive. At approximately 9:45 p.m., Officer Jackson entered Unit 2B to remove Jenkins from the wing. Jenkins refused to comply with Jackson's instructions to follow him out of the wing. Officer Jackson returned to the control center and requested help. While Officer Jackson waited for assistance, Driscoll assembled a homemade knife from parts he had collected and hidden in his cell. 3

Officer Jackson and two additional guards returned to the housing unit to remove Jenkins. The two other guards escorted Jenkins from the wing to the control center--one guard on each side of the prisoner--while Jackson trailed some distance behind. At that point, a group of twenty to thirty inmates from the wing, including Driscoll, charged the guards. The two guards escorting Jenkins made it to the rotunda where more guards were assembling to help control the situation; a crowd of prisoners, however, stopped Officer Jackson several feet short of the door. Jackson was restrained, beaten, and stabbed four times. At trial, the state advanced the theory that Driscoll stabbed Jackson three times, fatally penetrating his heart and lungs, and then stabbed another officer, Harold Maupin, in the shoulder as Maupin tried to rescue Jackson.

For a brief period, uncontrolled fighting between prisoners and guards raged both in the control center and just outside. After several thwarted attempts to rescue Jackson, guards successfully pulled him through the door into the rotunda. Jackson's shirt was covered in blood. The guards managed to control the worst of the fighting within a few minutes. Reinforcement guards herded inmates back to their cells by firing sixty to eighty shotgun blasts into the floor and ceiling of the housing wings. At some point, Driscoll returned to his cell and changed his clothes.

At the end of the fighting, Officer Jackson was dead and five other guards had been stabbed or otherwise injured. At least thirty inmates required treatment for their injuries; one prisoner was seriously wounded by a shotgun pellet. At trial, Driscoll presented substantial evidence that during the night of July 3rd and into the following day guards subjected the inmates of Unit 2B to brutal beatings in response to the incident. Driscoll's injuries, for example, required him to spend forty days in the prison hospital.

On July 4, 1983, just prior to his transfer to the Missouri State Penitentiary in Jefferson City, Missouri, Driscoll made an incriminating statement to investigating officers from MTCM and the Highway Patrol. In the statement, Driscoll admits that he "stabbed at" an officer after he was hit by someone. He stated that he did not know at which officer he stabbed or if he stabbed at the officer more than once. The trial court admitted the statement into evidence over Driscoll's objection that it was coerced and involuntary. Other evidence against Driscoll included the eyewitness testimony of two inmates and incriminating statements Driscoll reportedly made to other inmates right after the fighting. Three guards testifying for the prosecution, however, identified another inmate, Rodney Carr, as the person they saw stab Officer Jackson. No guard saw Driscoll stab Jackson.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Defense Handling of Serology Evidence

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