State v. Rance

Decision Date16 June 1999
Docket NumberNos. 98-2,98-130,s. 98-2
CourtOhio Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. RANCE, Appellee.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. Under an R.C. 2941.25(A) analysis, the statutorily defined elements of offenses that are claimed to be of similar import are compared in the abstract. (Newark v. Vazirani [1990], 48 Ohio St.3d 81, 549 N.E.2d 520, overruled.)

2. Involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery are not allied offenses of similar import.

3. In Ohio it is unnecessary to resort to the Blockburger test in determining whether cumulative punishments imposed within a single trial for more than one offense resulting from the same criminal conduct violate the federal and state constitutional provisions against double jeopardy. Instead, R.C. 2941.25's two-step test answers the constitutional and state statutory inquiries. The statute manifests the General Assembly's intent to permit, in appropriate cases, cumulative punishments for the same conduct. (Garrett v. United States [1985], 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764; Albernaz v. United States [1981], 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275; State v. Bickerstaff [1984], 10 Ohio St.3d 62, 10 OBR 352, 461 N.E.2d 892, approved and followed.)

Giano Rance pleaded guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter and one count of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A) and former 2911.01(A)(2), now (A)(3). The trial court sentenced Rance to consecutive terms of imprisonment on each count, imposing an aggregate sentence of sixteen to fifty years. Rance moved to correct his sentence, claiming that involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery are allied offenses of similar import as defined in R.C. 2941.25(A). He appealed the sentence, however, before the trial court ruled on the motion.

On appeal, Rance argued that R.C. 2941.25(A) and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions preclude the trial court from imposing separate, consecutive sentences for involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery. The court of appeals determined that because "involuntary Case No. 98-2 is before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists. Case No. 98-130 is before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

                manslaughter necessarily encompasses all of the elements of aggravated robbery," sentencing Rance for both crimes violated R.C. 2941.25(A) and the state and federal constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy.  State v. Rance (Dec. 5, 1997), Lucas App.  No. L-96-277, unreported, at 5, 1997 WL 770974.   Recognizing the discord between its decision and those of other Ohio appellate courts, the Sixth District Court of Appeals certified a conflict in this case
                

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, Craig T. Pearson and Dean P. Mandross, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

Jeffrey M. Gamso, Toledo, for appellee.

COOK, Justice.

Do R.C. 2941.25(A) and the constitutional protections against double jeopardy prohibit trial courts from imposing separate sentences for both involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery? Pursuant to Ohio's multiple-count statute, R.C. 2941.25, our answer to this question is "No."

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The double jeopardy protections afforded by the federal and state Constitutions guard citizens against both successive prosecutions and cumulative punishments for the "same offense." State v. Moss (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 515, 518, 23 O.O.3d 447, 448-449, 433 N.E.2d 181, 184. This case does not involve the successive-prosecution branch of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Instead, Rance objects to the cumulative punishments imposed in a single trial for his convictions of two separate offenses that he claims constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.

We initially note that the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause (made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment) and Ohio's counterpart are sufficiently similar to warrant consultation of federal jurisprudence when analyzing Ohio's proscription against placing persons "twice * * * in jeopardy for the same offense." Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution. See, e.g., Moss, supra.

Rance contends that according to the Supreme Court's decision in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309, he cannot be convicted of both involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery when the same act provides the grounds for both charges. The test outlined in Blockburger for determining whether two offenses are the same for double A legislature, however, may prescribe the imposition of cumulative punishments for crimes that constitute the same offense under Blockburger without violating the federal protection against double jeopardy or corresponding provisions of a state's constitution. Albernaz v. United States (1981), 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1145, 67 L.Ed.2d 275, 285; State v. Bickerstaff (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 10 OBR 352, 355, 461 N.E.2d 892, 895. In this regard, where a legislature expresses its intent to permit cumulative punishments for such crimes, the Blockburger test must yield. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, 101 S.Ct. at 1143, 67 L.Ed.2d at 282. See, also, Bickerstaff, 10 Ohio St.3d at 66, 10 OBR at 356, 461 N.E.2d at 896, fn. 1. "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." Missouri v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, 542. See, also, Moss, 69 Ohio St.2d at 518, 23 O.O.3d at 449, 433 N.E.2d at 184-185.

jeopardy purposes is whether each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. Id. See, also, Brown v. Ohio (1977), 432 U.S. 161, 165-166, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225-2226, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, 194-195.

For this reason, although two offenses constitute the same offense under Blockburger, when a legislature signals its intent to either prohibit or permit cumulative punishments for conduct that may qualify as two crimes, application of Blockburger would be improper; the legislature's expressed intent is dispositive. See Ohio v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2541, 81 L.Ed.2d 425, 433.

We agree, therefore, with the state's contention that the familiar Blockburger test, which is a rule of statutory construction, is not useful where the General Assembly's intent is clear. "[T]he Blockburger rule is not controlling when the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history." Garrett v. United States (1985), 471 U.S. 773, 779, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2411, 85 L.Ed.2d 764, 771. We thus evaluate Rance's double jeopardy argument by deciding whether the General Assembly intended as a sentencing possibility separate, cumulative punishments for both aggravated robbery and involuntary manslaughter when the two offenses stem from a single criminal act.

OHIO'S MULTIPLE-COUNT STATUTE

We discern the General Assembly's intent on this subject through review of Ohio's multiple-count statute, R.C. 2941.25. If the court's sentencing of Rance accords with the multiple-count statute, that harmony with the legislative intent precludes an "unconstitutional" label. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. at 1145, 67 L.Ed.2d at 285; Bickerstaff, 10 Ohio St.3d at 65-66, 10 OBR at 355-356, 461 N.E.2d at 895-896. This court has stated that Ohio's multiple-count statute "is a clear indication of the General Assembly's intent to permit cumulative With its multiple-count statute Ohio intends to permit a defendant to be punished for multiple offenses of dissimilar import. R.C. 2941.25(B); State v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117, 526 N.E.2d 816, 817. If, however, a defendant's actions "can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import," the defendant may be convicted (i.e., found guilty and punished) of only one. R.C. 2941.25(A). But if a defendant commits offenses of similar import separately or with a separate animus, he may be punished for both pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(B). State v. Jones (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 12, 13-14, 676 N.E.2d 80, 81.

                sentencing for the commission of certain offenses."   Id. at 66, 10 OBR at 356, 461 N.E.2d at 896, fn. 1
                

Were Rance's crimes allied offenses of similar import? The applicable test for deciding that issue is as follows: If the elements of the crimes " 'correspond to such a degree that the commission of one crime will result in the commission of the other, the crimes are allied offenses of similar import.' " Id. at 13, 676 N.E.2d at 81, quoting Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d at 117, 526 N.E.2d at 817. If the elements do not so correspond, the offenses are of dissimilar import and the court's inquiry ends--the multiple convictions are permitted. R.C. 2941.25(B). See, also, State v. Mughni (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 68, 514 N.E.2d 870, 873.

A problem inherent in the application of the test for similar/dissimilar import is whether the court should contrast the statutory elements in the abstract or consider the particular facts of the case. We think it useful to settle this issue for Ohio courts, and we believe that comparison of the statutory elements in the abstract is the more functional test, producing "clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases." Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael (1999), 526 U.S. ----, ----, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238, 250.

Because the comparison of elements of offenses outlined in Blockburger is reflected in R.C. 2941.25(A), courts engage in a similar analysis whether applying Blockburger or Ohio's multiple-count statute. Therefore, cases discussing and applying Blockburger are helpful, though not controlling, in our examination of Ohio law. For example, in its Whalen decision the United States Supreme Court considered whether to analyze abstract elements or...

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