R.W.T. v. Dalton
| Decision Date | 21 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | 82-1793,Nos. 82-1745,s. 82-1745 |
| Citation | 712 F.2d 1225 |
| Parties | R.W.T., K.M.R., and T.S.C., minors, by and through their next friends and attorneys, Kenneth A. Cohn, Robert J. Goodwin, Michael L. Lyons, Jeanette Ganousis, David C. Howard, and Adrienne E. Volenik, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellees, v. The Honorable Donald E. DALTON; The Honorable David Dalton; The Honorable Fred Rush; The Honorable Charles R. Schroeder; The Honorable William T. Lohmar; The Honorable Richard Zerr; and The Honorable Kathie Guyton, Appellants, The Honorable Paul Williams; The Honorable Charles Schwendemann; The Honorable Peggy Coppage; The Honorable Donald Boehmer; Guy L. Koester, Sheriff; Cliston Hilton, Sheriff; Dave Jenkins, Sheriff; Raymond J. Grush, Juvenile Officer; and Gerald W. Paul, Deputy Juvenile Officer, Appellees. R.W.T., K.M.R., and T.S.C., minors, by and through their next friends and attorneys, Kenneth A. Cohn, Robert J. Goodwin, Michael L. Lyons, Jeanette Ganousis, David C. Howard, and Adrienne E. Volenik, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. The Honorable Donald E. DALTON; The Honorable David Dalton; The Honorable Fred Rush; The Honorable Charles R. Schroeder; The Honorable William T. Lohmar; The Honorable Richard Zerr; The Honorable Kathie Guyton; The Honorable Paul Williams; The Honorable Charles Schwendemann; The Honorable Peggy Coppage; The Honorable Donald Boehmer; Guy L. Koester, Sheriff; Cliston Hilton, Sheriff; Dave Jenkins, Sheriff; Raymond J. Grush, Juvenile Officer; and Gerald W. Paul, Deputy Juvenile Officer, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Robert L. Presson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for appellants/cross-appellees.
David C. Howard, Adrienne E. Volenik, Howard & Volenik, St. Louis, Mo., Michael Ferry, Stanley J. Eichner, Legal Services of Eastern Missouri, Inc., St. Louis, Mo., for R.W.T., et al., appellees/cross-appellants.
Robert E. Edwards, Pros. Atty., Troy, Mo., for Cliston Hilton, Sheriff-appellees.
Thomas W. Dietrich, Pros. Atty., Bowling Green, Mo., for Paul E. Williams and Dave Jenkins, Sheriff-appellees.
Before ARNOLD and BENNETT, * Circuit Judges, and HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
In this case a class of juveniles allege that they were denied their constitutional rights when they were detained in Missouri county jails without being afforded probable-cause determinations. Plaintiffs, suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claim that to jail a juvenile without a hearing on whether there is probable cause to believe that an act justifying imprisonment has been committed, is an unreasonable seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court 1 agreed, granted the plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief against various county and state officials, and awarded costs and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. The judges and associate judges of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of the State of Missouri appeal, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal. On the merits of the principal questions presented, we agree with the District Court and affirm. We hold that juveniles are entitled to a probable-cause hearing before a neutral and detached magistrate, and that the District Court properly imposed upon the State of Missouri one-half the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
The plaintiffs are a class of juveniles who have been, are, or may be detained in jails or detention centers by juvenile authorities of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of the State of Missouri. The Eleventh Judicial Circuit contains St. Charles, Lincoln, and Pike Counties. The defendants include the judges and associate judges of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit; the judges of the County Court for St. Charles County, an administrative body under Missouri law; the sheriffs of St. Charles, Lincoln, and Pike Counties; and the juvenile officer and deputy juvenile officer of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on two issues. The first issue concerned alleged unconstitutional conditions in the St. Charles, Pike, and Lincoln County jails, in which juveniles were confined. This issue was disposed of by a consent judgment entered July 31, 1980, which prohibited the defendants from incarcerating juveniles in the St. Charles or Pike County jails. The issue of jail conditions is no longer in dispute.
The second issue concerned the defendants' practice of detaining juveniles without affording them a preliminary hearing before a neutral and detached judicial officer to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that the juveniles had committed the acts with which they were charged. On October 14, 1980, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on this issue, holding that the defendants' practice violated the plaintiffs' right to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 On March 30, 1982, the District Court entered a final judgment, awarding costs of $4,162.30 and attorneys' fees of $34,815 to the plaintiffs. The Court directed the defendants to pay as follows:
1/2 from the State defendants (the judges and the juvenile officer of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Missouri, in their official capacities); 1/4 from the St. Charles County defendants (the Sheriff and the county administrative court judges, all in their official capacities); and 1/8 each from the Lincoln County and Pike County defendants (the Sheriff of each county in his official capacity).
Designated Record (D.R.) 203. 3 The Court also directed the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay $872.75 for the attorneys' fees of defendant Gerald Paul, a former deputy juvenile officer of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.
Seven of the judges and associate judges of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit (hereinafter "judges") appeal, contending that (1) juveniles who are detained for "status offenses" are not entitled to probable-cause hearings, (2) the prerequisites for injunctive relief were not met, (3) judges are immune from declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983, and (4) the State of Missouri should not be required to pay one-half of the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
The plaintiffs cross-appeal, arguing that the District Court erred in (1) failing to award postjudgment interest on their award of attorneys' fees and costs and (2) awarding attorneys' fees in favor of defendant Gerald Paul against plaintiffs' counsel.
Under Missouri law, the juvenile court has jurisdiction over both children who are charged with violating the criminal law--delinquents--and children who are charged with committing noncriminal acts which are considered dangerous to the welfare of the juvenile or others--status offenders. The jurisdictional statute reads in pertinent part:
1. ... the juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:
* * *
* * *
(2) Involving any child ... who is alleged to be in need of care and treatment because:
(a) The child while subject to compulsory school attendance is repeatedly and without justification absent from school; or
(b) The child disobeys the reasonable and lawful directions of his parents or other custodian and is beyond their control; or (c) The child is habitually absent from his home without sufficient cause, permission, or justification; or
(d) The behavior or associations of the child are otherwise injurious to his welfare or to the welfare of others; or
(e) The child is charged with an offense not classified as criminal, or with an offense applicable only to children ....
(3) Involving any child who is alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance ....
Mo.Ann.Stat. § 211.031 (Vernon 1983). It is important to note that each of the five categories listed in paragraph (2) turns on some past act on the part of the juvenile charged.
Both delinquents and status offenders may be taken into judicial custody by law-enforcement officers or by the juvenile officer. Mo.Sup.Ct.R. 111.01. 4 The juvenile officer has authority to authorize detention of the child for 48 hours. Mo.Sup.Ct.R. 111.06(b). The juvenile can be detained for more than 48 hours only upon a court order to hold the juvenile for a detention hearing. Mo.Sup.Ct.R. 111.06(d). The detention hearing, at which the court determines "whether the juvenile is to be continued in detention or released," must be held within three days, excluding weekends and legal holidays, from the date of the court order. Mo.Sup.Ct.R. 111.07(b). At the hearing, "The court shall receive testimony and other evidence relevant only to the necessity for detention of the juvenile." Mo.Sup.Ct.R. 111.08(b). The court must release the child
unless the court finds that detention is required:
(1) to protect the juvenile; or
(2) to protect the person or property of others; or
(3) because the juvenile may flee or be removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; or
(4) because the juvenile has no custodian or suitable adult to provide care and supervision for the juvenile and return the juvenile to the court when required; or
(5) because the juvenile is a fugitive from another jurisdiction and an official of that jurisdiction has required the juvenile be detained pending return to that jurisdiction.
Mo.Sup.Ct.R. 111.08(d). As the Comment to the Rule emphasizes, "The detention hearing is to determine only whether a juvenile should be continued in detention, or released to his custodian." The rule requires no inquiry into whether there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed any particular past act. Sometime after the detention decision is made, the court holds a hearing on the merits of the charges against the juvenile and makes a disposition of the case. Mo.Sup.Ct.R. 119.01-.07.
The District Court found that...
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