Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach

• Citation: 713 F.3d 1066
• Decision Date: 01 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–15448.,11–15448.
• Parties: Fane LOZMAN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA, a Florida municipal corporation, Michael Brown, Gloria Shuttleworth, Norma Duncombe, Vanessa Lee, individuals, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

713 F.3d 1066

Fane LOZMAN, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA, a Florida municipal corporation, Michael Brown, Gloria Shuttleworth, Norma Duncombe, Vanessa Lee, individuals, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 11–15448.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 1, 2013.

Robert Taylor Bowling, Cobb & Cole, PA, Daytona Beach, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Benjamin Lawrence Bedard, Bradley John Ellis, Roberts, Reynolds, Bedard & Tuzzio, PLLC, West Palm Beach, FL, Jeffrey M. Bell, Bell & Melamed LLC, Fort Lauderdale Lakes, FL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before CARNES and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,^* Judge.

RESTANI, Judge:

Plaintiff–Appellant Fane Lozman (“Lozman” or “Appellant”) appeals from the district court's dismissal of his amended complaint asserting, inter alia, violations of his Constitutional rights, based on the Rooker–Feldman doctrine¹ and res judicata principles. For the following reasons, we reverse.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The jurisdiction of the federal courts to decide this matter is the primary issue here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review a final order of a district court. We review de novo the application of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Doe v. Fla. Bar, 630 F.3d 1336, 1340 (11th Cir.2011) (Rooker–Feldman); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 619 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.2010) (collateral estoppel); EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir.2004) (res judicata).

BACKGROUND

At issue here is the preclusive effect of a prior state court eviction action initiated by Defendant–Appellee City of Riviera Beach, Florida (the “City”) against Lozman. In August 2006, the City initiated a suit in state court to evict Lozman from the City-owned marina where Lozman lived in a floating home (the “eviction action”). Lozman responded to the eviction action by filing a counterclaim, a first amended counterclaim and, eventually, a second amended counterclaim. The second amended counterclaim alleged that the City: violated Lozman's Petition Clause rights by filing the eviction action in retaliation for Lozman's initiation of a separate suit against the City (the “sunshine action”) (Count I); violated Lozman's Free Speech Clause rights by filing the eviction action in retaliation for Lozman speaking at public meetings (Count II); and violated Federal and Florida Fair Housing Acts (Counts III and IV). Count II may be interpreted as alleging that the City violated Lozman's Free Speech Clause rights by removing him from various city council meetings and by arresting him during a meeting.

In March 2007, a Florida jury returned a verdict in favor of Lozman, finding that Lozman's protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the City's decision to terminate his lease. The state court issued a Final Order Denying Eviction. The state court had severed the eviction issue from any other issue, and thus, the Final Order Denying Eviction was entered before the counterclaims were resolved.

In December 2007, Lozman filed a third amended counterclaim. The third amended counterclaim contained two causes of action: breach of the marina agreement and violation of Florida's Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”) statute, which bars state entities from filing actions against individuals in retaliation for constitutionally protected activity. On January 14, 2008, although the third amended counterclaim had by that time been filed, the state court dismissed the second amended counterclaim without prejudice based upon an agreement between counsel.

On February 8, 2008, Lozman filed his initial federal complaint in the current case, alleging deprivation of his Constitutional rights, retaliation, harassment, and false arrest by the City and various city officials (the “Individual Defendants”) (collectively “Defendants”). In December 2008, the federal district court stayed proceedings pending resolution of the state court eviction action.

In July 2008, Lozman filed a fourth amended counterclaim in state court. The fourth amended counterclaim contained the same causes of action as the third amended counterclaim: breach of the marina agreement and retaliation in violation of Florida's SLAPP statute. The third and fourth amended counterclaims did not repeat the causes of action based on violations of the First Amendment, as alleged in Counts I and II of the second amended counterclaim.

In August 2010, the state court entered a Stipulation and Order for Dismissal of Counterclaim with Prejudice, which dismissed “the entire case, including the Counter-claim ....” In November 2010, Lozman moved to reopen his federal case and attached a proposed amended complaint,which contained the causes of action Lozman believed remained viable after the conclusion of the state court eviction action. The amended federal complaint alleges that during a closed meeting on June 28, 2006, the Defendants formulated an official policy to harass Lozman as retaliation for bringing his sunshine action against the City and for publicly opposing the city council's redevelopment efforts. Specifically, Lozman alleges the Defendants violated his rights by: (a) attempting to coerce Lozman into dismissing his sunshine action; (b) attempting to censor Lozman from speaking out on issues of redevelopment and corruption; (c) hiring a private investigator to follow Lozman; (d) arresting Lozman during a November 15, 2006 meeting; (e) publicly stating that Lozman had no First Amendment right to speak during a January 3, 2007 meeting; (f & g) removing Lozman from meetings on January 3, 2007 and May 2007; and (h) censoring Lozman's comments at meetings from June 2007 to November 2010 (the “non-admiralty-based claims”). The amended complaint also alleges that the City retaliated against him by filing an in rem action in federal district court (the “Admiralty Action”) against Lozman's floating home for violations of the marina rules (the “admiralty-based claim”). The district court deemed the amended complaint filed. The City and the Individual Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds, including Rooker–Feldman, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.

In May 2011, the district court dismissed all of Lozman's non-admiralty-based claims on the Rooker–Feldman doctrine and res judicata principles, based on the state eviction action. The district court reserved ruling on the admiralty-based claim because the Admiralty Action was ongoing in federal court. In August 2011, we affirmed the City's ability to foreclose on Lozman's floating home and concluded that Lozman had failed to show that the Admiralty Action was retaliatory. City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two Story Vessel Approximately Fifty–Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir.2011), rev'd––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 735, 184 L.Ed.2d 604 (2013). In October 2011, the district court relied on our opinion to dismiss Lozman's admiralty-based claim on collateral estoppel grounds and entered an Order of Final Dismissal with Prejudice and Close–Out. Lozman now appeals the dismissal of his amended complaint.

DISCUSSION

I. Rooker–Feldman Doctrine²

Appellant argues that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not deprive the lower federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over his amended complaint because he commenced his federal action before the state court issued judgment and he is not a state court loser complaining of injuries resulting from a state judgment. The Defendants argue that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars subject matter jurisdiction here because the federal action was commenced after the state court proceedings ended and involves essentially the same claims as the state eviction action.

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine states that federal district courts have “no authority to review final judgments of a state court ....” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303);see Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine makes clear that federal district courts cannot review state court final judgments because that task is reserved for state appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court.”).

The Supreme Court has reiterated that the scope of the doctrine is narrow and is “confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). “We determine the applicability of Rooker–Feldman by ‘adhering to the language in Exxon Mobil delineating the boundaries of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.’ ” Vasquez v. YII Shipping Co., 692 F.3d 1192, 1196 n. 1 (11th Cir.2012) (brackets deleted) (quoting Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1274).

Here, Lozman commenced his federal action on February 8, 2008, when he filed his complaint in federal court.³ Thus, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine will apply only if state court proceedings ended before February 8, 2008. See Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1274 (finding Rooker–Feldman did not apply when appellants “commenced the federal district court action before the end of state proceedings”). The City argues that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies because state court proceedings ended, at least to the First Amendment claims raised in the second amended counterclaim, on January 14, 2008, twenty-five days prior to Lozman filing his initial federal complaint, when the state court dismissed Lozman's second amended counterclaim without prejudice. According to the...