Jamerson v. Runnels

• Citation: 713 F.3d 1218
• Decision Date: 24 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–56064.,12–56064.
• Parties: Keith JAMERSON, Petitioner–Appellee, v. David L. RUNNELS, Warden, Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

713 F.3d 1218

Keith JAMERSON, Petitioner–Appellee,

v.David L. RUNNELS, Warden, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 12–56064.

United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 7, 2012.

Filed April 24, 2013.

David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, argued the cause and filed a brief for the respondent-appellant. With him on the brief were Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California; Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jason Tran, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA.

Brianna J. Fuller, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, argued the cause and filed a brief for the petitioner-appellee. With her on the brief was Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:02–cv–09890–JHN–AJW.

Before: DOROTHY W. NELSON and DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges, and JAMES K. SINGLETON, District Judge.^*

OPINION

O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether the California courts' determination that a prosecutor had genuine, race-neutral reasons for striking four black jurors during voir dire was an unreasonable application of federal constitutional law.

I

On June 15, 1999, California Highway Patrol Officers Joseph Phillips and John Beay found Petitioner Keith Jamerson sitting in the driver's seat of a Chevrolet truck stopped on a highway exit ramp in Manchester, California. Jamerson claimed to own the truck and requested that the officers help him move it off the exit ramp. Noticing that the passenger window on the truck was broken and that broken glass was scattered on the passenger seat and floorboard, the officers ran the license plate of the truck before attempting to move it. They discovered that the vehicle was registered to Phillip Allen—not Jamerson. Further investigation revealed that Jamerson did not have a key to the vehicle and that the ignition had been turned without a key. Jamerson's walking cane was found on the passenger seat atop the broken glass.

Jamerson was charged in California state court with one count of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle and one count of receiving stolen property. He was convicted of receiving stolen property, but the jury could not reach a verdict on the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle charge, and thus that count was dismissed.

During jury selection for his trial, Jamerson twice raised an objection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and its California analog, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978), to the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes against black jurors. He raised the first after the prosecutor had exercised eight of her peremptory challenges—two against Hispanic jurors and six against black jurors. The trial court determined that Jamerson had made “a prima facie showing” of an improper motive and required the prosecutor to explain her reasons for striking the black jurors. After the prosecutor provided her justifications for striking each juror, the trial judge found that the prosecutor had offered “valid, independent reasons which is [sic] a proper basis to excuse a juror.” He denied Jamerson's Batson/Wheeler motion.

Voir dire continued, and the prosecutor exercised her next two peremptory challenges on black jurors. Jamerson renewed his Batson/Wheeler motion. Although the judge believed that he had observed grounds warranting the two strikes, he again required the prosecutor to “justify them.” The prosecutor provided her reasons for striking both jurors, and the trial judge concluded “that the prosecutor in good faith [wa]s giving reasons” for her peremptory strikes. He denied the second motion.

Although the prosecutor exercised five additional peremptory strikes after Jamerson's second Batson/Wheeler motion—three against white jurors and two against black jurors—Jamerson did not renew his Batson/Wheeler motion a third time. The final jury panel included one Asian juror, two black jurors, five Hispanic jurors, and four white jurors. A black juror and a white juror were seated as alternates.

On direct appeal, Jamerson argued that the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motions. Listing the reasons that the prosecutor proffered for striking each black juror and ultimately deferring to the trial court's independent assessment of the prosecutor's credibility in giving those justifications, the California Court of Appeal affirmed. It declined to conduct a comparative juror analysis because, at the time, California law prohibited a court from performing a comparative analysis for the first time on appeal. See People v. Johnson, 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270, 285 (2003), rev'd,545 U.S. 162, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005). The California Supreme Court denied review.

Jamerson then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal district court. The case was initially referred to a magistrate judge, who conducted a comparative juror analysis. In his report and recommendation analyzing Jamerson's Batson/Wheeler claim, the magistrate judge concluded that comparative analysis undermined the prosecutor's rationale for striking four of the prospective black jurors. He urged the district court to grant habeas relief.

In the interim, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Citing Pinholster, the State filed an objection to the magistrate judge's initial report and recommendation because the magistrate judge had considered driver's license photographs submitted by Jamerson, which showed the race of each venire member. The State argued that, after Pinholster, the consideration of such evidence was prohibited. The magistrate judge ordered additional briefing and issued a supplemental report and recommendation. The report concluded that Pinholster did not bar consideration of the photographs because they were not new evidence but were instead demonstrative exhibits designed to reconstruct facts visible to the state trial court.

The district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge in full and granted habeas relief. The State of California, through Jamerson's prison warden, timely filed a notice of appeal.

II

The State asserts that the district court erred in granting Jamerson's habeas petition, which alleged that the California courts improperly denied his Batson/Wheeler motions. In short, the State argues that the California courts were reasonable in determining that the prosecutor did not engage in purposeful discrimination, even in light of the comparative juror analysis this court is required to conduct. Any discussion of the State's argument, therefore, must begin with an outline of the applicable Batson framework.

Batson challenges involve a three-step inquiry. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006). First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised a peremptory challenge based upon race. Id. If this showing is made, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. Finally, the court evaluates “the persuasiveness of the justification proffered by the prosecutor” to decide whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the defendant has the burden of persuading the court that the strike was racially motivated. Id. (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam)).

The State and Jamerson disagree about the reasonableness of the state court's analysis at Batson 's third step, where the trial court is acting as a “trier of fact,” determining whether the prosecutor's race-neutral justification for the challenge is sufficiently convincing. Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc). “In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion [at Batson 's third step], a court must undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (internal quotation marks omitted). The “totality of the relevant facts” includes the “prosecutor's statements about his jury selection strategies and his explanations ... for striking minority jurors” as well as “the characteristics of people he did not challenge.” Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360.

As part of its evaluation of the prosecutor's reasoning, the court must conduct a comparative juror analysis—that is, it must “compar[e] African American panelists who were struck with those non-African American panelists who were allowed to serve.” Briggs v. Grounds, 682 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir.2012). Where the prosecutor's reason for striking a black juror applies “just as well” to a non-black juror who is selected for the panel, “that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination” that should be considered in assessing the genuineness of the prosecutor's proffered explanations. Miller–El v. Dretke ( Miller–El II ), 545 U.S. 231, 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005).

When evaluating the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's justifications at Batson 's third step, the trial judge is making a credibility determination. Although the prosecutor's reasons for the strike must relate to the case to be tried, the court need not believe that “the stated reason represents a sound strategic judgment” to find the prosecutor's rationale persuasive; rather, it need be convinced only that the justification “should be believed.” Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). Because “it is widely acknowledged that the trial judge is in the...