Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. City of Norwalk

• Decision Date: 21 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15692,15692
• Citation: 245 Conn. 551,715 A.2d 46
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STAFFORD HIGGINS INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. v. CITY OF NORWALK et al.

Page 46

715 A.2d 46

245 Conn. 551

STAFFORD HIGGINS INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. v. CITY OF NORWALK et al.

No. 15692.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 28, 1997.

Decided July 21, 1998.

Frank W. Murphy, Norwalk, with whom, on the brief, was Barbara L. Coughlan, for appellant (intervening plaintiff).

M. Jeffry Spahr, Deputy Corporation Counsel, for appellees (defendants).

Before BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, McDONALD and EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, JJ.

BORDEN, Associate Justice.

The principal issue of this appeal is whether the defendant city of Norwalk ¹ acted constitutionally when, in 1994, it stayed the implementation of its decennial revaluation pursuant to No. 94-4, § 51, of the Public Acts, Spec. Sess., May, 1994 (Spec.Sess.P.A. 94-4, § 51). The plaintiff GTE Realty Corporation ² appeals ³ from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that the defendant had validly postponed the revaluation for purposes of the grand lists of October 1, 1993 and 1994; (2) concluded that Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, § 51, is constitutional, both as enacted and as applied by the defendant to the plaintiff; and (3) declined to consider the plaintiff's challenge to the defendant's subsequent postponements of the implementation of the revaluation, with regard to the 1995 and 1996 grand lists, which took place during the pendency of this case. Addressing the merits of those subsequent actions by the defendant, the plaintiff also claims that they were invalid. We conclude that: (1) the defendant's actions in postponing the revaluation for purposes of the 1993 and 1994 grand lists was valid; (2) there is no constitutional infirmity in Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, § 51, either as enacted or as implemented by the defendant; (3) under the circumstances of this case, the trial court should have adjudicated the plaintiff's claims regarding the 1995 and 1996 grand lists; and (4) under No. 97-254, § 1(b)(1) of the 1997 Public Acts (P.A. 97-254), the defendant may postpone its revaluation until 1999. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in part and reverse the judgment in part.

In its intervening complaint, the plaintiff challenged the defendant's action of staying the implementation of the defendant's October 1, 1993 decennial revaluation, which had the effect of retaining the real property valuations of October 1, 1983, for the grand lists of 1993 and 1994. That action had been taken in 1994, pursuant to Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, § 51, later codified as General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-62h, ⁴ which the plaintiff claimed was unconstitutional. The plaintiff's complaint contained two counts. In the first count, the plaintiff appealed from its tax assessment pursuant to General Statutes § 12-119, ⁵ claiming that its tax assessment was illegal because of, inter alia, the unconstitutionality of Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, § 51. In the second count, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, § 51, was unconstitutional.

The plaintiff's complaint purported to be limited to a challenge to the defendant's 1994 staying of the revaluation, affecting the grand lists of 1993 and 1994, and the plaintiff did not submit an amended complaint formally expanding its claims beyond those grand lists. Nonetheless, the record discloses that the parties ⁶ subsequently also submitted to the trial court the question of whether the defendant acted legally in further staying the revaluation, such that it was not implemented for the grand lists of October 1, 1995, and October 1, 1996, pursuant to No. 95-283, § 8, of the 1995 Public Acts (P.A. 95-283), ⁷ and No. 96-218, §§ 1 [245 Conn. 558] and 3, of the 1996 Public Acts (P.A. 96-218). ⁸ The following facts are undisputed. Since 1980, the plaintiff has owned real property in Norwalk, located [245 Conn. 559] at 32 Weed Avenue, where it operates a management and development center. In 1993, the defendant conducted a decennial revaluation of all real property located in the city for purposes of establishing a new grand list as of October 1, 1993 (1993 revaluation), pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 12-62(a). ⁹ The previous revaluation had been in 1983, based on real property values as of that time (1983 revaluation). On the basis of the 1993 revaluation, the defendant established a proposed 1993 grand list. The plaintiff was notified that, as of October 1, 1993, its assessment would be $22,750,420. The plaintiff appealed its 1993 assessment to the board of tax review. ¹⁰

On January 24, 1994, however, the director of finance reported to the board of estimate and finance ¹¹ that, after revaluation, revenues from commercial and industrial properties would decline from 26.9 percent to 25.6 percent of the grand list, revenues from condominiums would decline from 10.3 percent to 8.9 percent of the grand list, and revenues from noncondominium residences would increase from 45.6 percent to 53.5 percent of the grand list. On March 8, 1994, at the meeting of the common council, the mayor was granted authorization to seek permission from the state to defer implementation of the revaluation for no more than three years. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 12-117, ¹² however, the state office of policy and management may grant a municipality an extension of no more than two months to complete the process of hearing taxpayers' appeals regarding a revaluation. On March 16, 1994, the board of tax review and the mayor wrote to the office of policy and management seeking a one year extension. The office of policy and management, however, granted only a two month extension, until May 31, 1994, as permitted by the statute. ¹³

On April 22, 1994, ¹⁴ the board of estimate and taxation established a final budget and mill rate based, not on the 1993 revaluation, but on the 1983 revaluation. This had the effect on real property owners, including the plaintiff, of carrying forward the 1992 grand list, based on the values of real property as of 1983, rather than 1993.

Under the 1983 revaluation, the plaintiff's assessment was $24,058,826, resulting in a tax bill of $1,119,938.35. Under the defendant's proposed 1993 revaluation, which has not been implemented, the plaintiff's assessment would have been $22,750,420 and, under the defendant's proposed mill rate, the plaintiff's tax bill would have been $687,290.19. As a result of the deferment of the 1993 revaluation, therefore, the plaintiff's tax bill on the 1993 grand list was increased by $432,648.16, or 39 percent, over what it would have been had the 1993 revaluation been implemented.

On or about June 1, 1994, while the plaintiff's appeal to the board of tax review was pending, the defendant issued tax bills, based on the 1983 revaluation, accompanied by a letter from the mayor stating that the implementation of the 1993 revaluation had been postponed. Prior to the issuance of these tax bills, the board of tax review did not hold hearings on appeals by taxpayers potentially aggrieved by the 1993 assessment.

On June 9, 1994, Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4 became effective. See Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, § 85. Section 51 of Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, ¹⁵ in general terms, permits the legislative body of a municipality to stay the implementation of a decennial revaluation for up to two years. On June 28, 1994, the common council suspended its rules and, purporting to act pursuant to Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, passed a resolution, not listed on its agenda, authorizing the stay of the implementation of the 1993 revaluation. In the discussion of this resolution, the corporation counsel described this action as a ratification of the common council's prior decision to request a stay of the 1993 revaluation. Thereafter, on December 27, 1994, the common council also voted to stay the implementation of the 1993 revaluation until July 1, 1996. In addition, during the pendency of this case, the defendant has enacted further postponements of the revaluation, which have had the effect of retaining the 1983 real property valuations for the grand lists of 1995 and 1996.

The trial court rejected the plaintiff's various statutory and constitutional challenges to the defendant's actions in staying the 1993 revaluation. The court declined to consider, however, the plaintiff's challenge to the defendant's action in further postponing the revaluation for the 1995 and 1996 grand lists, which steps the defendant purportedly had taken pursuant to P.A. 95-283, § 8, and P.A. 96-218, §§ 1 and 3. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment for the defendant with respect to the stay of the 1993 revaluation, affecting only Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, § 51, and the 1993 and 1994 grand lists. This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the defendant did not validly postpone the revaluation for purposes of the 1993 and 1994 grand lists. The plaintiff relies on the conclusion of the trial court that the defendant's action on June 28, 1994, purporting to ratify its prior decision to postpone the 1993 revaluation, could not be a valid ratification because, prior to Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, the defendant had no such power of postponement. The plaintiff contends, therefore, that the defendant's action in postponing the 1993 revaluation was invalid. We disagree.

It is true that the trial court concluded that, prior to the enactment of Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, the defendant was without any power to postpone the 1993 revaluation and that, therefore, any attempt to ratify what was in effect an ultra vires act was ineffective. It does not follow from that conclusion, however, that the defendant's action on June 28, 1994, was also ineffective to postpone the 1993 revaluation pursuant to Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, § 51.

As the trial court also concluded, correctly, Spec. Sess. P.A. 94-4, § 51, by its terms had retrospective effect, and the defendant's June 28, 1994 resolution, which was specifically...