Ulrich v. Pope Cnty.

• Decision Date: 21 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–2813.,12–2813.
• Parties: Brian Thorvald ULRICH, Plaintiff–Appellant v. POPE COUNTY; Deputy Gilbert Mitchell; and Deputy Eric Thesing, in their Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

715 F.3d 1054

Brian Thorvald ULRICH, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.POPE COUNTY; Deputy Gilbert Mitchell; and Deputy Eric Thesing, in their Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants–Appellants.

No. 12–2813.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 14, 2013.

Filed: May 21, 2013.

Zorislav Romanovich Leyderman, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Stephanie A. Angolkar, argued, Jon K. Iverson, on the brief, Bloomington, MN, for Appellee.

Before WOLLMAN and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and HOLMES,¹ District Judge.

HOLMES, District Judge.

Brian Thorvald Ulrich appeals the judgment of the district court ² dismissing his case with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We affirm.

I.

On May 27, 2011, Ulrich and his wife attended the high school graduation ceremony of MaKenzie Ronning, the daughter of Ulrich's former girlfriend, Kristen Mohs (formerly Kristen Crane). At the time of the graduation, there was a valid harassment restraining order (HRO) in effect which provided that Ulrich “shall not harass” and “shall have no contact with” Mohs or her three children, including Ronning.³ The HRO did not specify that Ulrich was required to maintain a particular distance from Mohs or her children in order to be in compliance; instead, the order provided more generally that a violation could occur through “[a]ny contact with Petitioner [Mohs], direct or indirect[,] and including any minor children included in this Order....” The HRO also required Ulrich to “stay away from Petitioner [Mohs'] place of employment located at Minnewaska School District....” Ulrich admits that he was aware of the existence and content of the HRO yet chose to attend Ronning's graduation.

After Ulrich and his wife arrived at Ronning's high school and seated themselves in the gymnasium bleachers, an individual reported Ulrich's presence to the police. In response to the report, Deputy Gilbert Mitchell arrived at the school and asked Ulrich to speak with him in the hallway. During questioning, Ulrich expressed his belief that he had not violated the HRO. First, Ulrich felt he had not violated the indirect-contact provision of the HRO because he had not yet seen Mohs or Ronning while in the gymnasium and was not planning to make contact with them during the ceremony. Second, Ulrich was convinced that his presence on school property did not violate the HRO's place-of-employment provision because Mohs was no longer employed by the Minnewaska School District.

Deputy Eric Thesing then arrived on the scene and soon after obtained a copy of the HRO. Thesing spoke with Mohs in the gymnasium, and she confirmed that she had not had any contact with Ulrich and no longer worked for the Minnewaska School District. Nevertheless, Mohs expressed her wish that Ulrich be arrested for violating the HRO. Thesing then returned to Ulrich and stated that even though Ulrich was “technically correct” that he had not violated the HRO, Ulrich still needed to leave the building. Ulrich refused to leave and instead invited police to sit beside him and his wife during the ceremony and watch them leave afterward to ensure that Ulrich made no contact with Mohs or Ronning in violation of the HRO. The deputies declined Ulrich's offer and decided to arrest him when Ulrich told the deputies again he would not leave the building. He was charged with “Violation of Restraining Order,” which is a misdemeanor under Minnesota law. Minn.Stat. Ann. § 609.748 Subd. 6 (2012). Ulrich was detained at the Douglas County Jail for approximately 90 hours following his arrest.

On January 19, 2012, Ulrich filed suit against Mitchell and Thesing, in both their individual and official capacities, and against Pope County, Minnesota. As to the arresting deputies, Ulrich made claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arresting him without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and for preventing him from attending and participating in Ronning's public high school graduation in violation of the First Amendment. As to Pope County, Ulrich made a § 1983 claim for failure to adequately supervise and train the County's deputies and for developing policies or customs that exhibited deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens. Finally, as to all three defendants, Ulrich asserted a claim for false imprisonment under Minnesota law.

The district court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court determined that Mitchell and Thesing were entitled to qualified immunity that shielded them from liability for Ulrich's § 1983 and constitutional claims. Ulrich's § 1983 claim against Pope County was also dismissed after the district court determined that Ulrich's constitutional rights had not been violated and that no facts had been alleged to demonstrate a widespread policy or custom by the County to violate individuals' constitutional rights. As for Ulrich's state-law claim for false imprisonment, the district court held that because Ulrich had failed to allege facts showing the deputies had acted willfully or with malice, their decision to jail Ulrich following arrest was protected from civil liability through official immunity, which also protected Pope County by extension.

After dismissal of all claims by the district court, Ulrich filed this appeal.

II.

We review de novo a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and in doing so accept as true a plaintiff's well pleaded allegations. Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir.2009). “[D]ismissal is inappropriate unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir.1996) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

A.

We first consider Mitchell and Thesing's entitlement to qualified immunity for the federal claims made against them. “[Q]ualified immunity is an affirmative defense [that] will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the immunity is established on the face of the complaint.” Weaver v. Clarke, 45 F.3d 1253, 1255 (8th Cir.1995) (internal citation omitted). “Qualified immunity shields a public official from suit for civil damages when his ‘conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997, 1002 (8th Cir.2012) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). A police officer is therefore entitled to qualified immunity unless the evidence establishes (1) that a plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated, and (2) those rights were so clearly established at the time of the violation that a reasonable officer would have known that his actions were unlawful. Id.

Here, we conclude that Mitchell and Thesing are entitled to qualified immunity on Ulrich's Fourth Amendment claim.⁴ We find that the arresting deputies had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Ulrich for the crime of knowingly violating a valid restraining order, pursuant to Minn.Stat. Ann. § 609.748 Subd. 6 (2012).

“A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by probable cause, and an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if there is at least ‘arguable probable cause.’ ” Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 522–23 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir.2005)). Probable cause to make a warrantless arrest exists “when the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant has committed or is committing an offense.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Arguable probable cause exists even where an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based in probable cause if the mistake is ‘objectively reasonable.’ ” Id. at 523 (quoting Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832 (8th Cir.2008)). The probable cause standard inherently allows room for reasonable mistakes by a reasonable person, but the qualified immunity standard affords law enforcement officials an even wider berth for mistaken judgments “by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (internal quotation omitted). We recognize this accommodation for reasonable error is necessary “because officials should not err always on the side of caution because they fear being sued.” Id.

Notwithstanding the distinction between the two legal concepts, an analysis of arguable probable cause necessarily includes consideration of probable cause. In analyzing whether arguable probable cause exists in this case, we must determine whether Mitchell and Thesing's arrest of Ulrich was based on an objectively reasonable—even if mistaken—belief that the arrest was based in probable cause.

Drawing inferences in favor of Ulrich, while viewing the facts from the perspective of a reasonable officer, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Mitchell and Thesing were entitled to qualified immunity on Ulrich's Fourth Amendment claim.

The HRO specifically prohibited Ulrich from having either direct or indirect contact with Ronning or her mother, Mohs. While it does not appear that the Minnesota Supreme Court has defined “indirect contact” in this context, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has held in several unpublished opinions that indirect contact can occur when a defendant knowingly comes in close proximity to a person or persons protected by a court order. State v. Hazeman, 2002 WL 1050364 (Minn.Ct.App. May 28, 2002) (unpublished) (knowingly driving near and parking in close proximity to person protected by restraining order constitutes indirect contact in violation...