Copeland v. Todd

Decision Date16 September 2011
Docket NumberRecord No. 100929.
PartiesLucretia Putnam COPELANDv.Leslie TODD.
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Dana J. Cornett for appellant.David A. Penrod (Grant D. Penrod; Hoover Penrod, on brief), Harrisonburg, for appellee.Amicus Curiae: The American Academy of Adoption Attorneys; Colleen Marea Quinn (Locke Partin DeBoer & Quinn, on brief), Richmond, in support of appellant.Present: KINSER, C.J., LEMONS, GOODWYN, MILLETTE, and MIMS, JJ.Opinion by Justice DONALD W. LEMONS.

In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Rockingham County and dismissed the petition for adoption filed by Lucretia Putnam Copeland (“Copeland”).

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

On April 11, 2003, Leslie Renee Todd (“Todd”) gave birth to a female child who is the subject of this petition for adoption. At the time, Todd was incarcerated at Rockingham County Regional Jail for felony shoplifting and contempt of court. The name of the child's father does not appear on the birth certificate, and his identity is unknown. Todd's relatives were not prepared to take her newborn baby, and Todd agreed that Linda Guenther (“Guenther”), who worked as a minister to inmates at the jail, and Guenther's friend, Copeland, would take temporary custody of the child until Todd was released from incarceration.

On July 21, 2003, the Rockingham County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the “J&DR court) entered an order granting Guenther and Copeland “legal and physical custody, subject to [Todd's] visitation at the discretion of ... Guenther and ... Copeland.” Guenther and Copeland took the baby to visit Todd while she was incarcerated, usually on a weekly basis. Although Guenther and Copeland both cared for the baby during the first year, Copeland eventually became the baby's primary physical custodian.

After Todd was released in September 2003, Copeland, Guenther, and Todd all agreed that Todd could not take care of the child due to her housing and financial situation. However, both Guenther and Copeland encouraged Todd to spend time with the child, and they facilitated visits by providing transportation for Todd. Todd saw the child frequently through April 2005. During this period, the child lived exclusively with Copeland. Todd never offered financial support nor asked that the child be returned to her.

Beginning in April 2005, Todd's contact with the child began to wane. Between that time and June 2006, Todd only had contact with the child three times through two telephone calls and one chance encounter at a department store parking lot. Between July 2006 and July 2007, Todd neither contacted nor visited the child.

On June 21, 2007, Copeland met Todd at a local church and asked Todd for her consent to adopt the child. At that meeting, Todd refused Copeland's request, and she asked to see the child. Copeland agreed, and Todd visited with the child for approximately thirty minutes at Copeland's home.

After that visit, Todd asked that she be allowed to visit the child more frequently. However, Copeland, upon the advice of an attorney, refused further visitation. In response, Todd sought and received court-ordered visitation with the child from the J&DR court. The J&DR court appointed the Center for Marriage and Family Counseling (the “CMFC”), a private, non-profit counseling agency, to help set up a visitation plan for Todd and the child.

On November 26, 2007, Copeland filed a petition in the circuit court to adopt the child “without the consent of [Todd] pursuant to [Code § ] 63.2–1202(H).” In January 2008, Todd completed orientation with the CMFC and began supervised visits with the child. Todd visited the child on every occasion allowed by the court order. Counselors at the CMFC monitored these visits and reported that Todd and the child “interact[ed] in a positive manner,” and that “Todd has the knowledge, skills and ability to maintain and nurture an appropriate relationship with [the child].” Throughout these visits, the child was unaware that Todd was her birth mother. In a report dated March 20, 2008, the CMFC recommended that “Todd have the opportunity to have unrestricted visits with [the child] at her home and without Ms. Copeland's presence.” The CMFC further opined that [f]rom a developmental perspective, it would be detrimental ... to terminate a mother/daughter relationship at this point.” On April 24, 2008, the J&DR court issued an order mandating continued weekly visitations between Todd and the child at the CMFC, and ordered that [d]isclosure of identity of birth mother shall not occur [with-]out the consent of present custodians and birth mother.”

At the hearing regarding Copeland's petition for adoption, the circuit court heard testimony from several witnesses, including Guenther, Copeland, and Todd. Todd testified that she was not seeking immediate custody and that [her] goal is not to take [the child] from [Copeland].” Todd testified that Copeland has “done a phenomenal job raising [the child] and stated that it would probably be “traumatic” to move the child from Copeland's home. However, Todd stated that she does “eventually” want custody, but that “right now [her] plan is not to rip [the child] from [Copeland].”

At the conclusion of the proceedings, the circuit court granted Copeland's petition for adoption, holding that Todd failed to maintain contact with the child for a period of six months prior to the filing of the petition as provided in Code § 63.2–1202(H) and, in the alternative, that Todd had withheld her consent contrary to the child's best interests as provided in Code §§ 63.2–1203 and –1205.

Code § 63.2–1202(H) states that an adoption may proceed without a birth parent's consent when the prospective adoptive parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that the biological parent “without just cause, has neither visited nor contacted the child for a period of six months prior to the filing of the petition for adoption.” In interpreting this six month time period, the circuit court stated that Todd's contact with the child on June 21, 2007 “is solely, effectively the result of [Copeland] approaching her on the issue of adoption,” and “the evidence shows that if [Copeland] hadn't instituted these adoption conversations this status quo could have continued for years.” Therefore, the circuit court held “that as a matter of fact that [Copeland] has established by clear and convincing evidence that [Todd] ... without just cause has neither visited nor contacted this child for a period of six months prior to the filing of the petition for adoption,” with [t]he said six month period being contained in the period of June 10th, 2006, until June the 20th, 2007.” Accordingly, the circuit court held that under Code § 63.2–1202(H), Todd's consent to the adoption “is not necessary.” Alternatively, if the six month period of abandonment was not met under Code § 63.2–1202(H), the circuit court held that Todd withheld her consent for the adoption contrary to the child's best interests under Code §§ 63.2–1203 and –1205.

Code § 63.2–1203 states that if,

after consideration of the evidence, the circuit court finds that the valid consent of any person or agency whose consent is required is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child as set forth in Code § 63.2–1205, or is unobtainable, the circuit court may grant the petition without such consent.

When “determining whether the valid consent of any person whose consent is required is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child,” a circuit court

shall consider all relevant factors, including the birth parent(s)' efforts to obtain or maintain legal and physical custody of the child; whether the birth parent(s) are currently willing and able to assume full custody of the child; whether the birth parent(s)' efforts to assert parental rights were thwarted by other people; the birth parent(s)' ability to care for the child; the age of the child; the quality of any previous relationship between the birth parent(s) and the child and between the birth parent(s) and any other minor children; the duration and suitability of the child's present custodial environment; and the effect of a change of physical custody on the child.

Code § 63.2–1205.

In support of its determination that Todd withheld her consent contrary to the child's best interests, the circuit court addressed each of the eight factors set forth in Code § 63.2–1205. The circuit court held that: (1) Todd's efforts to obtain legal and physical custody of the child were “minimal and after the first two years almost nonexistent;” (2) Todd was not able financially or otherwise to assume full custody; (3) there was no effort by any other individuals to thwart Todd's assertion of parental rights; (4) Todd was not able to care for the child because of “her financial situation, her financial dependence[, and] her inability to legally operate a motor vehicle even five years post-release from incarceration;” (5) the child, at the age of five, has only known her home to be with Copeland and needs finality in a stable home life; (6) Todd's relationship with the child was poor, as she “in effect abandoned this child” and “simply failed to assume her duties as a parent” upon her release from jail; (7) the child's present custodial home with Copeland is “safe and secure from a duration standpoint it covers almost all of the child's life;” and (8) considering the long periods of abandonment by Todd, a change of physical custody from Copeland to Todd would “expose [ ] this child to substantial risk.” Accordingly, the circuit court held that, “considering the factors set forth in [Code § 63.2–1205, Todd's] consent is withheld contrary to the best interest of the child.”

A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and held that “the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States...

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