Williams v. the State.

Decision Date12 September 2011
Docket NumberNo. S11A0766.,S11A0766.
Citation715 S.E.2d 76,11 FCDR 2862,289 Ga. 672
PartiesWILLIAMSv.The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jennifer Sullivan Hanson, Bruce Steven Harvey, K. Julie Hojnacki, Mark Allen Yurachek, Atlanta, for appellant.Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Elizabeth A Baker, Paige Whitaker, Marc A. Mallon, Assistant District Attorneys, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Attorney General, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Kimmey Ware, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice.

Kelvin Williams was convicted of the malice murders of Brian Kyle Stringer and Myron Long, Jr., and other crimes. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial.1 Finding no error, we affirm.

1. The jury was authorized to find that victim Stringer was given $22,500 by his father to purchase a kilogram of cocaine. That amount of cocaine was usually sold in a “brick” form wrapped in plastic and bound with duct tape. Stringer contacted co-defendant Quanthony Williams to arrange the purchase. Within minutes of Stringer's call, Quanthony contacted appellant. Appellant and his co-defendants, however, did not have a kilogram of cocaine to sell. They devised a plan to obtain the money by selling the victims a brick containing a fake substance that would look like cocaine. Rather than research the issue himself, appellant contacted witness Robert Jones on Friday, August 22, for information on how to make such a fake brick. Jones, who was preparing to leave town for the weekend, told appellant about two legal substances that could be used to make a fake brick but did not tell appellant what he needed to do with the substances or how to package it. Jones then left town and did not return until the following Monday.

On Sunday, August 24, co-defendant Robinson gave money to witness John Jackson to use Jackson's home on Martin Street for a few hours. Shortly after Jackson left the home with witness Holt, they encountered the victims who asked for directions to the residence. Jackson told them where to go and alerted them that “somebody [was] up there waiting.” Afterwards Jackson and Holt heard gunshots and saw a man run from the back of the house and get into a car out front. When they returned home, Jackson saw the victims' bodies but could not enter because Robinson still had the key. Jackson later identified Robinson to the police.

Expert testimony established that victim Stringer died from a gunshot wound to the back of the head and that victim Long died from a gunshot wound to his front left shoulder. No drugs or weapons were found in the residence, and the victims' hands tested negative for gunshot residue.

A few weeks later, Jones was arrested for selling drugs and provided police with information about the crimes. This information included not only appellant's pre-crime inquiry about making fake cocaine but also appellant's post-crime admission to Jones on Tuesday, August 26, that we messed up, we did that” in regard to setting up the sale of the fake cocaine and the shooting of the victims after they realized the brick did not contain real cocaine. Jones also testified that, after his own release, appellant confronted Jones about talking to the police and that appellant asserted co-defendant Robinson was the shooter.

Appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient under the rule that [in] felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient.” OCGA § 24–4–8. Specifically, appellant asserts that the only evidence supporting his convictions was the uncorroborated testimony of witness Jones, whom appellant asserts was an accomplice or unindicted co-conspirator. However, we do not agree with appellant that Jones may be considered an accomplice to murder and the other crimes for which appellant was tried. The evidence showed only that Jones was a drug dealer whom appellant contacted for information regarding possible ingredients to be used in the making of a fake brick of cocaine. While Jones gleaned from his conversation with appellant that appellant was contemplating making a fake brick with the idea of selling it to persons unknown to Jones under the guise that the brick contained real cocaine, there was no evidence that Jones advised, encouraged or counseled appellant to commit any crime, see OCGA § 16–2–20(b)(4), or that Jones intended to participate in any crime. See Jackson v. State, 278 Ga. 235, 236(1), 599 S.E.2d 129 (2004) ( [p]roof that [one] shares a common criminal intent with the actual perpetrator is necessary” to render one a party to the crime (emphasis supplied)); Jack Goger, Daniel's Georgia Handbook on Criminal Evidence, § 6.33 (2010) ([t]he proof necessary to establish that [one's] actions were those of an accomplice ... must be of such a character so as to demonstrate a common criminal intention ... with the actual perpetrator[ ] (emphasis supplied)).

The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Appellant next contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object on hearsay grounds to the admission of Jones's statements to police. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant has the burden to show that counsel's performance was professionally deficient and that but for such deficient performance there is a reasonable probability...

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10 cases
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 29 Abril 2013
    ...counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to make a meritless objection to the admission of this evidence.” Williams v. State, 289 Ga. 672, 674(2), 715 S.E.2d 76 (2011) (citation omitted). And in any event, the lawyers made a reasonable strategic decision to instead use that statement ......
  • Durham v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 30 Agosto 2022
    ...(2011), and citing OCGA § 17-8-58 (b).6 Stripling v. State , 304 Ga. 131, 136 (2), 816 S.E.2d 663 (2018), citing Williams v. State , 289 Ga. 672, 673, 715 S.E.2d 76 (2011).7 See Palencia , 313 Ga. at 629-630, 872 S.E.2d 681 (explaining that even if there was independent corroborating eviden......
  • Beasley v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 27 Enero 2016
    ...1, 2013).24 (Punctuation omitted.) Threatt v. State, 293 Ga. 549, 551(1), 748 S.E.2d 400 (2013).25 See generally Williams v. State, 289 Ga. 672, 673(1), 715 S.E.2d 76 (2011) (holding that a witness was not an accomplice because "there was no evidence that [the witness] advised, encouraged[,......
  • Babbage v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 20 Enero 2015
    ...702 S.E.2d 151 (2010). As counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection, see Williams v. State, 289 Ga. 672(2), 715 S.E.2d 76 (2011), this enumeration is without merit. (b) Babbage also contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the ......
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