715 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1983), 83-5671, Kordich v. Marine Clerks Ass'n
|Citation:||715 F.2d 1392|
|Party Name:||Dennis KORDICH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MARINE CLERKS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants, and International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 13; and International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Defendants-Appellees. Merrill, Schultz, Hersh & Stoll, Appellant.|
|Case Date:||September 15, 1983|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
Submitted July 11, 1983.
Patricia Zugibe, Merrill, Schultz, Hersh & Stoll, Newport Beach, Cal., for appellant.
George E. Shibley, Long Beach, Cal., William H. Carder, Leonard & Carder, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before TANG, HUG, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Merrill, Schultz, Hersh & Stoll represented the plaintiffs in this action at
the time that a motion for a temporary restraining order was filed. Appellant seeks to challenge the district court's orders imposing sanctions on the firm and its clients because the court found the motion to be frivolous.
The appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant contends that an order compelling a non-party to pay attorney fees and costs is immediately appealable as a final order. We agree. Reygo Pacific Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647 (9th Cir.1982). It is equally true, however, that an order compelling a party to pay fees and costs is not appealable prior to the entry of final judgment. Johnny Pflocks, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 634 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir.1980). Thus, had the orders at issue here imposed liability solely on appellant, we would clearly have jurisdiction; had they imposed liability solely on plaintiffs, we would not. We must decide where to draw the line when the liability is joint and several.
We are persuaded by the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Eastern Maico Distributors, Inc. v. Maico-Fahrzeugfabrik, 658 F.2d 944 (3d Cir.1981), that jurisdiction is lacking here. As in that case, the congruence of interests between attorney and client here is so great that counsel's status as a non-party is questionable. We see no reason to permit indirectly through the attorney's appeal what the client could not achieve directly on its own: immediate review of interlocutory orders imposing liability for fees...
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