McCarty v. Herdman, 82-3216

Decision Date06 September 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-3216,82-3216
Citation716 F.2d 361
PartiesRichard McCARTY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Captain HERDMAN, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

R. Williams Meeks (argued), Columbus, Ohio, for petitioner-appellant.

James Kirk (argued), Franklin County Prosecutor, Columbus, Ohio, for respondent-appellee.

Before KENNEDY, MARTIN and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.

This appeal presents the sole issue of whether law enforcement officers must give "Miranda warnings" to individuals in custody for misdemeanor traffic offenses. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

Richard McCarty appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. The petitioner was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs in violation of Ohio Revised Code Sec. 4511.19, a first degree misdemeanor. Evidence supporting his conviction included incriminating statements which he tried unsuccessfully to suppress. He was sentenced to ninety days in jail, eighty of which were suspended. The Franklin County, Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the Ohio Supreme Court refused to accept jurisdiction in this matter. The district court below denied habeas relief because in its judgment, one arrested for a misdemeanor traffic offense is not constitutionally entitled to Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Clay v. Riddle, 542 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.1976); and Ohio v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St.2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969). McCarty appeals from that decision.

The state trooper's arrest report and the parties' stipulations comprised all the facts before the trial judge. Ohio State Trooper Williams observed McCarty's car weaving in and out of its lane while travelling south on Interstate 270 on the evening of March 31, 1980. Trooper Williams stopped the car and asked McCarty to get out. He noticed that McCarty needed support to keep from falling as he exited the vehicle. "At this time Trooper Williams concluded that the defendant would be charged with a traffic offense and, therefore, his freedom to leave the scene terminated." 1 (Joint stipulation.)

McCarty had difficulty performing the field sobriety balancing test. While still at the scene of the arrest, he told Trooper Williams that he had recently consumed two beers and several joints of marijuana. McCarty's speech was very slurred and Trooper Williams had difficulty understanding him.

Trooper Williams placed McCarty under formal arrest and took him to the county jail for an intoxilyzer test. The test showed no alcohol in McCarty's system. At the jail, McCarty answered Trooper Williams' questions for the State Highway Patrol Alcohol Influence Report. McCarty responded that he was "barely" under the influence of alcohol. At Trooper Williams' request, McCarty wrote on the report that the marijuana he had smoked had not been treated with "PCP" or "angel dust." At no time, either before or after McCarty was taken into custody, did Trooper Williams advise him of his constitutional rights.

Before the trial judge, McCarty moved to exclude his statements to Trooper Williams. His motion was denied. He pleaded nolo contendere and was found guilty of driving while intoxicated.

McCarty argued consistently, at both state and federal levels 2 that Miranda v. Arizona requires law enforcement officers to advise all persons taken into custody of their constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. Because he was not so advised when arrested for drunken driving, he maintains that the statements he made while in police custody cannot support his conviction. We agree.

In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that an individual in police custody may not be interrogated until and unless he is first advised that he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says may be used against him; that he had the right to an attorney; and that an attorney will be appointed for him if he cannot retain one. These warnings are an "absolute prerequisite to interrogation," said the court, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1624, and without the warnings, the fruits of a custodial interrogation are inadmissible at trial.

To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege.... But unless and until such warnings are demonstrated ..., no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

384 U.S. at 478-479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630 (footnote omitted).

Miranda, then, creates procedural safeguards to secure the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Although felony offenses were specifically in issue in Miranda and its companion cases, the language of the opinion does not limit the safeguards to individuals suspected of felonies. Similarly, yet more importantly, the language of the fifth amendment does not limit the privilege against self-incrimination to those charged with felonies. It has never been suggested that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor could be compelled to testify against himself. To so argue would be both illogical and inconsistent. "[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege ... serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves." 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624 (emphasis added). We hold that Miranda warnings must be given to all individuals prior to custodial interrogation, whether the offense investigated be a felony or a misdemeanor traffic offense.

Our reasoning here follows Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), which concerned the scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel. There the defendant faced potential incarceration for committing a misdemeanor. The Court held, "[a]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Id. at 37, 92 S.Ct. at 2012. The Court relied heavily on Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1964), for the proposition that all defendants, including the indigent, are entitled to counsel. Although Gideon involved a felony offense, the Court noted neither Gideon nor the sixth amendment right to counsel was limited to "serious" offenses. 407 U.S. at 30, 92 S.Ct. at 2009. We follow this same reasoning to extend the right to counsel to individuals charged with misdemeanors.

We recognize that the Fourth Circuit in Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.1976), declined to require Miranda warnings for misdemeanor traffic offenses. That court's decision seemed to turn on two factors. First, the court noted its awareness of language in Miranda that the Miranda decision was "not intended to hamper" the traditional investigative functions of the police. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, quoted in Clay, 541 F.2d at 457. Second, the court emphasized that "the unlawful incident [in Clay ] was a commonplace event--a traffic offense ...." Id. Neither of these factors convinces us that Miranda does not apply to traffic misdemeanors.

First, the traditional investigative police functions will not be hampered by requiring Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogations in misdemeanor traffic offenses. "On-the-scene questioning," preserved by the Miranda Court, is likewise preserved today. To the extent that Miranda and its progeny permit non-custodial interrogations when a felony is investigated, our decision permits the same when a misdemeanor traffic offense is investigated. It is only when an individual "has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, that warnings must be given before questioning begins. We do not hold that the mere stopping of a motor vehicle triggers Miranda. Because the police gather information in misdemeanor traffic offenses primarily through on-the-scene questioning, their freedom to investigate remains essentially unhampered.

Second, we attach no significance to the fact that traffic offenses are "commonplace" events. The privilege against self-incrimination is an enduring right, undiminished by...

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29 cases
  • Berkemer v. Carty
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 2 Julio 1984
    ...him and thus has not yet had an opportunity to try to impeach the State's evidence or to present evidence of his own. Pp. 442-445. 716 F.2d 361 (CA 6 1983) Alan C. Travis, Columbus, Ohio, for petitioner. R. William Meeks, Columbus, Ohio, for respondent. Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinio......
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    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • 14 Julio 1989
    ...Miranda warnings. The record consisted of the highway patrolman's arrest report and stipulations by the parties. McCarty v. Herdman, 716 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1983). During the state court proceeding, the statements were held admissible. The driver pleaded guilty and preserved the error fo......
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    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 2 Abril 1996
    ...Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.1976); State v. Tabory, 260 S.C. 355, 366, 196 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1973); but see McCarty v. Herdman, 716 F.2d 361 (6th Cir.1983) cert. granted 464 U.S. 1038, 104 S.Ct. 697, 79 L.Ed.2d 163 (1984). 1 (footnote in State v. Peele, 298 S.C. 63, 378 S.E.2d 254 ......
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    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • 12 Febrero 1988
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1 books & journal articles
  • Pronouncements of the U.s. Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1983 - 1984
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 13-9, September 1984
    • Invalid date
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