Paradis v. State

Decision Date25 March 1986
Docket NumberNo. 15867,15867
PartiesDonald M. PARADIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

William V. Brown and John P. Luster (argued), Coeur d'Alene, and Charles B. Lempesis, Post Falls, for petitioner-appellant. Edwin S. Matthews, Jr., New York City, appeared after argument and filed supplemental brief.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., and Lynn E. Thomas (argued), Sol. Gen., Boise, for respondent.

BISTLINE, Justice.

HISTORY

Donald Paradis has been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in the killing of Kimberly Ann Palmer. In State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1984), cert. denied 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 3592, 82 L.Ed.2d 888, this Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence. The history behind the arrest and conviction of Paradis is adequately contained in our decision on Paradis' direct appeal and will not be repeated here.

On April 13, 1984, Paradis filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The state moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court on December 17, 1984. Paradis now appeals to this Court.

Essentially, Paradis argues that there are three areas wherein genuine issues of material fact exist, consequently making it improper for the district court to have granted the state's motion for summary judgment. These three areas are: (1) medical evidence available to counsel, but not used by him, revealed that the victim was killed in Washington and not Idaho, thereby precluding Idaho courts from exercising jurisdiction to try him; (2) the state unconstitutionally permitted the cremation of the victim's body without allowing the defense an opportunity to independently conduct its own examination; and (3) Paradis was denied effective assistance of counsel.

After this case was argued, additional counsel has appeared on behalf of Paradis and, with Court approval, has filed a supplemental brief, raising the additional challenges that the district court erred in denying a motion for a change of venue, and that prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced Paradis in the eyes of the jury. The state filed a responsive brief.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A petition for post-conviction relief is a special proceeding that is civil in nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 1. It is a proceeding entirely new and independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction. I.C. § 19-4901(b); Bearshield, supra, 104 Idaho at 678, 452 P.2d at 550. Thus, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable in such a proceeding. State v. Goodrich, 104 Idaho 469, 471, 660 P.2d 934, 936 (1983).

Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a summary judgment is "only to be granted when all the facts contained in all the applicable pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits have been construed most favorably to the nonmoving party, and it is clear that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985); Crowley v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818, 821, 683 P.2d 854, 857 (1984).

Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) and (c) deal with summary dispositions of a petition for post-conviction relief as follows:

(b) When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or on default thereof, the court may order the application dismissed or grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings otherwise continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a material issue of fact.

(c) The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

As our Court of Appeals stated in Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (Ct.App.1982):

[T]o justify an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent upon the applicant to tender a factual showing based upon evidence that would be admissible at the hearing. His application must be supported by written statements from witnesses who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge, or must be based upon otherwise verifiable information. Absent the witnesses or verifiability of the facts to which they could testify, we hold the application fails to raise material issues of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing.

Applying these rules to the facts of this case, we hold that the district court did not err in granting the state's motion for summary judgment.

II. THE STANDARD APPLIED
A. Sufficiency of Jurisdictional Evidence.

The essence of Paradis' first argument on this issue is that the evidence in this case is insufficient to prove that the victim was killed in Idaho, and that Idaho courts do not have jurisdiction in the matter. This argument was already decided by this Court on Paradis' direct appeal wherein this Court rejected Paradis' contention stating:

[Paradis] also argues that the prosecution did not sufficiently prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in Kootenai County. Appellant's reliance upon these arguments is misplaced since a defendant can be convicted solely on circumstantial evidence. State v. Chapple, 98 Idaho 475, 567 P.2d 20 (1977); State v. Ponthier, 92 Idaho 704, 449 P.2d 364 (1969). The state presented a strong circumstantial case against appellant. He was placed at or near the scene where the victim's body was found, in the company of a person, Larry Evans, who was almost certainly in or around the scene at the time of the murder (as indicated by the presence of his hat under Palmer's body). The area was sparsely populated, and very few people used the road where the van was found; thus, the presence of strangers in the area was conspicuous. Witnesses observed a van Palmer and Currier had been driving on that road shortly before three men, whose identities were established, including appellant, were observed leaving the area on foot. The presence of these men on foot left little doubt that they had reached the area in the van. In addition, strong evidence of motive was presented in that appellant was strongly linked, by evidence discovered in his house, to the death of Scott Currier. Currier's distinctive brass belt buckle, cut off his belt, was found at appellant's house. The belt was found on Currier's body. A lawn dart which was used to stab Currier in the back was found in appellant's house. Pieces of terry cloth identical to those used to tie Currier into the sleeping bag were found in appellant's house. There was evidence that an attempt was made to clean the house after Currier's death, as evidenced by the bloody rug hidden in the basement, with rags having been washed in a washing machine. An arson-caused fire had been set in appellant's house in an apparent attempt to destroy all of this evidence. There was a strong inference that appellant attempted to leave the area after the killings. Also, a blue blanket that had been in Currier's fiancee's van was found in appellant's car when he was arrested. The circumstantial evidence presented in this case was more than sufficient to support the conviction of appellant for aiding and abetting the murder of Kimberly Palmer. Paradis, supra, 106 Idaho at 121, 676 P.2d at 35 (emphasis added).

A trial court need not consider anew in post-conviction proceedings issues previously raised and decided on direct appeal. I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4), in fact, only allows individuals to seek post-conviction relief who allege "that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." (Emphasis added.) See also Larsen v. May, 93 Idaho 602, 606, 468 P.2d 866, 870 (1970); Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 674, 603 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1979) ("If [defendant] chooses to raise the issue on direct appeal and the matter is considered, it becomes res judicata."). Accordingly, we will not review again Paradis' arguments that have already been fully considered and rejected in his direct appeal to this Court.

B. Destruction of Exculpatory or Jurisdictional Evidence.

Paradis' next argument is that the state violated his constitutional rights when it allowed the victim's body to be cremated two days after an autopsy had been performed but before the defense had been given an opportunity to independently examine the body. Paradis asserts that the autopsy performed was inadequate, and that a more complete one would have corroborated his claim that the victim was killed in Washington rather than Idaho. We disagree.

Paradis relies upon two United States Supreme Court decisions to support his argument. They are: California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). We find both cases to be inapposite.

1. The State's Duty to Disclose and Preserve Exculpatory Evidence--The Federal Rule. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Supreme

Court held that due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence within its possession. Said the Court:

[T]he...

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