Jones v. McDaniel

• Decision Date: 10 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10–16658.,10–16658.
• Citation: 717 F.3d 1062
• Parties: Christopher A. JONES, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. E.K. McDANIEL; Mark Drain; Jackie Crawford, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

717 F.3d 1062

Christopher A. JONES, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.E.K. McDANIEL; Mark Drain; Jackie Crawford, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 10–16658.

United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 12, 2013.

Filed June 10, 2013.

Bradley Walters (argued) and Jorge Nicolas Anwandter (argued), Law Students, under the supervision of Erwin Chemerinsky, Peter Afrasiabi, and Kathryn Davis, University of California, Irvine, School of Law, Appellate Litigation Clinic, Irvine, CA, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Clark G. Leslie (argued), Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City, NV, for Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, Robert A. McQuaid, Magistrate Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:05–cv–00278–RAM.

Before: MARSHA S. BERZON and RICHARD C. TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and LEE H. ROSENTHAL, District Judge.^*

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

While incarcerated in Ely State Prison in Ely, Nevada, Christopher Jones wrote a letter to his fellow inmates, calling on them to work together in support of his class action lawsuit against prison administrators. Later, prison officials discovered the letter in Jones' cell and disciplined him for violating a prison regulation that prohibited encouraging disruption.

Jones filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden E.K. McDaniel, Corrections Officer Mark Drain, and Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”) Director Jackie Crawford (collectively, “defendants”), alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted Jones summary judgment on the due process claim, but granted defendants summary judgment as to the First Amendment claims. Following a jury trial on damages in which Jones was awarded both nominal and punitive damages, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, according to which Jones received $11,000 plus costs and attorney's fees, as well as expungement of the record of the violation, “in full satisfaction of the judgment entered herein.” Jones then filed this appeal seeking review of the district court's adverse partial summary judgment order regarding his First Amendment claims.

The question in this case is whether Jones' appeal may go forward or whether it was rendered moot by the parties' settlement agreement. We hold the latter and dismiss the appeal.

I. Background

A. The Letter

In September 1999, Jones drafted a letter to his fellow inmates, calling on them to “work togather [sic] and try and tie this system in knots, by using the legal system and the administrative grievence [sic] process to open the door for [a] class action I am working on.” By “working together for our common good,” Jones wrote, the inmates “[would] have a loud voice” to “direct [their] distrust, dissatisfaction, rage and intelligence in one direction (at the system) instead of at each other.” Jones concluded by telling inmates to “read this[,] and if you agree[,] just write your cell [number] on the back and pass it to the next cell and I'll get back to you with the next step.” Jones did not circulate the letter broadly; he may, however, have shown it to a few other inmates.

In September 2000, NDOC Corrections Officer Michael Nustad searched Jones' cell as part of an unrelated prison-wide search. According to Jones, Officer Nustad was aware that Jones previously had filed § 1983 actions against several other corrections officers. Jones states that during the search of his cell, he heard Officer Nustad tell another corrections officer, “this is the case I was telling you about against the Sarg, Rob and Grant. This is that assh—e.” At some point during the search, Officer Nustad discovered the letter.

B. Disciplinary Proceedings

The following day, Officer Nustad wrote up charges against Jones for violating Code of Penal Discipline Section MJ–28, which prohibits prisoners from “[o]rganizing, encouraging or participating in a work stoppage or other disruptive demonstration or practice.” The charging document characterizes the letter as an “attempt to organize and disrupt,” citing language from the letter calling on inmates to “[tie] the system in knots” and “direct ... distrust, dissatisfaction, rage and intelligence ... at the system.”

Corrections Officer Mark Drain served as the Hearing Officer at Jones' subsequentdisciplinary hearing on the MJ–28 charge. At the hearing, Officer Drain refused Jones' request for a copy of the letter to review prior to or during the proceedings. When Jones repeatedly asked for the letter to be produced, Officer Drain removed him for “disrupting the hearing.” Officer Drain then determined that Jones had violated MJ–28, and issued sanctions of 180 days in disciplinary segregation, 90 days loss of phone privileges, and forfeiture of the letter.

Jones appealed Officer Drain's determination to Warden McDaniel, contending that the letter should have been presented at the hearing, and that it was protected under the First Amendment. Warden McDaniel upheld the finding and sanctions. Having exhausted his appeals within the prison system, Jones served the entirety of his disciplinary sanctions.

C. Jones' § 1983 Suit1. Partial Summary Judgment Orders

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jones filed an amended complaint against Officer Drain, Warden McDaniel, and NDOC Director Crawford. Jones asserted three causes of action: (1) violation of his procedural due process rights stemming from Officer Drain's refusal to produce the letter at the disciplinary hearing; (2) violation of his First Amendment rights and retaliation based on the exercise of his right to free speech; and (3) violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments by Warden McDaniel and Crawford based on their failure to supervise their subordinates. Jones requested declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $10,000.

Magistrate Judge Robert McQuaid, Jr. issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment recommending that the court: (1) grant Jones' request for summary judgment as to the due process claim; (2) grant defendants' request for summary judgment as to the First Amendment and retaliation claims; and (3) grant Jones' request for summary judgment on his failure to supervise claim against Warden McDaniel, but deny Jones' request for the same claim as to Crawford. The district court later issued an order accepting the R & R.

2. The Trial

Upon the district court's finding that Officer Drain and Warden McDaniel violated Jones' due process rights, the parties “proceed[ed] to trial solely on the issue of Mr. Jones' damages.” ¹ Magistrate Judge McQuaid, the same judge who issued the R & R, presided over the trial. As in his amended complaint, Jones sought nominal and punitive damages,² as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. At trial, Jones argued that his disciplinary sanctions, particularly his placement in disciplinary segregation, constituted an exaggerated response to the uncirculated letter, thereby entitling him to punitive damages.

The jury agreed and awarded Jones $2 in nominal damages ($1 each for Officer Drain's violation and Warden McDaniel's violation) and $11,000 in punitive damages. That same day, the district court issued its “Judgement in a Civil Case,” which ordered that Jones recover $11,002 from defendants.

3. The Settlement

Following the district court's entry of judgment in this case, the parties filed various post judgment motions. Magistrate Judge McQuaid then held a “Status Conference” to resolve the post judgment motions.³ At the conference, defendants agreed to pay Jones a total of $34,825.16, which included Jones' damages award of $11,000 ⁴ plus attorney's fees and costs. Defendants also agreed to expunge the official records of Jones' MJ–28 violation and subsequent discipline. Judge McQuaid then stated to Jones, “[i]n exchange for that ... you will execute a release of all claims, releasing the defendants from all claims arising out of this lawsuit.” Jones' attorney responded that “since the case was decided on the merits,” the term “release [ ]” may not be appropriate. Judge McQuaid agreed, and indicated that the agreement instead would be designated a “satisfaction of judgment,” meaning that “the defendants paid the judgment and it's satisfied.” At that point, Judge McQuaid asked Jones, “[n]ow, you agree to that settlement, Mr. Jones?” to which Jones responded, “[y]es, I do, Your Honor.” The parties then stipulated to withdraw all post-trial motions, and Judge McQuaid concluded: “[t]hen it's done. It's all done.... Just a Satisfaction of Judgment, that's the last document in the file and then the file will be closed.”

The parties thereupon executed an “Accord and Satisfaction,” providing that the defendants agreed to pay Jones a total of $11,800 plus $23,025.16 in attorney's fees, and to remove all record of the disciplinary charge. The document then states that “Jones, by and through his attorney ... hereby acknowledge[s] receipt of payment ... in full satisfaction of the judgment entered herein and the accord regarding post judgment disputes raised by the parties.”

4. The Appeal

Two days after executing the Accord and Satisfaction, Jones filed a pro se Notice of Appeal of the district court's order adopting the R & R. Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the Accord and Satisfaction resolved all of Jones' claims against them. Alternatively, defendants' motion sought an indicative ruling from the district court pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1 as to the scope of the Accord and Satisfaction. A motions panel of this court denied the motion “without prejudice to refiling if the district court issues an indicative ruling.”

Defendants thereupon filed a “Motion for Indicative Ruling” in the district court, seeking the court's views as to the scope of the Accord and Satisfaction....