Roosevelt-Hennix v. Prickett
Decision Date | 16 May 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 12–1307.,12–1307. |
Citation | 717 F.3d 751 |
Parties | Lara ROOSEVELT–HENNIX, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Officer Shane PRICKETT, in his individual and official capacities, Defendant–Appellant, and The City of Florence, a municipal corporation; Officer James Barr, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Eric M. Ziporin (Sarah E. McCutcheon with him on the briefs), Senter Goldfarb & Rice, L.L.C., Denver, CO, for Defendant–Appellant.
Kim Welch, William Muhr Law Firm, Colorado Springs, CO (L. Dan Rector, Rector Law Firm, Colorado Springs, CO, on the brief), for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Officer Shane Prickett of the Florence City Police Department used a Taser on Lara Roosevelt–Hennix while Roosevelt–Hennix's hands were cuffed behind her back and she was seated in the back seat of a police car. Roosevelt–Hennix brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Prickett subjected her to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ( ).1 Prickett argued he was entitled to qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ( ). The district court denied qualified immunity in an brief oral ruling at the conclusion of the hearing on Prickett's summary judgment motion. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
Orders denying summary judgment are ordinarily not appealable final orders for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. Black, 706 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir.2013). This court does, however, have interlocutory jurisdiction over a subset of appeals from the denial of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir.2008). Whether a ruling falls within, or outside, that subset depends on the nature of the appeal. To the extent an appeal turns on an abstract issue of law, we have jurisdiction to review a denial of qualified immunity. Allstate Sweeping, 706 F.3d at 1266–67. That is, this court has jurisdiction to review “(1) whether the facts that the district court ruled a reasonable jury could find would suffice to show a legal violation, or (2) whether that law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. at 1267 (quotation omitted). In contrast, this court has no interlocutory jurisdiction to review “whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 320, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). “[T]he Supreme Court [has] indicated that, at the summary judgment stage at least, it is generally the district court's exclusive job to determine which facts a jury could reasonably find from the evidence presented to it by the litigants.” Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir.2010). “So, for example, if a district court concludes that a reasonable jury could find certain specified facts in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court has indicated we usually must take them as true—and do so even if our own de novo review of the record might suggest otherwise as a matter of law.” Id.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, however, it will not always be easy “to separate an appealed order's reviewable determination (that a given set of facts violates clearly established law) from its unreviewable determination (that an issue of fact is ‘genuine’).” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319, 115 S.Ct. 2151. This is particularly true when district courts “deny summary judgment motions without indicating their reasons for doing so.” Id. In denying Prickett qualified immunity, the district court simply stated as follows: 2 In light of the district court's failure to set out which set of facts it assumed when it denied summary judgment,3 Prickett's brief on appeal sets out a version of the encounter and asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity given that factual background.4 For her part, Roosevelt–Hennix sets out a materially different version of the facts and argues, given that set of facts, the district court correctly denied Prickett's assertion of qualified immunity. Given this unfortunate state of affairs, this court has no alternative other than “to undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to [Roosevelt–Hennix], likely assumed.” Id.; see also Lewis, 604 F.3d at 1225 (). That cumbersome review demonstrates a factual milieu at odds with Prickett's version.
With two notable exceptions, the facts leading up to Prickett's use of a taser on Roosevelt–Hennix are largely undisputed. Those facts, stated in the manner most favorable to Roosevelt–Hennix, are as follows. Prickett and James Barr are officersof the Florence City Police Department. Barr initiated a traffic stop when he observed Roosevelt–Hennix's vehicle exceeding the speed limit. Roosevelt–Hennix pulled her vehicle off the road and into a grocery store parking lot. Barr pulled his patrol car in behind Roosevelt–Hennix's vehicle, approached Roosevelt–Hennix, and explained the reason for the stop. At this point, Barr observed the following: (1) accompanying Roosevelt–Hennix in the vehicle were an adult male and Roosevelt–Hennix's young daughter; (2) an odor of alcohol was emanating from the vehicle; and (3) Roosevelt–Hennix appeared to have been drinking. When Barr asked Roosevelt–Hennix how much alcohol she had consumed, she admitted consuming two or three drinks.
At Barr's request, Roosevelt–Hennix agreed to step out of her vehicle and perform standard roadside sobriety tests. Barr conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which indicated Roosevelt–Hennix might be intoxicated. Barr also began to instruct Roosevelt–Hennix through additional tests, but stopped when Roosevelt–Hennix indicated a back injury prevented her from performing some physical tasks. At that point, Barr handcuffed Roosevelt–Hennix's arms behind her back and placed her under arrest for DUI. Although she was angry Barr ignored her request to employ the handcuffs outside her daughter's line of sight, Roosevelt–Hennix voluntarily presented her hands for cuffing. Barr placed Roosevelt–Hennix in the back seat of a patrol vehicle and closed the door. Barr testified Roosevelt–Hennix was compliant as he placed her in the patrol vehicle. Although the exact timing of his arrival is less than clear, Roosevelt–Hennix testified Prickett arrived on the scene by the time Barr placed her in the patrol car.
Roosevelt–Hennix began to panic after Barr placed her in the police car. She testified as follows: “I'm claustrophobic, and with the windows up, doors locked, hands behind my back handcuffed, and I didn't know what was going on with my daughter....” She yelled at the officers to return to the patrol vehicle and tell her what was going on with her daughter, but Barr and Prickett initially ignored her request. During this outburst, Roosevelt–Hennix banged her head against the window of the patrol vehicle to try and get the officers' attention.5 Prickett returned to the patrol vehicle and opened the door. According to Roosevelt–Hennix, she asked Prickett if “one of [the officers] could stand by the car with [her] so that the door [could] remain open so [she would not] go into a full panic because of being in a confined space.” Prickett refused her request and told Roosevelt–Hennix to calm down and stop banging her head against the window.
Prickett determined Roosevelt–Hennix should be “hobbled” 6 prior to transport to the police department. Prickett opened the patrol vehicle's rear door and ordered Roosevelt–Hennix to place her feet outside the vehicle. It is at this critical point that the parties' different versions of the events become irreconcilable. In his opening brief, Prickett asserts his use of the taser was precipitated by Roosevelt–Hennix's refusal to comply with his order. In particular, Prickett asserts Barr attempted to physically remove Roosevelt–Hennix's feet from the patrol car, but was unable to do so because Roosevelt–Hennix wedged her feet underneath the cage partition separating the front seat from the back seat. Accordingly, Prickett contends that in analyzing his claim for qualified immunity, this court must view Roosevelt–Hennix's excessive force claim through the lens of an individual actively resisting a lawful police order. In her brief, on the other hand, Roosevelt–Hennix asserts she told the officers a preexisting back injury left her unable to lift herself and turn her body to place her feet outside the vehicle. Furthermore, she specifically asserts that “the two officers never attempted to lift [her] legs to obtain compliance.” Appellee Br. at 14. Roosevelt–Hennix argues that under this set of facts, the one this court must assume for purposes of review of a summary-judgment based denial of...
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