Haliye v. Celestica Corp., Case No. 06-CV-4769 (PJS/JJG)

• Citation: 717 F.Supp.2d 873
• Decision Date: 10 June 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 06-CV-4769 (PJS/JJG)
• Parties: Faysal HALIYE, Burhan Abdi, Abshir Aden, Abdirahman Ahmed, Kalid Ahmed, Mohamed Ahmed, Suleyman Arab, Liban Artan, Bazi Sheikh Bin-Sheikh, Abdulkadir Elmi, Ahmed Elmi, Adil Gatur, Ahmed Hassan, Amin Hassen, Hussein Jama, Abdulkadir Matan, Burhan Mohamud, Fozi Mustapha, Zabiti Omer, Ibrahim Roble, and Zeinab Yusef, Plaintiffs, v. CELESTICA CORPORATION and Adecco USA, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

717 F.Supp.2d 873

Faysal HALIYE, Burhan Abdi, Abshir Aden, Abdirahman Ahmed, Kalid Ahmed, Mohamed Ahmed, Suleyman Arab, Liban Artan, Bazi Sheikh Bin-Sheikh, Abdulkadir Elmi, Ahmed Elmi, Adil Gatur, Ahmed Hassan, Amin Hassen, Hussein Jama, Abdulkadir Matan, Burhan Mohamud, Fozi Mustapha, Zabiti Omer, Ibrahim Roble, and Zeinab Yusef, Plaintiffs,

v.CELESTICA CORPORATION and Adecco USA, Inc., Defendants.

Case No. 06-CV-4769 (PJS/JJG).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

June 10, 2010.

James H. Kaster, David E. Schlesinger, and Megan I. Brennan, Nichols Kaster, PLLP, for plaintiffs.

Erika N.D. Stanat, Lucinda Odell Lapoff, and Jeffrey J. Calabrese, Harter Secrest & Emery LLP; and Frederick W. Vogt, MacKall, Crounse & Moore, PLC, for defendant, Celestica Corporation.

Bruce J. Douglas and Carrie L. Zochert, Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, for defendant, Adecco USA, Inc.

ORDER

PATRICK J. SCHILTZ, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are former employees of defendants Celestica Corporation ("Celestica") and Adecco USA, Inc. ("Adecco") (a temporary-employment agency) who worked at Celestica's manufacturing plant in Arden Hills, Minnesota. Plaintiffs are all practicing Muslims who allege that defendants discriminated against them on the basis of their religion and failed to accommodate their religious duty to pray five times each day. Plaintiffs bring this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn.Stat. §§ 363A.01 et seq.¹

This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment. Defendants move for summary judgment on numerous grounds, including that some plaintiffs failed to notify defendants of a conflict between their religious obligations and their work duties; that some plaintiffs did not suffer an adverse employment action; and that, by offering every plaintiff the opportunity to transfer to a different shift, defendants provided a reasonable accommodation. The Court held a lengthy hearing on defendants' motion on March 19, 2010. As the Court noted at that hearing, defendants have properly moved for summary judgment only on plaintiffs' reasonable-accommodation claims, and not on plaintiffs' disparate-treatment claims. Thus, this case would have to be tried even if the Court granted defendants' summary-judgment motion.

The Court will not grant defendants' summary-judgment motion, though. As the Court explained at the hearing, disputes of fact preclude summary judgment on the issues of notice and adverse action (with one exception ²). The Court also finds that disputes of fact preclude summary judgment on the issue of the reasonableness of defendants' proffered accommodations. The Court writes thisshort opinion to clarify why it believes that the issue of reasonableness is for the jury in this case. The Court also describes what factors the jury will be permitted to consider in making its determination. This guidance is necessary because, at oral argument, it became apparent that the parties dispute what factors the Court (at summary judgment) or the jury (at trial) may consider when deciding whether an employer has reasonably accommodated an employee's religious practices. Finally, the Court addresses the parties' arguments regarding the issue of Adecco's liability and the issue of punitive damages.

A. Reasonable Accommodation

At oral argument, defendants insisted that, in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable, the only factor that a court or jury may consider is the extent to which the employee's religious conflict was resolved by the accommodation. Defendants further argued that, because they offered to fully accommodate every plaintiff's religious needs by transferring them to the first shift, plaintiffs' claims necessarily fail as a matter of law. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) ("where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee's religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end").

There are several problems with defendants' argument. First, the argument rests on the assumption that a transfer to the first shift would, in fact, have fully resolved each plaintiff's religious conflict. Although it is true that no first-shift employee has joined this lawsuit, the record suggests that the practicing Muslims who work on the first shift generally believe that the windows of time during which prayers may be performed are fairly large. See Defs.' Ex. 2 (listing windows between one and four hours long for the various prayers). As defendants themselves persuasively argued when opposing plaintiffs' motion for class certification, plaintiffs vary considerably in their beliefs concerning the required timing of their prayers. Many plaintiffs believe that prayers must be performed either at a precise time or within a very small window of time-a belief that may not be shared by the Muslims working on the first shift. Given the variance in the religious beliefs at issue in this case, the Court cannot conclude that, because the first-shift employees may be satisfied with their schedule, an offer to transfer to the first shift would have fully resolved the religious conflict for each of the plaintiffs in this lawsuit.

The Court stresses that it is not holding that the defendants were required to offer an accommodation that fully resolved plaintiffs' religious conflicts. See Sturgill v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (8th Cir.2008) (rejecting argument that an accommodation is unreasonable as a matter of law unless it eliminates the conflict). The Court is merely responding to defendants' argument that they did offer an accommodation that fully resolved plaintiffs' religious conflicts. That is a disputed issue of fact, and thus defendants' motion for summary judgment must be denied. See Thomas v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir.2000) (after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it either offered a reasonable accommodation or was unable to do so without undue hardship); EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir.1997) ("The burden of making a reasonable accommodation or of showing that any accommodation would result in undue hardship lies with the employer."); see also Seaworth v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) ("Once a plaintiff establishes aprima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that accommodation would result in undue hardship to the employer.").

The second problem with defendants' argument is that they misstate the law. That should be obvious, as the legal rule urged by defendants is utterly illogical. Again, defendants argue that the only thing that may be considered in deciding whether an accommodation is reasonable is the extent to which the accommodation resolves the religious conflict. Suppose, then, that in a particular case, the court found that an accommodation resolved 30 percent of the conflict. How could the court possibly decide whether 30 percent was "reasonable" if the court could look at nothing except the fact that 30 percent of the conflict was resolved? Defendants have no answer.

Moreover, the legal rule urged by defendants is irreconcilable with Eighth Circuit precedent. As noted, the Eighth Circuit has made clear that an accommodation may be reasonable notwithstanding the fact that it does not completely eliminate the employee's religious conflict. Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1030-31. At the same time, however, the Eighth Circuit expressly declined to hold that employers are never required to eliminate their employees' religious conflicts. Id. at 1030. Instead, the Eighth Circuit explained that "[w]hat is reasonable depends on the totality of the circumstances and therefore might, or might not, require elimination of a particular, fact-specific conflict." Id. at 1030. The Eighth Circuit later reiterated the point: "[T]here may be many situations in which the only reasonable accommodation is to eliminate the religious conflict altogether." Id. at 1033. Given that total elimination of the conflict is required in some circumstances and not in others, the reasonableness of an accommodation must depend in part on factors other than the extent to which the accommodation resolves the conflict.

The final, and most important, problem with defendants' argument is that it is contrary to what appears to be the unanimous weight of authority that the reasonableness of any given accommodation is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances. In Sturgill, the Eighth Circuit made this clear:

[I]n close cases, [reasonableness] is a question for the jury because it turns on fact-intensive issues such as work demands, the strength and nature of the employee's religious conviction, the terms of an applicable CBA, and the contractual rights and workplace attitudes of co-workers. Bilateral cooperation under Title VII requires employers to make serious efforts to accommodate a conflict between work demands and an employee's sincere religious beliefs. But it also requires accommodation by the employee, and a reasonable jury may find in many circumstances that the employee must either compromise a religious observance or practice, or accept a less desirable job or less favorable working conditions.

Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1033. See also id. at 1030 ("[w]hat is reasonable depends on the totality of the circumstances").

Many other cases illustrate the point that "totality of the circumstances" means "totality of the circumstances." See Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir.2007) (" 'Each case involving [a reasonable accommodation] determination necessarily depends upon its own facts and circumstances, and comes down to a determination of "reasonableness" under the unique circumstances of the...