Flores v. U.S. Citizenship

• Decision Date: 04 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–3549.,12–3549.
• Citation: 718 F.3d 548
• Parties: Franika Fonshea FLORES, et al., Plaintiffs, Stacey Leigh Suazo and Saady Suazo Calix, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Alejandro Mayorkas, Mark Hansen, Janet Napolitano, Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, and Steven M. Dettelbach, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

718 F.3d 548

Franika Fonshea FLORES, et al., Plaintiffs,Stacey Leigh Suazo and Saady Suazo Calix, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Alejandro Mayorkas, Mark Hansen, Janet Napolitano, Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, and Steven M. Dettelbach, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–3549.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 14, 2013.

Decided and Filed: June 4, 2013.

ARGUED:Abraham Kay, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. James R. Bennett II, United States Attorney's Office, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:Abraham Kay, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Kathleen L. Midian, United States Attorney's Office, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees.

Before: KEITH, MARTIN, and COLE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge.

This case illustrates the archaic and convoluted state of our current immigration system. While many suggest that immigrants should simply “get in line” and pursue a legal pathway to citizenship, for Saady Suazo and other similarly situated Temporary Protected Status beneficiaries, the Government proposes that there is simply no line available for them to join. The law does not support such a conclusion in this case.

Appellants are Mr. and Mrs. Suazo. The are married and raising a minor child together in the United States. Mr. Suazo is a citizen of Honduras, but has been in the United States for about fifteen years. He was granted temporary protected status by the Attorney General, which has allowed him to work and live legally in the United States as a protected individual since 1999. After their marriage, the couple sought to obtain lawful permanent resident status for Mr. Suazo. They were unsuccessful before the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and thus filed the present action in federal district court.

The Suazos appeal the district court's dismissal of their claims under the Administrative Procedures Act and the Mandamus Act. On appeal the parties dispute whether 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4), a subsection of the temporary protected status statute, provides a pathway for Mr. Suazo to obtain lawful permanent resident status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255, the adjustment of status statute. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand the case to the USCIS for further proceedings with respect to the Administrative Procedure Act claim and decline to address the mandamus claim at this stage.

Saady Suazo is a Honduran immigrant. He entered the United States without inspection on or about March 15, 1998. He has been in the United States continuously since that time. On September 3, 1999, Suazo was granted Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) due to his Honduran citizenship. His TPS designation has been continuously renewed since then due to his continued good moral character. As of this writing, his TPS designation has been renewed until July 5, 2013, but could potentially be discontinued anytime without notice.

On August 5, 2010, Saady Suazo married Stacey Leigh Suazo. On September 10, 2010, Stacey Suazo filed an Immediate Relative I–130 Petition on behalf of her husband, Saady Suazo. The same day, Saady Suazo filed an accompanying I–485 Application for Adjustment of Status form, seeking to become a Lawful Permanent Resident (“LPR”) of the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The Suazos had an interview with immigration officials on November 29, 2010 at the USCIS Cleveland District Office. Mrs. Suazo's I–130 Petition for Mr. Suazo was approved-providing him with an independent basis to become an LPR. Mr. Suazo's LPR Application, however, was denied on December 21, 2010. The stated reason for the denial was that Mr. Suazo “entered the United States without inspection” on March 15, 1998.

Following the USCIS's denial of Mr. Suazo's LPR Application, Mr. and Mrs. Suazo filed a complaint in district court for declaratory judgment under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and for mandamus relief. The Suazos argued that the USCIS wrongfully denied Mr. Suazo's LPR application. They argued for the district court to assume jurisdiction over the case and approve the LPR application. The Suazos argued below, and argue now, that Mr. Suazo's TPS status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) makes him eligible to adjust to LPR status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255.

USCIS filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Suazos opposed the motion. Nevertheless, the district court granted the Government's motion to dismiss. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act because the Suazos had an adequate remedy under the APA. It further held that the Suazo's failed to state a claim under the APA. The district court reasoned that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1255—the adjustment of status statute—precludes a TPS beneficiary who was not initially “inspected and admitted or paroled” into the United States, as a matter of law, from adjusting his status to LPR. The district court largely deferred to the Government's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537. The Suazos filed this timely appeal.

This Court reviews a district court's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo. Brown v. Cassens Transp. Co., 675 F.3d 946, 952 (6th Cir.2012). Conclusions of law are also subject to de novo review by this Court. Dicicco v. U.S. Dep't of Justice INS, 873 F.2d 910, 913 (6th Cir.1989).

We review Appellants' APA claim and consider whether § 1254a(f)(4) of the TPS statute provides a path to LPR status under the adjustment of status statute, § 1255. Appellants argue that the plain language of the statutes allows for a path to LPR status, otherwise there would be absurd results, as is apparent in the instant case. The Government's position was adopted by the district court—that there is no pathway to citizenship for Mr. Suazo while he is in the United States as a TPS beneficiary.

Under the APA, courts may review an agency's interpretation of a statute. 5 U.S.C. § 706. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Nat'l Cotton Council of Am. v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 933 (6th Cir.2009). In determining if the intent is clear, courts consider “the language [of the statute] itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Nat'l Cotton Council of Am., 553 F.3d at 935 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

If the statute is found to be silent or ambiguous, and there is an agency interpretation that does not constitute the exercise of the agency's formal rule-making authority, courts may defer to an agency interpretation, even when the agency is not exercising its formal rule-making authority. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). The weight of deference, if so given, depends on “the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161.

The plain language of the statute answers the question before the Court. Both parties agree that § 1255, which has to do with adjustment of status from nonimmigrant to LPR status, contains three requirements, two of which Mr. Suazo unquestionably satisfies. First, he has made an application for adjustment of status and second, an immigrant visa is immediately available through his American citizen wife. The parties disagree, however, as to the meaning of § 1255(a) which reads “the status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled” may be adjusted in the Attorney General's discretion and also § 1255(a)(2), which states that an “alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence.” ¹§ 1255(a).

USCIS argues that Mr. Suazo and other TPS beneficiaries who initially entered the United States without inspection and have an independent basis for a visa can never satisfy the threshold requirement of being “admitted or paroled” or “admissible.” The USCIS argues that Suazo is only allowed protection under TPS as long as the designation is conferred upon him. USCIS argues that he is unable to adjust to LPR under the independent basis—through his wife's application—because he was not admitted. The Government argues that he would essentially have to leave the United States and his family, risk his safety even though the Government has deemed him worthy of protected status, take a chance at not being readmitted to the United States, reapply on an independent basis to become an LPR, and then hope that he would finally be allowed to become an LPR in a country to which he has spent fifteen years contributing.

The Suazos, however, argue that the plain language, when considering the “language itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole,” shows that Congress's clear intent was that a TPS beneficiary is afforded with a pathway to LPR status. The Suazos agree that one must be “admitted” or “admissible.” However, they argue that TPS beneficiaries are afforded with an exception under the TPS statute which operates as an inadmissibility waiver. See§ 1254a(f). We agree.

In this case, Mr. Suazo seeks to adjust his status to that of LPR. Section 1255 of Title 8 of the U.S.Code authorizes the Attorney General to adjust the

status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United...