Exch. Comm'n v. Jenkins, CV-09-1510-PHX-GMS.

Decision Date09 June 2010
Docket NumberNo. CV-09-1510-PHX-GMS.,CV-09-1510-PHX-GMS.
Citation718 F.Supp.2d 1070
PartiesSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. Maynard L. JENKINS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Arizona

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Catherine Oriordan, Donald Werner Searles, Lorraine B. Echavarria, Robert Conrrad, Securities & Exchange Commission, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Gregory J. Weingart, Jenny Jiang, John W. Spiegel, Melinda E. Lemoine, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER

G. MURRAY SNOW, District Judge.

Four motions are pending before the Court:(1) Defendant Maynard L. Jenkins's (“Jenkins” or Defendant) Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 17), (2) Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's (“SEC” or Plaintiff) Motion for Ruling Regarding Request for Judicial Notice (Dkt. # 24), (3) the SEC's Motion for Leave to File a Response to Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Authority (Dkt. # 33), and (4) the SEC's Motion for Leave to File [a] Reply to Defendant's Response to the SEC's Submission Regarding Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Authority (Dkt. # 37). For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss, denies the SEC's Motion for Ruling Regarding Judicial Notice, and denies as moot both parties' Motions regarding supplemental authority, except to the extent otherwise explained in this Order.

BACKGROUND

During the time relevant to this action, CSK Auto Corporation (“CSK”) was a publicly-traded retail company of automotive parts and accessories, operating under three brand names: Checker Auto Parts, Schucks Auto Supply, and Kragen Auto Parts. From January 1997 through August 2007, Jenkins was CSK's CEO and the chairman of its board of directors, receiving a base salary, bonuses, and stock option grants.

While Jenkins worked for CSK, the company engaged in a vendor allowance program called “Let's Work Together.” The Complaint alleges that, by intentionally failing to properly account for receivables under this program, CSK reported greater pretax income than the company actually earned during fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004. Although the SEC does not allege that Jenkins personally was aware of the fraudulent concealment perpetrated by various CSK officers, Jenkins did certify the company's inaccurate financial statements for those years.

Eventually, to correct these overstatements, CSK filed two accounting restatements as required by federal securities laws, which Jenkins also certified. In 2004, CSK released its first restatement. That restatement, however, failed to write-off all known uncollectible vendor allowance receivables and incorrectly indicated that the errors were mistakes rather than fraudulent misstatements by CSK. In 2007, CSK filed a second restatement, which restated the financial statements for fiscal years 2002-2004. The Complaint does not allege that Jenkins played any role in perpetuating the scheme. In fact, the SEC has filed both civil complaints and criminal indictments against other CSK officers, alleging that those officers concealed the scheme from Jenkins. 1

From May 2003 through May 2005, Jenkins received over $2 million in compensation in the form of bonuses and other incentive-based and equity-based compensation. During the same period, Jenkins realized over $2 million from the sale of CSK securities. Jenkins has not reimbursed CSK for any portion of these bonuses, incentive-based compensation, equity-based compensation, or stock sale profits.

The SEC now seeks an order compelling Jenkins to reimburse CSK for this income pursuant to Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or the Act), 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006). Section 304 of the Act requires that, if an issuer, such as CSK, must prepare an accounting restatement because of its material noncompliance with financial-reporting securities laws, and if that noncompliance was caused by CSK's misconduct, then the CEO or CFO must provide certain reimbursement to the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a). Under the Act, such reimbursement includes any bonuses, incentive-based, and equity-based compensation received during the twelve-month period following the first improper public issuance or filing. Id. Because the Complaint does not allege that Jenkins was personally responsible for either the Let's Work Together scheme or the incorrect SEC filings, except to the extent that Jenkins certified the SEC filings, Jenkins's liability depends on whether Section 304 requires a CEO to reimburse an issuer even where the CEO committed no personal wrongdoing. The Court is unaware of any cases discussing this issue, but the Court concludes that the Complaint properly states a claim under the statute.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The task in a motion to dismiss “is to evaluate whether the claims alleged can be [plausibly] asserted as a matter of law.” See Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.2004); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). When analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, all plausible “allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir.1996). However, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1998).

DISCUSSION

Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley provides:

(a) Additional compensation prior to noncompliance with Commission financial reporting requirements

If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for-

(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement; and

(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month period.

(b) Commission exemption authority

The Commission may exempt any person from the application of subsection (a) of this section, as it deems necessary and appropriate.

15 U.S.C. § 7243.

I. Section 304 Does Not Require Personal Misconduct.

The overarching issue is whether the Complaint alleges facts sufficient to raise a plausible claim under Section 304. Because a motion to dismiss turns not on what facts ultimately may be proven, but rather on what the complaint plausibly alleges, the Court need not reach issues that depend on factual disputes. Accordingly, based on traditional rules of statutory interpretation, the Court concludes that the Complaint has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim under Section 304.

“The purpose of statutory construction is to discern the intent of Congress in enacting a particular statute.” United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir.1999). “The starting point for the interpretation of a statute is always its language,” and [a]ny inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir.2009) (citation omitted). Applying these steps of statutory interpretation, the Court holds that the text and structure of Section 304 require only the misconduct of the issuer, but do not necessarily require the specific misconduct of the issuer's CEO or CFO. Moreover, Section 304's legislative history supports this textual reading. Because Congress's intent is evident from these main methods of statutory interpretation, the Court need not resort to the additional canons raised by Defendant.

A. The Text of the Statute Requires Misconduct Only by the Issuer.

When discerning Congress's intent from a statute's text, courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there[.] Alvarado, 588 F.3d at 1268 (citation omitted). When possible, a statute's plain meaning is determined according to its terms' “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning[,] Cooper v. F.A.A., 596 F.3d 538, 544 (9th Cir.2010), and by “look[ing] to the entire statutory scheme [,] Daas, 198 F.3d at 1174.

The relevant statutory phrase specifies that the reimbursement obligation is triggered if an issuer has to prepare an accounting restatement “due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a). The ordinary, contemporary and common meaning of that language is that the misconduct of the issuer is the misconduct that triggers the reimbursement obligation of the CEO and the CFO. In this case, the issuer is a corporation. In general, a corporation acts through its officers, agents or employees and is liable for the actions of such persons acting within the scope of their agency. In re Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 802, 823 (Del.Ch.2009). Thus, the plain language of the statute indicates that the misconduct of corporate officers, agents or employees acting within the scope of their agency or employment is sufficient misconduct to meet this element of the statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a). Before reimbursement can be required, however, the issuer's misconduct must also be sufficiently serious to result in material noncompliance with a financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, and must...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Sec. v. Microtune Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas
    • February 15, 2011
    ...generally find that disgorgement is not subject to Section 2462's statute of limitations. The SEC cites to, inter alia, SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F.Supp.2d 1070 (D.Ariz.2010), for this proposition, but this very case highlights the difference between Section 304's statutory reimbursement remedy a......
  • U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jensen
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • August 31, 2016
    ...received additional compensation during the period of that misconduct, and to have unfairly benefitted therefrom.” SEC v. Jenkins , 718 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1075 (D. Ariz. 2010) ; see also SEC v. Baker , No. A–12–CA–285–SS, 2012 WL 5499497, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2012) (“Jenkins persuasively ......
  • U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • March 23, 2018
    ...engaged in misconduct before they are required to disgorge profits under that statute." Id. at 1115 ; see also S.E.C. v. Jenkins , 718 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1075 (D. Ariz. 2010) ("A CEO need not be personally aware of financial misconduct to have received additional compensation during the period......
  • Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Bardman
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • October 27, 2016
    ...has committed "misconduct" resulting in Logitech preparing an accounting restatement. ECF No. 16 at 25; see also SEC v. Jenkins , 718 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1074 (D. Ariz. 2010) (Section 304 does not require personal misconduct by chief executive officer or chief financial ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5 firm's commentaries
  • Top 5 SEC Enforcement Developments For June 2022
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • July 11, 2022
    ...#cpacheating #correctyourvoluntaryresponses Footnote 1 See, e.g., SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2016); SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. Because of the generality of this update, the information provided herein may not be applicable in all situations and should not be ......
  • SEC Accounting Enforcement Action Signals Heightened Focus on Individual Accountability and Puts Public Company Executives on Notice for Potential SOX 304 Reimbursement
    • United States
    • LexBlog United States
    • June 16, 2022
    ...even if the CEO or CFO did not participate in the misconduct. See, e.g., SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2016); SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010). It remains unsettled whether the SEC could pursue a Section 304 clawback claim where the “misconduct” at issue does no......
  • SEC Adopts Final Rule 10D-1 Regarding Clawbacks Of Executive Compensation
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • January 24, 2023
    ...subchapIII-sec7243.pdf. 6. See supra note 3; see also SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010). It is too early to know whether Rule 10D-1 will affect how the SEC pursues enforcement actions relying on SOX 304, which remains in effect. However, even after Rule 10D-1 was adopted,......
  • The Top 10 SEC Enforcement Events Of 2011
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • January 18, 2012
    ...unsuccessfully challenged the SEC's clawback as a "grossly excessive" punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074-75 (D. Ariz. 2010). The CEO ultimately settled with the SEC and agreed to reimburse the company. Press Release, SEC, No. 2011-243......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • EXECUTIVE PAY CLAWBACKS AND THEIR TAXATION.
    • United States
    • Florida Tax Review Vol. 24 No. 2, March 2021
    • March 22, 2021
    ...[section] 954. (15.) SOX, supra note 1, [section] 304(a). (16.) SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2016); see also SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010); Anne E. Moran, Reasonable Compensation, 390-6th TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) [section] XIV.A, at (17.) Stuart Gelfond & D......
  • Securities and Exchange Commission Is Showing Its Claws With an Increased Focus on Recouping Executive Compensation
    • United States
    • Full Court Press The Journal of Federal Agency Action No. 1-1, January 2023
    • Invalid date
    ...remedies in other sections of the same Act.").11. Id.12. https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-255.htm.13. SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074-75 (D. Ariz. 2010). Notably, the House Report on the proposed bill that ultimately became SOX contemplated some scienter requirement befor......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT