Danforth v. State

• Decision Date: 27 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. A04-1993.,A04-1993.
• Citation: 718 N.W.2d 451
• Parties: Stephen DANFORTH, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

718 N.W.2d 451

Stephen DANFORTH, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A04-1993.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 27, 2006.

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John Stuart, State Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael K. Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice.

Stephen Danforth was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2004), on March 6, 1996. This conviction arose out of the sexual abuse of J.S., a 6-year-old boy. J.S. was found incompetent to testify at trial, but a videotaped interview of J.S. conducted at a non-profit center was admitted into evidence. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed Danforth's conviction but remanded for resentencing. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn.App. 1997) (Danforth I), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998).¹ On remand, Danforth was sentenced to imprisonment for 316 months. The court of appeals affirmed this sentence on appeal. State v. Danforth, No. C5-98-2054, 1999 WL 262143, at *1 (Minn. App. May 4, 1999) (Danforth II), rev. denied (Minn. July 28, 1999). Alleging various trial errors, Danforth filed a petition for postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied the petition and the court of appeals affirmed. Danforth v. State, No. C6-00-699, 2000 WL 1780244, at *1 (Minn.App. Dec.5, 2000) (Danforth III), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 2001).

After the Supreme Court's decisions in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), Danforth filed a second petition for postconviction relief alleging he was entitled to relief based on the rules established by those cases. The postconviction court denied Danforth relief, finding that neither Crawford nor Blakely applied retroactively to Danforth's case; the court of appeals affirmed. Danforth v. State, 700 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Minn.App.2005) (Danforth IV). We granted review of the Crawford issue only and requested that the Office of the State Public Defender represent Danforth on this appeal.

Danforth argues that this court is free to apply a broader retroactivity standard than that of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), and that he is entitled to the benefit of Crawford under state retroactivity principles. He also argues that, even using the framework of Teague, Crawford should be retroactively applied to his case. We reaffirm our holding in State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn.2005), that we are required to apply Teague's principles when analyzing the retroactivity of a rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure. Because we conclude that, under Teague, Crawford does not apply retroactively to Danforth's case, we affirm.

I.

We recently held that the retroactivity principles of Teague control when determining the retroactive effect of a federal constitutional rule of criminal procedure.² Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. Under Teague, a new rule is usually not retroactively applicable to a defendant's case once the defendant's case has become final. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (plurality opinion).³ It is undisputed that Danforth's case was final before Crawford was decided.⁴

For the first time in his brief to this court, Danforth argues that this court is free to apply a broader retroactivity standard than that in Teague and that he is entitled to the benefit of Crawford under state retroactivity principles. We choose to address this issue in the interests of justice.

We have stated that, when dealing with a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure, we are "compelled to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in determining when a decision is to be afforded retroactive treatment." O'Meara v. State, 679 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Minn.2004). This conclusion is based on American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, in which a plurality of the Supreme Court stated that the retroactive effect of its federal constitutional decisions is a question of federal law and that the Court has "consistently required that state courts adhere to [the Court's] retroactivity decisions." 496 U.S. 167, 177-78, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (plurality opinion); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916, 918, 110 S.Ct. 3202, 111 L.Ed.2d 734 (1990). In Houston, we applied O'Meara's principles to hold that we must follow the Teague framework when determining whether a postconviction petitioner is entitled to have a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure applied retroactively to his or her case. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. Minnesota is not the only state to have determined that a Teague analysis is required when determining whether a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure can be applied retroactively to cases on state postconviction review. See Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or. 379, 84 P.3d 133, 134-38 (2004).

Danforth argues that Teague dictates the limits of retroactive application of new rules only in federal habeas corpus proceedings and does not limit the retroactive application of new rules in state postconviction proceedings. Danforth is incorrect when he asserts that state courts are free to give a Supreme Court decision of federal constitutional criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by the Supreme Court. In American Trucking Associations, the plurality rested its retroactivity analysis in part on Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 93 S.Ct. 1966, 36 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973). Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 496 U.S. at 178, 110 S.Ct. 2323. In Payne, the Court reversed the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, which had applied North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), retroactively to Payne's case, and held that Pearce would not apply to errors occurring before Pearce was decided. Payne, 412 U.S. at 49, 57, 93 S.Ct. 1966.

In light of Payne and American Trucking Associations, we cannot apply state retroactivity principles when determining the retroactivity of a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure if the Supreme Court has already provided relevant federal principles. While the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed retroactivity principles in state postconviction proceedings, the Court has drawn a line between cases that are "pending on direct review," and cases that are "final." See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) ("When a decision of this Court results in a `new rule,' that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review. As to convictions that are already final, however, the rule applies only in limited circumstances." (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). Once a case is "final," a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure can be retroactively applied to the case only if retroactive application is warranted under the Teague framework. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351-52, 124 S.Ct. 2519. The Court, therefore, has created a retroactivity framework with only two procedural categories of cases: (1) those on direct review and (2) those that are final. Since we have already concluded that a petition for postconviction relief does not constitute "direct review," see Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270, and it is undisputed that Danforth's case was final at the time of the Crawford decision, we must apply Teague when determining whether Crawford can be retroactively applied to Danforth's case.

We are aware that other states have declined to apply Teague or have emphasized that they apply Teague as a matter of choice when determining the retroactivity of new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure in state postconviction proceedings. See Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind.1990); State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292, 1296-97 (La.1992); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 266-68 (Mo.2003); Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463, 470-71 (2002); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517-18 (S.D.1990). The principal rationales given in these decisions are: (1) a state may give a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure greater retroactive effect than that given by the Supreme Court and (2) state postconviction proceedings involve different interests than federal habeas proceedings. See Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 267-68; Colwell, 59 P.3d at 470-71; Cowell, 458 N.W.2d at 517-18. Teague's framework is based, in part, on concerns unique to federal habeas corpus decisions. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 308, 109 S.Ct. 1060 ("[W]e have recognized that interests of comity and finality must also be considered in determining the proper scope of habeas review." (emphasis added)). Notwithstanding these different policy concerns, in light of Payne, American Trucking Associations, and the dichotomy drawn by Teague between cases on "direct review" and "final" cases, we reaffirm our decision in Houston and conclude that we are not free to fashion our own standard of retroactivity for Crawford. Therefore, the retroactivity of Crawford to Danforth's case must be analyzed under Teague.

II.

Danforth argues that, even using a Teague analysis, Crawford applies retroactively to his case because: (1) Crawford did not announce a "new" rule and, alternatively, (2) Crawford established a "watershed rule" of criminal procedure and therefore is fully retroactive under an exception to Teague's general rule. Whether Crawford applies retroactively to cases final at the time Crawford was decided is a purely legal issue reviewed de novo. See Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. We address each of Danforth's arguments in turn.

A.

Under Teague, we inquire ...