719 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2013), 10-56036, Pride v. Correa
|Citation:||719 F.3d 1130|
|Opinion Judge:||PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:|
|Party Name:||David Codell PRIDE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. CORREA; Levin, Dr.; T. Ochoa, Warden; Santiago, Dr., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Attorney:||Johanna S. Schiavoni (argued), Jacobs Schlesinger & Sheppard LLP, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Vickie P. Whitney (argued), Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, CA; William N. Frank, Deputy Attorney General; Thomas S. Patterson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Jonathan L. Wolff, Se...|
|Judge Panel:||Before: HARRY PREGERSON, JOHN T. NOONAN, and RICHARD A. PAEZ, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||July 16, 2013|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
Argued and Submitted Dec. 6, 2012.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01382-BEN-JMA.
Plaintiff-Appellant David Pride is a California state prisoner. In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Pride claims that Defendants-Appellees, officials and employees of Calipatria Prison, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference towards his serious medical needs. He seeks damages and injunctive relief concerning his own individual medical treatment. The district court dismissed Pride's claim for injunctive relief on the ground that Pride's claim is already being provided for in the class action Plata v. Brown, No. C01-1351 THE, pending in the Northern District of California. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse the district court's dismissal of Pride's claim for injunctive relief. We hold that because Pride's claim for injunctive relief concerns only his individual medical care, his claim is not already encompassed in the Plata litigation, which seeks systemic reform of medical care in California prisons.1
In his pro se complaint, Pride alleges that he has a permanent shoulder injury from prior gunshot wounds. He alleges that his shoulder was shattered by bullets and could not be fully mended. His gunshot injuries allegedly cause him significant pain and difficulty sleeping, and prevent him from exercising. Pride contends that he also has an old sports injury that causes his knee to slide out of joint, resulting in pain and swelling.
The complaint further alleges that while Pride was a prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison, a prison doctor examined him and prescribed him a double mattress and a knee brace for his injuries. Once Pride was transferred to Calipatria State Prison, he sought the same treatment from his treating physician, Dr. Santiago. Pride alleges that after conducting a medical examination, including a specific examination of his shoulder and knees, Dr. Santiago issued a chrono 2 prescribing Pride knee braces and an egg crate mattress.3 Pride alleges, however, that a Chrono Committee reviewing Dr. Santiago's chrono improperly denied the prescribed medical treatment. Pride asserts that because of the denial of medical care he is in constant pain and is unable to sleep.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Pride filed his pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of adequate medical care against two alleged members of the Chrono Committee, Defendants M. Correa, a nurse, and Dr. Levin, the Chief Medical Officer of Calipatria State Prison.4 Pride requested injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from denying him medical treatment and accommodations.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure solely on the ground that Pride's claim for injunctive relief " cannot be brought independently of the Plata class-action." The assigned magistrate judge recommended denying Defendants' motion. Defendants objected to the recommendation, repeating the same argument. The district court declined to adopt the magistrate judge's recommendation. Instead, the district court construed Defendants' motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss " for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the claim is currently pending as a class action." So construed, the district court granted Defendants' motion and dismissed Pride's claim for injunctive relief. Pride timely appealed.5
Our review of the district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) is de novo. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir.2004); Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir.1988). Whether we construe Defendants' motion as one under Rule 12(b)(6) or as a facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), all factual allegations in Pride's complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in his favor. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir.2005); Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.2009).6
The district court dismissed Pride's claim for injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that Pride " asserts interests that are already being provided for by [the Plata court]." We conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Pride's claim for injunctive relief.
We have not previously addressed the availability of injunctive relief for individual defendants in the context of the Plata litigation. But we have addressed similar issues in Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.1979) and Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.2003).
In Crawford, we addressed whether a district court may properly dismiss an individual complaint " because the complainant is a member in a class action seeking the same relief. " Crawford, 599 F.2d at 892 (emphasis added). We held that a district court may dismiss " those portions of [the] complaint which duplicate the [class action's] allegations and prayer for relief." Id. at 893. But a district court may not " dismiss[ ] those allegations of [the] complaint which go beyond the allegations and relief prayed for in [the class action]."Id.;
see also Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 359 (9th Cir.1999) (remanding for a determination of whether a pending " class action involv[es] the same issues raised by [plaintiff]" ).
In Krug, we considered when class action consent decrees concerning prison conditions bar an individual claim for relief. Krug, 329 F.3d at 696. There, " consent decrees had been entered regarding a broad category" of conduct at the prisons. Id. We held that an individual defendant is permitted to litigate an " independent constitutional action" where the " specific issues" raised " [have] not already been addressed conclusively by the decrees." Id.
Following the principles of Crawford and Krug, to determine whether an individual inmate's claim for injunctive relief is duplicative of Plata, we must first identify the relief sought and obtained by Plata concerning medical care.
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