United States v. Bryan

Decision Date21 May 1947
Docket NumberNo. 365-368.,365-368.
Citation72 F. Supp. 58
PartiesUNITED STATES v. BRYAN and three other cases.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Charles A. Horsky, of Washington, D. C., for defendant Richard Morford, for the motion.

Abraham J. Isserman, of Washington, D. C., for defendant George Marshall, for the motion.

O. John Rogge, of New York City, for defendant Helen R. Bryan, and defendants Edward K. Barsky and others, for the motion.

George Morris Fay, U. S. Atty., and Charles B. Murray, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Washington, D. C., opposed.

HOLTZOFF, Associate Justice.

In January 1945 the House of Representatives of the United States, by House Resolution No. 5, 79th Congress, 1st Session, created a Committee known as the Committee on Un-American Activities, which was authorized to make investigations of "(1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation."

The defendants Richard Morford, George Marshall and Helen Bryan, have been indicted under U.S.C.A. Title 2, § 192,1 for failure to comply with subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Committee and directing them to produce certain records before the Committee.

The indictment against Richard Morford alleges that he was subpoenaed to produce "all books, records, papers and documents showing all the receipts and disbursements of money by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc., and all cordespondence, memoranda and communications with any and all persons, together with a complete list of all affiliated organizations, for the year 1945."

The indictment against the defendant George Marshall alleges that he was subpoenaed to produce "all books, records, documents and correspondence pertaining to the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties relating to the solicitation and disbursement of funds with a list of contributors." This indictment also charges the defendant Marshall with refusal to answer questions as to whether he had connection with an organization known as the Marshall Foundation.

The indictment against the defendant Helen R. Bryan alleges that she was subpoenaed to produce "all books, ledgers, records and papers relating to the receipt and disbursement of money by or on account of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee or any subsidiary or subcommittee thereof, together with all correspondence and memoranda of communications by any means whatsoever with persons in foreign countries for the period from January 1, 1945, to March 29, 1946."

The indictment against the defendants Edward K. Barsky and others consists of two counts. The first count avers that they were members of the Executive Board of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, and charges them with a conspiracy to defraud the United States by encouraging the defendant Helen R. Bryan to refuse to produce records before the Committee; and further with a conspiracy to violate U.S. C.A. Title 2, § 192.

The second count of this indictment charges the defendants with the substantive offense of failure to comply with a subpoena directing them to produce "all books, ledgers, records and papers relating to the receipt and disbursement of money by or on account of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee or any subsidiary or any subcommittee thereof, together with all correspondence and memoranda of communications by any means whatsoever with persons in foreign countries for the period from January 1, 1945, to March 29, 1946."

The defendants now move to dismiss the indictments for alleged failure to state an offense against the United States.

The principal contention advanced by the defendants is that the House Resolution under which the Committee acted is invalid.

It is elementary that for use in connection with the exercise of its power to legislate and to appropriate funds, the Congress has the authority to secure information. Ordinarily legislation cannot be intelligently enacted without previously ascertaining facts from which conclusions can be drawn as to whether need for legislation exists and, if so, what form the legislation should assume. Similarly, detailed data are necessary in connection with the appropriation of moneys. Historically the control of the purse is one of the basic and vital functions of the legislative branch of the Government. Whenever necessary or desirable the Congress may secure the requisite facts by study and research, or by procuring information from persons who volunteer it. The Congress, however, is not limited to these sources of knowledge. It has the right to compel the disclosure of factual material. At times this is the only method by which necessary data can be obtained. For this purpose, the Congress may issue subpoenas to require the attendance of witnesses and to exact the production of records and documents. When resort is had to this course, the customary practice is to delegate the duty to a Committee.

Manifestly, the sole purpose for which the Congress may carry on investigations and secure information is in connection with the exercise of its legislative function and with the appropriation of moneys. It may not, for example, compel the divulgence of information for the purpose of ascertaining whether a crime has been committed as a basis for a criminal prosecution, since this is a matter for the judiciary and for the prosecuting officers of the Government. On the other hand, if the same information is desired for use in connection with legislation, the Congress has a right to demand it. The information sought to be secured by a Congressional Committee must be germane to the legislative or the appropriating function.

In connection with the exercise of these powers, however, the Congress is not limited to securing information precisely and directly bearing on some proposed measure, the enactment of which is contemplated or considered. The collection of facts may cover a wide field. Obviously in order to act in an enlightened manner, it may be necessary and desirable for the Congress to become acquainted not only with the precise topic involved in prospective legislation, but also with all matters that may have an indirect bearing on the subject. For example, in connection with the regulation of interstate commerce, it may conceivably become desirable for Congress to secure facts bearing solely on some aspects of intrastate commerce. Or, in enacting criminal legislation, it may first become desirable to investigate conditions in States and localities involving violations of local law. In connection with appropriating funds and determining what allotments of moneys should be made, it may become desirable to obtain information covering a wide range. While the power of the Congress to carry on investigations is not without limit, nevertheless, the Congress has broad discretion in determining the subject matter of the study and the scope and extent of the inquiry. If the subject under scrutiny may have any possible relevancy and materiality, no matter how remote, to some possible legislation, it is within the power of the Congress to investigate the matter. Moreover, the relevancy and the materiality of the subject matter must be presumed. The burden is on one who maintains the contrary to establish his contention. It would be intolerable if the judiciary were to intrude into the activities of the legislative branch of the Government, and virtually stop the progress of an investigation, which is intended to secure information that Congress deems necessary and desirable in the proper exercise of its functions, unless the lack of materiality and relevancy of the subject matter is clear and manifest.

The authorities unanimously and conclusively support the foregoing views. Thus, in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174, 175, 47 S.Ct. 319, 328, 71 L.Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1, Mr. Justice Van Devanter discussed this question as follows:

"We are of opinion that the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. It was so regarded and employed in American legislatures before the Constitution was framed and ratified. * * *

"A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which not infrequently is true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. All this was true before and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. In that period the power of inquiry, with enforcing process, was regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate — indeed, was treated as inhering in it. Thus there is ample warrant for thinking, as we do, that the constitutional provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses are intended to include this attribute to the end that the function may be effectively exercised."

In the cited case the Supreme Court observed that it is not necessary for the Resolution directing the investigation to avow in express terms...

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