Eagen v. Robb

• Citation: 339 N.Y.S.2d 526,72 Misc.2d 364
• Parties: . EAGEN, Jr., as Commissioner of Social Services, Petitioner, v. William ROBB, Respondent. * Family Court, Dutchess County
• Decision Date: 18 December 1972
• Court: New York Family Court

Page 526

339 N.Y.S.2d 526

72 Misc.2d 364

In the Matter of a Proceeding for Support under Article 4 of

the Family Court Act William J. EAGEN, Jr., as Commissioner of Social Services, Petitioner, v. William ROBB, Respondent. ^*

Family Court, Dutchess County.

Dec. 18, 1972.

Judith Ann Hillery, Poughkeepsie, for petitioner.

Quinn & Reilly, Poughkeepsie, for respondent.

DECISION

JOHN R. HEILMAN, Jr., Judge.

This is a proceeding in which the Dutchess County Department of Social Services, by petition dated September 3, 1971, seeks to obtain reimbursement from the stepfather for monies expended on behalf of a minor child placed in a state training school on March 23, 1971, after the child had been adjudicated by this court to be a person in need of supervision. The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the respondent-stepfather was not responsible for such support. Memoranda on behalf of the petitioner and respondent were submitted and have been considered by the court.

The petitioner contends that it is entitled to seek reimbursement from the stepfather, pursuant to the provisions of the Social Services Law and the Family Court Act. (Soc.Ser.Law, Sections 101, 2(20), 110; Fam.Ct.Act, Section 233.)

Section 101 of the Social Services Law, so far as it is applicable, provides as follows:

'The spouse or parent of a recipient of public assistance or care . . . shall . . . be responsible for the support of such person . . . Stepparents shall in like manner be responsible for the support of minor step-children.'

The respondent contends that, as a stepparent, his obligation to support a stepchild is limited to circumstances where the child is, or is likely to become, a public charge. (See also Fam.Ct.Act, Section 415.) Further, he contends that Section 101 of the Social Services Law and Section 415 of the Family Court Act are inapplicable, because involuntary incarceration by court order is not public assistance or care.

Neither the petitioner nor the court differs with the respondent's contention with regard to the basic obligation of a stepparent. At common law a stepfather was under no obligation to support children of his wife by a former marriage. (Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 N.Y. 312 (1850); People v. Fermoile, 236 App.Div. 388, 259 N.Y.S. 564 (4th Dept., 1932)). Since the obligation of a stepparent to support a stepchild is imposed by legislation (Soc.Ser.Law, Section 101; Fam.Ct.Act, Section 415; Matter of Mercer v. Mercer, 26 A.D.2d 450, 275 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1st Dept., 1966)), this legislation, which is in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed. (Matter of Du Mond, 196 Misc. 14, 92 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Children's Court 1949); People ex rel. Deming v. Williams, 161 Misc. 573, 577, 292 N.Y.S. 458, 463 (Sup.Ct., 1936)). Such statutes cannot be extended beyond their terms or enforced beyond the extent and manner therein prescribed. 'Castellani' v. 'Castellani', 176 Misc. 763, 28 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Dom.Rel.Ct., 1941), affd. Capaldo v. Capaldo, 263 App.Div. 984, 34 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1st Dept., 1942), mot. for lv. to app. den. 264 App.Div. 755, 35 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1st Dept., 1942)).

There seems to be some conflict as to whether maintenance at a training school is public care and assistance. In Matter of Brodine, 10 A.D.2d 414, 200 N.Y.S.2d 199 (4th Dept., 1960), affd. without opinion 13 N.Y.2d 734, 241 N.Y.S.2d 864, 191 N.E.2d 916 (1963) and Matter of Tuttle, 37 Misc.2d 91, 233 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Sur.Ct., 1962), the respective courts did indicate that involuntary incarceration did not constitute public care and assistance in the traditional sense. However, the essence of each decision revolved around the authority of Surrogate's Court to compel reimbursement for maintenance of a child placed in an institution by court order. It is interesting to note that in Brodine the court indicated that relief might properly be obtained elsewhere, namely pursuant to Section 56--a of the Dom.Rel. Court Act, the forerunner of Section 235 of the Family Court Act.

Matter of Charles, 181 Misc. 194, 40 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sur.Ct., 1943), also cited by respondent, and upon which the Brodine court relied, can also be distinguished, in that the reimbursement sought there was from the estate of an individual confined by reason of a criminal offense and not by reason of a civil commitment, as is the case here.

It is significant to note that less than one year prior to the Appellate Division decision in Brodine, the Court of Appeals, in a case involving facts closely resembling those of the instant matter, specifically held that a stepparent is liable for the expenses incurred by the Department of Welfare in connection with the confinement of a delinquent stepchild. (Dept. of Welfare v. Siebel, 6 N.Y.2d 536, 190 N.Y.S.2d 683, 161 N.E.2d 1 (1959)). There the court found that the maintenance of the respondent's child at a school for delinquents was public care and assistance within the meaning of the applicable statues. The decision in Siebel was favorably cited in a recent Court of Appeals decision dealing with the constitutionality of Section 233 of the Family Court Act. (Matter of Jesmer v. Dundon, 29 N.Y.2d 5, 8, 323 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418--419, 271 N.E.2d 905, 906 (1971)). This would tend to support this court's reliance on the continued viability of one of the major premises of that decision, namely that dealing with the characterization of the detention in question as public care and assistance.

Section 110 of the Social Services Law, which was repealed, effective July 1, 1971, (now Section 528, Executive Law) provided:

'1. The court committing a child to any school for juvenile delinquents which is a state institution in the department shall ascertain the financial condition of his or her parents or other persons responsible for his or her support and, if it shall be found that any such parent or other person is able to pay any part of the cost of maintenance of such child while in or being maintained at the expense of such school, or a branch thereof, the court shall make an order directing such parent or other person to make such payments as the court may decide to be fair and equitable . . .'

Section 528 of the Executive Law, which replaced Section 110 of the Social Services Law, is basically identical to the latter section. The fundamental purpose for the former section remains unchanged, the new provisions being mandated by the establishment of the division for Youth and the transfer of jurisdiction over institutions from the Department of Social Services to the Division for Youth (Exec. Law, Section 510).

The respondent urges that the language of former Section 110 of the Social Services Law, relating to 'school for juvenile delinquents', excludes persons in need of supervision. There does not appear to be any merit to this argument. Such schools have been designated and used for the placement of persons in need of supervision, and the term 'juvenile delinquents' should not be construed, in this instance, as being exclusive of persons in need of supervision, but rather as distinguishing those schools from others used for persons over sixteen (16) years of age. (See Matter of Anonymous v. People, 20 A.D.2d 395, 400, 247 N.Y.S.2d 323, 328--329 (1st Dept., 1964); Matter of Anonymous, 40 Misc.2d 1058, 245 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Fam.Ct., 1963).)

This brings us to the applicable provisions of the Family Court Act. Section 233 of the Family Court Act, which to a large degree parallels the provisions of former Section 110 of the Social Services Law and Section 528 of the Executive Law, in part, provides as follows:

'(a) Whenever a child is detained, placed or committed under the provisions of this act to an authorized agency, or to any person other than his parent or other person legally chargeable with the expense of his maintenance, and is retained in accordance with the rules of the State Board of Social Welfare, compensation for his care and maintenance shall be a charge on the county . . .' The section goes on to say that such payments shall come from monies appropriated for public relief.

'(b) The court may, after issuance and service of an order to show cause upon the parent or other person having the duty under the law to support such child, adjudge that such parent or other person shall pay to the court such sum as will cover in whole or in part the support of such child . . .'

The respondent urges that these provisions of the Family Court Act are inapplicable, since the institution in which the child in question was placed was not an authorized agency, and further, that the respondent, as a stepparent, is not one of those other persons legally chargeable with the expense of the maintenance of his stepchild, or other person having a duty under the law to support the child, as required by Section 233 of the Act.

As to the first argument, it has been held that Family Court has jurisdiction to place a girl in a state institution as a 'person in need of supervision'. (In re Doe, 36 Misc.2d 611, 232 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Fam.Ct., 1962).) The Hudson Training School for Girls in which the child was placed was one of the institutions designated for placement by Family Court of persons in need of supervision. The legislative history of Section 756, and...