Myers v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company
| Decision Date | 27 October 1897 |
| Docket Number | 10,524--(11) |
| Parties | FLORA MYERS v. CHICAGO, ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS & OMAHA RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Ramsey county, Brill and Bunn, JJ., from an order overruling its demurrer to the complaint, on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. Reversed.
Order overruling the demurrer reversed.
L. K Luse and Thos. Wilson, for appellant.
C. D. & Thos. D. O'Brien, for respondent.
Flora Myers, as administratrix of the estate of Edward Myers deceased, brought this suit against the defendant, a railway corporation, to recover damages for its wrongful acts, which she alleges caused the death of her husband, Edward Myers, on February 14, 1896, in the state of Wisconsin. The plaintiff and her husband were at the time of his death residents of Ramsey county, in the state of Minnesota, and this action was commenced in the district court of said county, she having been duly appointed by the probate court administratrix of the estate of said Edward Myers. The deceased had no children at the time of his decease, and the plaintiff alleges that she and the estate of Edward Myers were damaged by the said wrongful acts of the defendant in the sum of $ 5,000. The defendant was and is a railroad corporation, duly created and organized under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Minnesota, transporting passengers and freight for hire from and into the state of Wisconsin, and said line of railway for such purpose, extends from Elroy, in said state, to the city of St. Paul, in the state of Minnesota. At and prior to his death, Edward Myers was in the employ of defendant as a brakeman, and, while so employed, he was killed by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant. To the allegations of the complaint the defendant interposes a demurrer, upon the grounds that it appears upon the face of said complaint that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant appeals.
It is a general rule that for the purpose of redress it is immaterial where the tort was committed, and that, the wrong being personal, the action is transitory and may be brought in the jurisdiction where the wrongdoer may be found. Tiffany, Death Wrongf. Act, § 195; Herrick v. Minneapolis, 31 Minn. 11, 16 N.W. 413; Dennick v. Railroad, 103 U.S. 11, 26 L.Ed. 439. Thus an action will lie in the courts of this state for a wrongful act or omission occurring out of this state, and within the bounds of another state, by which death is caused, if the statute of the latter state gives a cause of action for such wrong.
It is not necessary to determine in this action whether it is essential to the maintenance of such an action in this state that a similar statute must exist here as the one in the state creating the liability, because there is and can be no question raised as to the existence of a statute [2] here authorizing the maintenance of an action for wrongs of the character alleged in the complaint; and, such causes of action being authorized by express statutory enactments, it cannot be claimed that the enforcement of such a cause of action, arising in another state, before the tribunals of this state is against public policy, where the court can obtain jurisdiction of the parties. In the case of Texas v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 12 S.Ct. 905, 36 L.Ed. 829, it was held that a right given by the statute of one state, such as a right to sue and recover for the death of a person caused by negligence, will be recognized and enforced in the courts of another state whose laws give a like right under the same state of facts; "and while the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another, this rule cannot be invoked as applicable to a statute which merely authorizes a civil action to recover damages for a civil injury." The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 10 Wheat. 66, 123, 6 L.Ed. 268, cited with approval in Texas v. Cox, supra.
The next question raised is that the plaintiff failed to plead the Wisconsin statute, and thereby allege or show that the alleged wrongful acts of the defendant created a cause of action. We are of the opinion that this objection is well taken. If the wrong complained of was one for which an action might be maintained at common law, it might be presumed that it was in force where the wrongful act was committed; and, if the common law was also in force in the state of the forum, no pleading or proof of the existence of the common law in the foreign state would be required or necessary. "But where the wrong is one for which the right of action is purely statutory, no presumption arises that such statute is in force outside the state which enacted it." Tiffany, Death Wrongf. Act, § 195; 1 Rice, Ev. § 41e. And if the action is based upon the foreign law, it cannot be maintained if that law is not alleged and proved. Hoyt v. McNeil, 13 Minn. 362 (390); Tiffany, Death Wrongf. Act, § 195. In the case of Hoyt v. McNeil it is said that --
"It is well settled that the courts of one state do not take judicial notice of the statutes of another state, and that, where a party relies upon the law of a foreign state, such law must be pleaded, and, so far as it is relied on, its terms must be set forth, that the court may determine whether the effect claimed for the law is legitimate." Smith, St. & Const. Con. § 831, and authorities cited; Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. 84; Legg v. Legg, 8 Mass. 99; Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 Johns. 263.
The same doctrine was applied in Ellis v. Maxson, 19 Mich. 186, where it is said:
"We certainly cannot presume that the legislature of another state had adopted all of our statutes, and therefore we must have proof before we can know that they have passed any statute."
In Robards v. Marley, 80 Ind. 185, it was held that the statute law of a sister state is a fact that must be proved like any other fact, and, in the absence of such proof, this court presumes that the common law is in force in such state.
It is the prevailing doctrine of the state courts that the respective states of the Union are foreign to each other, so far as taking judicial notice of what the statutory laws of those states are is concerned. Such laws are usually regarded as matters of fact, and, because they are so regarded, they are required to be pleaded as well as proved, if they constitute the foundation of the claim or defense. See authorities cited in note to the case of State v. Twitty, 11 Am. Dec. 779.
Now while, in the absence of rebutting evidence, the foreign law will be presumed to be the...
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