Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 25 October 1937
• Docket Number: 5793
• Citation: 93 Utah 342,72 P.2d 1077
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: BUCKINGHAM TRANSP. CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al

72 P.2d 1077

93 Utah 342

BUCKINGHAM TRANSP. CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al

No. 5793

Supreme Court of Utah

October 25, 1937

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Original proceeding by the Buckingham Transportation Company as employer, to review an award of the Industrial Commission in favor of Melvin Jack Kennedy, as employee.

AWARD ANNULLED, AND CAUSE REMANDED.

J. M. Carlson, of Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Joseph Chez, Atty. Gen., for defendants.

HANSON, Justice. FOLLAND, C. J., and MOFFAT, WOLFE, and LARSON, JJ., concur.

OPINION

HANSON, Justice.

Plaintiff has brought before us for review an award made by the Industrial Commission of Utah in favor of Melvin Jack Kennedy and against plaintiff for injuries and disability arising out of an accident occurring while Kennedy was in plaintiff's employ. There are no disputed facts. Kennedy, while a resident of Colorado, was employed at Denver, Colo., by plaintiff, a Colorado corporation, as a truck driver. There is no evidence, however, that he ever performed services for plaintiff in that state. Plaintiff maintained an office at Salt Lake City, Utah, to which place Kennedy was sent by plaintiff to drive one of its trucks in hauling freight between Salt Lake City, Utah, and Rawlins, Wyo. Apparently Salt Lake City was his headquarters as it was there he resided and it was from that office that he was paid. On February 28, 1935, while driving to Salt Lake City with a load of freight picked up at Rawlins, Kennedy was injured at Morgan, Utah. The plaintiff had not provided workmen's compensation insurance as prescribed by the Utah law. Kennedy filed an application for compensation with the Utah Industrial Commission and was granted an award. The proceedings before the commission, in so far as they affect the questions before us, will be referred to as we proceed to dispose of those questions.

Kennedy's application for compensation is based upon section 42-1-55, R. S. Utah 1933, which permits an injured employe to apply for and obtain an award of compensation where the employer, otherwise subject to the Compensation Act, has failed to comply with its provisions. Such award may be docketed in the district court and then becomes a lien upon the real estate of the employer situated in the county where the award is docketed.

The several grounds upon which plaintiff relies for vacating the award now urged upon us may be summarized as follows: (1) The Industrial Commission of Utah had no jurisdiction over plaintiff. (2) Said commission had no jurisdiction to award compensation because our Workmen's Compensation Act (Rev. St. 1933, 42-1-1 et seq.) does not apply to foreign corporations engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. (3) There is no evidence to support the commission's findings as to the amount of the hospital and nursing bills and the bill of one of the doctors; that there is no evidence to show such services were necessarily rendered or the amounts awarded were reasonable. (4) There was no evidence to support a finding that plaintiff has three or more workmen in its employ in Utah. (5) There was no evidence to support the conclusion of the commission that plaintiff should pay in full all medical and hospital expenses and nursing fees. (6) The commission exceeded its powers in: (a) Awarding medical, hospital, and nursing fees in excess of the maximum provided by law without an application having been made for such an award and without taking evidence that said sums were necessary and reasonable. (b) Making an award without giving credit for compensation voluntarily paid. (c) Making an award under a relationship of employment created and existing under the laws of Colorado.

To arrive at a correct and intelligent solution of the jurisdictional question thus presented to us for disposition, we first must come to an understanding of the basic principle underlying our Workmen's Compensation Act and upon which the fundamental purposes of that act are predicated. An examination of the cases construing and applying Workmen's Compensation Acts in many of the states shows that their interpretations and application have been controlled by a consideration of whether the particular act was by its terms to be effective as a matter of contract; whether the acceptance of the provisions of the act was elective or compulsory. It is manifest that in a given situation different results would be arrived at, depending upon which interpretation was adopted and applied. It is only natural, therefore, that considerable confusion exists in the authorities involving the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission or courts of one state over the relation of employer and employee arising from a contract of employment entered into in another state. We deem it unnecessary to discuss or analyze the various cases illustrative of the statutory interpretation and application above referred to. Many such cases may be found reported and referred to under the following annotations: 3 A. L. R. 1351; 18 A. L. R. 292; 28 A. L. R. 1345; 35 A. L. R. 1414; 59 A. L. R. 735; 82 A. L. R. 709; and 90 A. L. R. 119.

Referring specifically to our own Workmen's Compensation Act, it is apparent that from its original passage in 1917 it was intended to be operative by virtue of the status of employer and employee, and not upon the theory of contract, express or implied, between the employer and employee. Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020, 8 A. L. R. 930; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153, 154, 68 L.Ed. 366, 30 A. L. R. 532. In the Parramore Case, which involved our Workmen's Compensation Act, Mr. Justice Sutherland uses this language:

"Workmen's Compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon that of implied contract; that is, upon the conception that the injured workman is entitled to compensation for an injury sustained in the service of an industry to whose operations he contributes his work as the owner contributes his capital--the one for the sake of the wages and the other for the sake of the profits. The liability is based, not upon any act or omission of the employer, but upon the existence of the relationship which the employee bears to the employment because of and in the course of which he has been injured."

The right of the state to thus regulate the status of employer and employee is predicated upon the "police powers inherent in every sovereignty--the power to legislate and govern for the best interests of the state." Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122, 124. That right was fully recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct. 260, 61 L.Ed. 685, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642.

The Workmen's Compensation Act of Arizona was originally of the contractual type. In 1925 a new act was passed which, in its essential features, is practically identical with ours. In the case of Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Arizona, 32 Ariz. 275, 257 P. 644, 646, the Supreme Court of that state construed the new act and came to the conclusion that such act "is neither elective nor contractual in its nature, but, on the contrary, that it rests upon the police power to regulate the status of employer and employee within the state of Arizona, and that no contract, express or implied, made within or without the state of Arizona, unless expressly so authorized by our law, can of itself affect the rights and duties of such status."

Plaintiff's position that the Utah Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction to enter the award it did is based upon three grounds. It is first contended that the commission did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff. The record shows that written notice of the filing of Kennedy's application for compensation and the time fixed for the hearing thereon was given to plaintiff by registered mail addressed to plaintiff's president and to its process agent appointed by it in this state. It is argued that such notices were ineffective to give jurisdiction as they were mailed to and received in Denver, Colo Plaintiff's counsel and process agent appeared in response to said notices. Counsel stated he appeared specially to make some objections to the proceedings. Before making any objections, he stipulated that plaintiff, on the date of the accident, had three or more workmen in its employ and that it had not procured workmen's compensation insurance to cover its employees in Utah. On the question of Kennedy's earnings, the process agent admitted he was earning a little more than $ 100 a month, but would not agree he was making $ 11 a trip. The commission had the record show that plaintiff "is contesting the salary of $ 125.00 per month," and then inquired if the parties were ready to proceed. Counsel for plaintiff then objected to the proceedings "for the reason that the Industrial Commission of Utah has no jurisdiction over the matter; and for the reason that the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce exclusively and that at the time this man Kennedy was injured he was engaged in interstate business transporting from Colorado through Wyoming and Utah to Nevada and California, and on this particular trip it was interstate business exclusively; that the provisions of our Compensation Law itself, more particularly title 42, chapter 1, section 89 provides that this Commission does not have jurisdiction over parties engaged in interstate business or commerce, and that business of course is such that it is not segregated." Upon this objection being made there was some discussion as to whether a federal compensation act applied at the time of the accident. The presiding commissioner concluded that there was...