Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Durden

Decision Date07 October 1911
Docket Number3,469,3,487.
PartiesMUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. DURDEN. DURDEN v. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court.

"A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right benefit, or advantage, which, except for such waiver, the party would otherwise have enjoyed."

"A person may lawfully waive the benefit of a statutory provision, where the rights of third parties are not involved, unless such waiver violates public policy."

The only authentic and admissible evidence of public policy of a state are its Constitutions, laws, and judicial decisions. Courts should guard with jealous care the rights of private contracts, and give to them full effect when possible so to do. The provisions of Civ. Code 1910, § 4253 et seq., should not be enlarged without convincing and conclusive reasons.

In a suit by the beneficiaries against a life insurance company the policy, and such papers as are made a part thereof contain the contract entered into between the insured and the insurer, and must be looked to, in order to ascertain upon what terms the parties agreed, and what are the rights and liabilities of each.

"Death by suicide *** releases the insurer from the obligation of his contract." Civ. Code 1910, § 2500. Suicide is intentional self-destruction by one who is sane. If insane or accidental, it is not legally suicide. The law never presumes suicide from the fact of self-destruction.

Where the policy contained the clause, "The company shall not be liable hereunder, in the event of the insured's death by his own act, whether sane or insane, during the period of one year after the issuance of the policy," the benefit of Civ. Code 1910, § 2500, was waived, unless such waiver was against public policy.

If one should procure life insurance upon a false promise, made to the insurer at the time of making the contract, that he would not commit suicide, when, in fact, it was his intention to do so, it would be a fraud, entering into the consideration and into the procurement of the contract, which would render the contract void and against public policy, irrespective of the statute.

In the absence of the fraudulent intent at the time, it would be a fraud on the public, and against public policy, to declare a policy, such as is referred to above, void as against the beneficiaries when the insured had lived up to his contract. As a matter of public policy it is of great importance to hold the parties to a contract voluntarily made, especially when death has removed one of the parties, and closed his lips upon the question raised.

In the present case, there is no clearly defined public policy opposed to the waiver of the Georgia statute, and there is a clear and vitally important public policy demanding the enforcement of the contract according to its terms and the intention of the parties.

If any doubt should exist in regard to the construction of the contract of insurance, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the insured, and the policy should be liberally construed in favor of the validity of the contract and against the insurance company which wrote the policy, and which is presumed to know the Georgia statute, the benefits of which it has waived.

When the insurance company defends upon the ground of suicide, the burden is upon the company to establish such contention by a preponderance of the evidence. While the authorities are not uniform upon the question, the weight of authority seems to hold that the presumption against suicide is not overcome by the introduction at the trial of the proofs of death in one of the affidavits composing which the cause of death is stated to be suicide. It is a matter of common knowledge that proofs of death are made under conditions of haste to comply with the company's requirements, and under circumstances not conducive to safe conclusions.

The insured died after the expiration of one year from the issuance of the policy, the terms of which are not void as against public policy, and hence the trial court properly directed a verdict for the plaintiff.

Error from City Court of Covington; W. H. Whaley, Judge.

Action by J. G. Durden, guardian, against the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York. To a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error, and plaintiff files a cross-bill of exceptions. Judgment affirmed on main bill of exceptions, and cross-bill dismissed.

Conyers J., dissenting.

Jas. H. Gilbert and Rogers & Knox, for plaintiff in error.

Napier & Cox, for defendant in error.

GILBERT J.

This is a suit upon a policy of life insurance issued by the plaintiff in error upon the life of Mattie L. Durden, brought by the defendant in error as guardian for the beneficiaries named in the policy. The answer of plaintiff in error set up various defenses, only one of which is to be considered here under the evidence, viz., that the insured committed suicide, whereby plaintiff in error was discharged from liability under the policy, thus claiming the protection afforded by section 2500 of the Civil Code of 1910. At the trial defendant in error made out his prima facie case by proof of the guardianship, and of the insurance contract, and rested. Plaintiff in error introduced in evidence the application for insurance and the proofs of death made to it by defendant in error, as alleged in his petition, and also rested. Defendant in error offered no further evidence. The case being thus closed, plaintiff in error moved the court to direct a verdict in its favor, upon the ground that the proof of death, uncontradicted, showed that the insured had committed suicide, and therefore plaintiff in error, by force of Civ. Code 1910, § 2500, was released from liability under the policy. The motion was denied, and the court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff below.

1. After an exhaustive search, we have been unable to find an adjudicated case in any jurisdiction upon the controlling point in this case, and hence the conclusion must be reached from premises, most of which fortunately are well established and comparatively uniform. As we view the matter the correct conclusion depends upon whether an insurance company may by contract waive the benefits of section 2500 of the Civil Code 1910, and whether the contract of insurance in the present case constitutes such a waiver. It is insisted by the plaintiff in error that such a waiver would be void and of no effect, even if attempted, as against public policy; that such contracts, if allowed, would encourage suicide, and would result in legalizing insurance against self-destruction. "A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right, benefit, or advantage, which, except for such waiver, the party would otherwise have enjoyed." Kennedy v. Manry, 6 Ga.App. 819, 66 S.E. 31.

2. A person may lawfully waive the benefit of a statutory provision where the rights of third parties are not involved, unless such waiver violates public policy. 9 Cyc. 480.

3. The only authentic and admissible evidence of public policy of a state are its Constitutions, laws, and judicial decisions. As the habits, opinions, and wants of the people vary with the times, so public policy may change with them. So, because these habits, opinions, and wants are different in different places, what may be against public policy in one state or country may not be so in another. "It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because, if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full age and of competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and shall be enforced by the courts of justice. Therefore you have this paramount public policy to consider--that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract." 9 Cyc. 482, 483, and note. The provisions of Civ. Code 1910, § 4253 et seq., should not be enlarged without convincing and conclusive reasons. In the case of Ph nix Insurance Co. v. Clay, 101 Ga. 332, 28 S.E. 854, 65 Am.St.Rep. 307, Chief Justice Simmons has forcefully summed the whole matter up in these words: "It is well settled that contracts will not be avoided by the courts as against public policy, except where the case is free from doubt, and where an injury to the public interest clearly appears."

4. In a suit by the beneficiaries against a life insurance company, the policy and such papers as are made a part thereof must be looked to in order to ascertain upon what terms the parties agreed, and what are the rights and liabilities of each. Civ. Code 1910, § 2471; Mass. Life Ass'n v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 268, 30 S.E. 918, 42 L.R.A. 261.

5. "Death by suicide *** releases the insurer from the obligation of his contract." Civ. Code 1910, § 2500. Suicide is intentional self-destruction by one who is sane. If one is insane, his self-destruction cannot legally be suicide, nor is self-destruction legally suicide when due to accident. The law never presumes suicide from the fact of self-destruction alone; but, upon the contrary, it does presume that death ensues from natural causes. Life Ass'n v. Waller, 57 Ga. 535; Jenkins v. National Union, 118 Ga. 588, 45 S.E. 449. Self-destruction is never a legal presumption. The fact that the insured committed suicide is not of itself evidence of insanity. Upon the contrary, where it is shown that the insured committed suicide, the law in this state, as well as in most other states, presumes sanity. Merritt v. Cotton States Life Ins. Co., 55 Ga. 103. Were this question not settled...

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