Miller v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co.

• Decision Date: 25 October 1911
• Citation: 72 S.E. 397,89 S.C. 530
• Parties: MILLER v. HAMILTON BROWN SHOE CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

72 S.E. 397

89 S.C. 530

MILLER v. HAMILTON BROWN SHOE CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 25, 1911

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Abbeville County; John S Wilson, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by J. C. Miller against the Hamilton Brown Shoe Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Wm. N Graydon, for appellant. Wm. P. Greene, for respondent.

WOODS A. J.

In this action of slander, the verdict was for the defendant and the plaintiff appeals, assigning error in the admission of testimony offered by the defendant.

The uncontroverted facts as they appear from the record are as follows: The plaintiff was a traveling salesman for the defendant, a corporation doing a wholesale shoe business in St. Louis, Mo. On and immediately after July 19, 1909, the plaintiff was in St. Louis for the purpose of obtaining his samples for use in soliciting business. John E. Ritchey, the agent of the defendant, through whom it dealt with its salesmen, charged the plaintiff in the presence of other employés, with being "doped," or under the influence of "dope," and refused to allow him to take samples. After the plaintiff had returned to his home in Abbeville, S. C., the same agent of the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff, and addressed it to him, reiterating the charge by saying, "You cannot make me believe anything different from what I told you last Tuesday." This letter was opened by plaintiff's wife, and the defendant afterwards sent a copy of it to M. T. Coleman. The plaintiff did not deny that he was in a very bad condition when he was in St. Louis, but alleged that his condition was due to an attack of paralysis, and was not caused by "dope," or the use of drugs.

The issues in the case were: First, was the charge made by the defendant false? Second, was it a privileged communication made to employés in the regular course of business? And, third, if false, was the charge maliciously made? On the last issue, it is manifest that the defendant had a right to prove any facts tending to show that other reasonable men in the situation of its agent would have drawn the inference that the plaintiff had, by the use of drugs, rendered himself unfit to be intrusted with important business.

The first error assigned is the admission of the testimony of T. G. Patterson that he saw the plaintiff, at the Central Hotel, at Florence, S. C., very drunk, on June 13, 1909, and of V. O. Willis that he was in the same condition, at the same place, from the 15th to the 17th of June, 1909, when he last saw him. It is true, as argued by plaintiff's counsel, that the rule is against allowing proof of specific acts of past conduct, occurring at a different time, similar to that mentioned in the alleged slanderous charge; but the rule does not extend to the exclusion of testimony as to other specific acts which may be reasonably considered so closely connected in sequence with the alleged slanderous charge as to throw light on the inquiry as to its truth or falsity. According to the evidence of these witnesses, the plaintiff was in a state of gross intoxication from June 13 to June 17, 1909. The evidence does not disclose how long this condition continued, but there was no abatement when Mr. Willis left him on June 17th. The knowledge is common to all men that the use of drugs, popularly known as "dope," is very commonly resorted to after periods of extreme intoxication. In view of this fact, we do not think there ought to be any doubt that the evidence was competent on the sharp issue whether the sad condition in which the plaintiff appeared about a month later at defendant's store in St. Louis was due to "dope" or an attack of paralysis.

But aside from that consideration, the testimony was competent as bearing directly on one of the charges of the complaint. The letter written by defendant, alleged to be slanderous, contained this statement: "I gave you an opportunity to make good, and at the time your...