Williams v. Vukovich
| Decision Date | 04 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-3513,81-3513 |
| Citation | 720 F.2d 909 |
| Parties | 33 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 238, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,890 Leonard WILLIAMS, Sr., et al., Plaintiff-Appellees, Herbert Allison; Paul Gains; Richard S. Gresh; Nicholas E. Modarelli; John William Averhart, Jr.; Ismael Caraballo, Jr.; Objectors-Appellants, v. George VUKOVICH; Otis Coney, Sr.; Stanley E. Peterson, Chief of Police; Richard J. Groucutt, Administrator; Defendant-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Edward N. Sobnosky, Robert P. Milich, Law Dept., John Breckenridge, E. Winther McCroom (argued), Youngstown, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.
Bernard A. Berkman, Lorraine R. Baumgardner (argued), Berkman, Gordon, Murray & Palda, Cleveland, Ohio, for objectors-appellants.
Thomas G. McNally, Rocky River, Ohio, for Gutierrez & Velazquez.
Before ENGEL and KEITH, Circuit Judges, and NICHOLS, * Senior Circuit Judge.
In 1976, Black Youngstown policemen filed the present class action against the Mayor of Youngstown, Ohio, the Youngstown Chief of Police, and the Youngstown Civil Service Commission. The Black policemen alleged that the police department's employment practices, particularly their use of unvalidated "qualification" examinations, were racially discriminatory. After five and one-half years of intense negotiations a consent decree finally resolved all hiring and promotion issues. The decree promoted certain minorities, but does not require future qualification examinations to be validated for job-relatedness. Moreover, the decree absolutely prevents minorities from objecting to future hiring and promotion examinations if a certain portion of the minorities who took a particular examination passed. Several members of the plaintiff class objected to the decree. The district court initially held that the decree was unreasonable. Later, however, it granted a motion to stay the decree pending the present appeal. We hold that the decree is illegal and contrary to the public interest because it embodies impermissible waivers of future discrimination claims. Accordingly, we remand this action to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On January 7, 1976, thirteen Black Youngstown policemen 1 and three Black applicants 2 to the police department ("Plaintiffs") filed the present class action against the Mayor of Youngstown, the Youngstown Chief of Police, and the Youngstown Civil Service Commission ("City") in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The complaint alleged that the City had engaged in racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986. Specifically, Plaintiffs maintained that the City's "qualification" examinations were discriminatory, not job-related, and had a disproportionate impact on minorities. Plaintiffs sought to prevent further promotions until the City adopted qualification standards which would make employment and promotion opportunities "available to Black employees and applicants for employment on the same basis as those opportunities have been available to whites." Plaintiffs also sought back pay, seniority credit, and the creation of an affirmative action program to redress the effects of past discrimination.
On March 1, the City answered, denying the allegations of racial discrimination. The City asserted that its examinations "fairly and equitably" tested the candidates for employment and promotion. 3 The City however, did admit that the following summary accurately described their hiring and promotion practices between 1960 and 1976. 4
In 1976, twenty-five percent of Youngstown's population was Black, yet only twenty of the 295 police officers were Black. Moreover, no Black policeman had been promoted during the fifteen years prior to the date this action was filed. Nineteen of the twenty Black policemen held the rank of patrolman. None of the nine captains, seven lieutenants and forty detectives were Black. The only Black who held the rank of sergeant was promoted prior to 1961.
During pretrial proceedings on March 24, the parties agreed to submit written proposals to the court regarding the possibility of an interim settlement or resolution of the case pending a final determination on the merits. The next day the parties entered into a stipulation which prohibited promotions based on promotion examinations which were administered shortly before the action was filed. This stipulation was vacated by agreement of the parties on April 22, 1976. On May 12, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prohibit the City from making any promotions in the police department. They alleged the promotions would exacerbate the discriminatory effect of the City's employment practices.
On June 7, plaintiffs submitted a proposed order which would have required one-to-one hiring. Counsel, however, was unable to respond to the proposed order because he had not discussed it with City officials. The City ultimately rejected the proposal.
On June 28, further pre-trial proceedings were conducted in open court. The district court issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") restraining the City from promoting or hiring any individual. The City, however, was allowed to fill six vacancies which allegedly were necessary to the "health, safety and welfare" of Youngstown. Two of the positions were required to be filled with "[q]ualified Black applicants." The ruling also required the City to file an explanation should it decide not to make the appointments before the expiration of the eligibility lists on December 18. Subsequently, the City disputed the efficacy of the district court's June 28 ruling. Therefore, on November 24, 1976, the district court issued a written order memorializing the temporary restraining order.
On January 7, 1977, the City filed an explanation why it had not filled the six vacancies. Allegedly, a financial crisis caused the City to lay off seven existing patrolmen and not fill the twelve vacancies in the authorized strength of the police department. On February 9, a supplemental explanation was filed. It indicated that although many City employees had been laid off, only four patrolmen had been placed on layoff status.
Additional pre-trial proceedings were conducted on March 31. The court requested that the parties meet, attempt to resolve disputed issues, and exchange settlement proposals. The parties were not to submit the proposed settlements to the court until an agreement had been reached.
On April 20, the court noted that its TRO had prevented several vacancies in the rank of patrolman, sergeant, and detective from being filled. Accordingly, it issued an order vacating the restraining order upon the following conditions. The City must first promote at least two Blacks from the current eligibility list before appointing the next four individuals according to usual procedures. The first of every three persons appointed to the rank of sergeant or detective thereafter was to be a qualified Black.
Subsequently, the City received a letter from the Director of the Office of Revenue Sharing, United States Department of the Treasury. 5 The letter condemned the City's use of unvalidated hiring and promotion examinations and stated that their investigation revealed sufficient facts to constitute a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The letter concluded with the recommendation that all qualification examinations be validated and an affirmative action plan adopted. The City apparently took no action in response to this letter.
In the spring of 1978, however, the City unilaterally announced that it would administer an entry level examination for the rank of patrolman on May 31. On March 23, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo. Plaintiffs argued that the non-validated examinations had a disproportionate impact on minorities. Administering the examinations could only further decrease the possibility of adequate minority representation in supervisory ranks in the future. A few days later, the district court held extensive pre-trial discussions with the parties. The parties indicated that some accommodation could be reached concerning the examination. Therefore, the court issued an order directing that the examination be held on June 28, rather than May 31, as originally scheduled. The parties were further directed to "continue their good faith negotiations" and "report the status of the same to the Court on or before June 15, 1978."
On June 15, the parties reported that an agreement had been reached on the following aspects of the patrolman's examination: recruitment efforts; patrolman candidate training procedures; and the procedural requirements of taking the examination. Plaintiffs also indicated that they would propose a "settlement decree" after the test results were revealed. The examination was administered as scheduled. Subsequently, the court directed the Civil Service Commission to grade the examination, but to only present the scores to the counsel of record and the court.
On August 8, the parties informed the court that an interim consent decree was being drafted to resolve disputed issues concerning patrolmen examinations. On September 20, 1979, the parties presented an interim consent decree ("Interim Decree") to the court.
The Interim Decree established two eligibility lists and provided that the examinations would be graded on an academic curve. Non-minorities with passing scores were placed on one eligibility list, and minorities on a separate list. The City was required to appoint in multiples of three, with the first candidate to be a minority. The Interim Decree was not an admission of liability. It was to remain in effect until the promotion lists expired by operation of law or the complement of...
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