Green v. Maraio

• Decision Date: 07 November 1983
• Docket Number: No. 1178,D,1178
• Citation: 722 F.2d 1013
• Parties: Leroy Edward GREEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Camilla MARAIO and Angelo J. Ingrassia, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 83-2023.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 1013

722 F.2d 1013

Leroy Edward GREEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Camilla MARAIO and Angelo J. Ingrassia, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1178, Docket 83-2023.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued April 26, 1983.

Decided Nov. 7, 1983.

Leroy Edward Green, pro se.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., State of N.Y., New York City (George D. Zuckerman, Deputy Sol. Gen., Gerald J. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ellen S. Weisburd, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel, New York City), for defendants-appellees.

Before KEARSE, PIERCE and PECK, ^* Circuit Judges.

PIERCE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered December 29, 1982, by Charles L. Brieant, Judge, granting defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 pro se complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Green is presently incarcerated at the Auburn Correctional Facility, Auburn, New York. He is serving three concurrent state sentences of eighteen years to life imprisonment for the crimes of attempted rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree and robbery in the second degree.

The criminal charges against plaintiff were tried in a jury trial, in a New York State court, which commenced on October 15, 1973. The defendants-appellees herein are: Orange County Court Judge Angelo J. Ingrassia and the official court reporter, Camilla Maraio. In his pro se complaint, dated August 27, 1982, Green set forth the following allegations which, for purposes of deciding the issues herein, we assume to be true. ¹

Yetta Pasachoff was the first of twelve regular jurors selected on October 15th, and, as required by law, she was designated jury "foreman." ² James Stegall was the sixth juror selected. The trial continued, with Judge Ingrassia presiding, until October 19, 1973, when the presentation of evidence was concluded, the jury was instructed, and it began deliberations. The jury returned that day for further instructions and re-reading of portions of the trial testimony. Seated in the chair reserved for the jury foreman, Stegall, instead of Pasachoff, requested further instructions and re-reading. Shortly thereafter, the jury returned a verdict of guilty which was confirmed upon the jury being polled at the request of defense counsel. The announcement of the jury's verdict was rendered by Stegall who was occupying the seat reserved for Pasachoff, who had switched to Stegall's seat.

Sentence was imposed on December 4, 1973. Green alleges that sometime during the period from December 5, 1973, to January 4, 1974, the court reporter, Maraio, was instructed by Judge Ingrassia to alter the record of Green's trial to indicate that Pasachoff had requested the instructions and re-reading of testimony; that Pasachoff had announced the guilty verdict at the conclusion of the jury's deliberations; that the jurors' votes upon polling were consistent with the verdict as announced by Pasachoff; and that Pasachoff had sat at all times in the seat reserved for the jury foreman. Green alleges that Maraio made these changes, as directed. Green seeks damages totalling three million dollars.

On October 25, 1982, the defendants moved to dismiss Green's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Judge Brieant granted the motions and dismissed the complaint, holding that the "[d]efendants are immune from civil liability for money damages." Following entry of the December 27 and 29, 1982 rulings, Green timely filed a notice of appeal. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.

II. DISCUSSION

The issue presented on appeal is whether the district court erred in granting the defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We hold that the district court did not err and that the decision should be affirmed.

Initially, we note that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests only the sufficiency of a complaint. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Further, a motion for failure to state a claim should Green's complaint alleges that Judge Ingrassia and the court reporter, Maraio, by altering his trial transcript, were acting under color of state law and deprived him of his procedural due process right to an accurate transcript on appeal. ⁴ The district court determined that Judge Ingrassia and Maraio were immunized from any "civil liability for money damages" assuming proof of the allegations of the complaint. We agree.

                not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."   Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957);  Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.1983).  We also note, briefly, that a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 3 only need allege that some person acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right.   Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)
                

A. Judicial Immunity

"[I]mmunity is a judicially developed limitation on the protection established by Congress in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983." Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 854-55 (10th Cir.1981). The doctrine of judicial immunity has been an established principle in American jurisprudence since Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). In Bradley, the Court wrote that "judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Id. at 351. ⁵ The doctrine of judicial immunity was deemed applicable to section 1983 actions in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 1967) (judge immune from liability for damages).

A judge defending against a section 1983 action is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages liability for acts performed in his judicial capacity. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 734-35, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1975-76, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1106, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).

[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a "judicial" one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.

Id. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1107.

Judicial immunity has been universally approved "[d]espite the unfairness to litigants that sometimes results." Id. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 1108. Such immunity is not for the protection of malicious and corrupt judges, but for the overall benefit of the public. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1217. The commonwealth is best served by having judges who can perform their judicial functions with independence and free of concern for personal liability as a consequence. Id. "[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own Green raises two principal arguments regarding the district court's determination that Judge Ingrassia was immunized from money damages arising from civil liability under section 1983. First, Green contends that Judge Ingrassia's acts were "in clear absence of personal jurisdiction." Therefore, Green argues, Judge Ingrassia could not successfully assert the defense of judicial immunity.

                convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself."    Bradley, 80 U.S.  (13 Wall.) at 347.  Judicial immunity recognizes that a judge may err.  However, the policy behind the defense also recognizes that it is better for a judge when exercising the discretion inherent in his judicial power "to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all."   Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 242, 94 S.Ct. at 1689;  see also Marty's Adult World of New Britain, Inc. v. Guida, 453 F.Supp. 810, 815 (D.Conn.1978) (judicial immunity is required in order to protect the discretion necessary for the proper use of the judges' decision-making powers)
                

Although it may be argued that once Green was sentenced the trial judge no longer had personal jurisdiction over Green and the case, Judge Ingrassia did possess subject matter jurisdiction. As demonstrated in Bradley, and by the Supreme Court's approving citation of Bradley in Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. at 1105 n. 7, ⁶ it is apparent that a judge who possesses subject matter jurisdiction is not within the "clear absence of all jurisdiction" posture which would deprive him of the use of the defense of judicial immunity. ⁷ Judge Ingrassia--assuming, of course, for purposes of this appeal that all the allegations of the complaint are true--was not bereft of all jurisdiction, although such acts would be in excess of his jurisdiction. As explained in Bradley, and its progeny, a judge who acts in excess of his jurisdiction is still entitled to rely on the defense of judicial immunity. While we do not sanction Green next contends that the district court erroneously dismissed the suit based on the immunity defense without first conducting a hearing to determine Judge Ingrassia's motivations for his actions, or the scope of immunity to which he was entitled. This contention is without merit. The Supreme Court has established that " 'judges defending against Sec. 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity for acts performed in their judicial capacities.' " Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at 186 (quoting ...