Carpenter v. City of Flint

• Decision Date: 25 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–2240.,12–2240.
• Citation: 723 F.3d 700
• Parties: John CARPENTER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF FLINT; Jackie Poplar; and Dayne Walling, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

723 F.3d 700

John CARPENTER, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.CITY OF FLINT; Jackie Poplar; and Dayne Walling, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–2240.

United States Court of Appeals,

Sixth Circuit.

July 25, 2013.

ON BRIEF:F. Anthony Lubkin, Owosso, Michigan, for Appellant. Thomas L. Kent, City of Flint, Flint, Michigan, for Appellees City of Flint and Dayne Walling. Michael J. Gildner, Simen, Figura & Parker, P.L.C., Flint, Michigan, for Appellee Jackie Poplar.

Before: MOORE and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; SARGUS, District Judge. ^*

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff–Appellant John Carpenter (“Carpenter”) appeals the sua sponte dismissal with prejudice by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan of this case arising out of Carpenter's termination as the Director of Transportation for the City of Flint. During the early stages of the litigation, Carpenter's counsel violated local filing rules several times and failed to respond in a timely manner to a motion to strike portions of the complaint. After five and a half months without docket activity, the district court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Applying this court's four-factor test governing review of dismissals for failure to prosecute, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed the case with prejudice. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's judgment and REMAND the case for further pretrial proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2011, Carpenter filed a complaint in the Genesee County Circuit Court in Michigan against Defendants City of Flint, City Councilwoman Jackie Poplar, and Mayor Dayne Walling (together, “Defendants”) in connection with Carpenter's termination in September 2009 from his position as the Director of Transportation for the City of Flint. R. 1–2 (Compl.¶¶ 5, 8) (Page ID # 8–9). Carpenter alleged that his termination was the result of discrimination based on age and political affiliation in violation of federal and state law. Id. ¶¶ 37, 43, 47, 49 (Page ID # 13–16). Carpenter also brought state-law claims for breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants removed the case to federal court on January 25, 2011, see R. 1 (Notice of Removal) (Page ID # 1), and subsequently filed a motion for a more definite statement and to strike. R. 4 (Defs.' Mot. for a More Definite Stmt. and to Strike) (Page ID # 27). Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were being alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations as a whole were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Id. at 2 (Page ID # 28). The district court set February 16, 2011, as the date by which Carpenter could respond to the motion to strike. R. 8 (Request for Resp.) (Page ID # 50). No response was filed by this deadline, and about five weeks after the deadline, a joint stipulated order was entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011, and ordering Defendants to withdraw without prejudice their motion for a more definite statement and to strike. R. 10 (Stipulated Order at 3) (Page ID # 56).

Carpenter's counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, in violation of Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 5.1.1, which requires electronic filing. E.D. Mich. Local Rule 5.1.1(a); see R. 11 (Am.Compl.) (Page ID # 57). Although the clerk's office accepted the filing, it issued a notice of failure to comply to Carpenter's counsel, warning that “[s]anctions may be imposed if additional violations occur after this date.” R. 12 (Notice of Failure to Comply) (Page ID # 71). Defendants renewed their motion to strike in June 2011. R. 13 (Defs.' Mot. to Strike) (Page ID # 72). The motion argued that Carpenter's complaint was “vague, ambiguous and littered with argument and prolix,” and that “[t]he language used is overly rhetorical and argumentative, and the allegations ... are narrative, and in some cases, nonsensical.” Id. at 3 (Page ID # 74). After Carpenter failed to respond to the motion within the time permitted by Local Rule 7.1(e), the district court issued an order to show cause on July 5, 2011, why Carpenter's complaint should not be stricken. R. 15 (Order to Show Cause) (Page ID # 78); E.D. Mich. Local Rule 7.1(e). Carpenter responded to the show-cause order, but failed to abide by the local rules requiring electronic filing. The filing was accepted by the clerk's office, but a second notice of failure to comply was issued. R. 17 (Notice of Failure to Comply) (Page ID # 91). On October 5, 2011, the district court entered a second order to show cause, noting counsel's repeated noncompliance with the local rules, and that counsel's response “did not address the [previous] order to show cause or explain the failure to file a response to the motion by the deadline.” R. 18 (Order to Show Cause at 1–2) (Page ID # 92–93).

Carpenter responded to the second show-cause order, explaining that technical issues with the electronic filing system, destruction of office property, and family medical issues caused the delay in counsel's compliance with the local rules. See R. 19 (Pl.'s Resp. to Order to Show Cause at 1–4) (Page ID # 94–97). The district court dismissed both show-cause orders on October 17, 2011. R. 20 (Order Dismissing Show Cause) (Page ID # 102). The order stated that even Carpenter's counsel's most recent filing was single-spaced, in violation of Local Rule 5.1(a)(2), and warned that “ future failure to comply with the Local Rules will not be tolerated.” Id. At this point, Defendants' motion to strike the amended complaint remained pending.

Four months later, on February 15, 2012, the district court denied without prejudice Defendants' motion to strike, finding that Defendants' three-page motion and accompanying brief consisting of three sentences did “not set forth a sufficient basis upon which to grant their motion.” R. 21 (Dist. Ct. Order at 2) (Page ID # 105). The court found that the motion “d[id] not ‘point out the defects complained of and the details desired’ as required by Rule 12(e) or identify the ‘redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter’ the court should strike as provided in Rule 12(f).” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e)-(f)). The court also explained that Defendants' motion failed to comply with Local Rule 7.1(a), which requires that the moving party obtain concurrence on the motion or make a statement in its motion that concurrence was not reached. See id.; E.D. Mich. Local Rule 7.1(a).

There was no further docket activity until July 31, 2012, five and a half months later, when the district court entered an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. R. 22 (Order to Show Cause) (Page ID # 107). This order warned that “[f]ailure to respond may result in dismissal of the case.” Id. In response, Carpenter's counsel argued that although negotiations had begun regarding a stipulation to file a second amended complaint, those negotiations had broken down. R. 23 (Pl.'s Resp. to Order to Show Cause at 2–3) (Page ID # 109–10). Carpenter's counsel asserted that the failure of negotiations prevented him from filing another version of the complaint. Id. at 4 (Page ID # 111). Defendant City of Flint (“Flint”) also responded to the show-cause order, contending that Carpenter's counsel “has failed to cooperate in any manner to construct the proposed stipulation that would avoid the filing of the motion [to strike].” R. 24 (Def. City of Flint's Reply to Order to Show Cause at 2) (Page ID # 116). Flint acknowledged that “in hindsight Defendant should have simply filed the renewed motion weeks ago and takes responsibility for that delay.” Id.

On August 28, 2012, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice, and judgment was entered in favor of Defendants. R. 26 (Order Dismissing Case) (Page ID # 135); R. 27 (Judgment) (Page ID # 139). The district court's dismissal was based on Carpenter's counsel's repeated noncompliance with the local rules, his uncooperativeness in negotiating a stipulation relating to a second amended complaint, and his failure “to take appropriate actions to pursue the claims asserted in this case.” R. 26 (Order Dismissing Case at 4) (Page ID # 138). Carpenter timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute. Tung–Hsiung Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir.2005). “An abuse of discretion exists when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Sch., 138 F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir.1998). We will find an abuse of discretion if the district court “relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, ... improperly applies the law, or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Id. Correspondingly, “[a] clear example of an abuse of discretion exists where the trial court fails to consider the applicable legal standard.” Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Patel, 445 F.3d 899, 906 (6th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

It is well settled that a district court has the authority to dismiss sua sponte a lawsuit for failure to prosecute. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir.1980). Nonetheless, “[t]he dismissal of a claim for failure to prosecute is a harsh sanction which the court should order only in extreme situations showing a clear record of contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Wu, 420 F.3d at 643 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Link, the Supreme Court stated that there was “no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client.” Link, 370 U.S. at 633, 82 S.Ct. 1386. Although this principle—that generally it...