Kinds v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–4048.,12–4048.
• Citation: 724 F.3d 648
• Parties: Debra KINDS, Plaintif–Appellant, v. OHIO BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

724 F.3d 648

Debra KINDS, Plaintif–Appellant,

v.OHIO BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–4048.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

July 29, 2013.

ON BRIEF:Mark P. Herron, Herron Law Offices, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Laura A. Lindner, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Amy Ryder Wentz, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: GILMAN, GRIFFIN, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

Debra Kinds, a decade-long employee of the Ohio Bell Telephone Company, sought leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654, for nine weeks of work that she missed in late 2009. Ohio Bell denied Kinds's request for FMLA leave with respect to three of those weeks when she failed to timely provide medical justification for the leave, and it then fired her because of her documented history of unexcused absences.

Kinds subsequently filed a lawsuit against Ohio Bell, alleging that the company had unlawfully interfered with the exercise of her FMLA rights. The district court granted Ohio Bell's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Kinds was involved in a mentally and physically abusive relationship with her live-in boyfriend that culminated in death threats and an assault that put Kinds in the emergency room on August 30, 2009. She told her supervisors about the abuse and requested time off from work to find a new place to live and to get her affairs in order. But Kinds did not have any vacation time available and was not eligible for FMLA leave because she had worked less than 1,250 hours for Ohio Bell during the previous 12–month period. See29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (defining an “eligible employee” as one who has worked a minimum of 1,250 hours for the specific employer in the previous 12 months). Her supervisors nonetheless granted her one week of discretionary leave for the first week of September 2009.

Kinds returned to work after this discretionary leave and continued working until October 12, 2009, at which point she had accumulated enough hours of work to become eligible for FMLA leave. She applied for FMLA leave the following day and did not work again until returning part-time on December 15, 2009. After her eighth full day of absence in October, Ohio Bell took three relevant actions: (1) it notified the third-party administrator of its short-term disability insurance plan, Sedgwick Claims Management Services (Sedgwick), of Kinds's absence; (2) it notified its affiliated FMLA Operations Department in Texas of those same absences; and (3) it sent Kinds a form that confirmed her eligibility for FMLA leave and also informed her that a claim for short-term disability benefits had been initiated on her behalf. This form further indicated that Kinds did not need to submit an FMLA medical certification at that time.

The FMLA Operations Department sent a letter to Kinds on October 21, 2009 that acknowledged her FMLA leave request and stated that her period of absence “will result in a claim for Short Term Disability Benefits.” In addition, the letter explained that if Kinds's claim for disability benefits were approved, then FMLA leave would run concurrently. And even if the claim were denied, the letter stated that Kinds would still “have the right to request FMLA consideration,” but would in such event need to have her healthcare provider submit an “FMLA4” form to document “the medical facts ... to support the denied absence period.” The letter further stressed that “[t]he FMLA4 is only required if your request for disability benefits has been denied.”

Kinds first sought mental health treatment from Paula Reshotko, a licensed independent social worker, on November 3, 2009. This counseling session was the first medical treatment that Kinds received during her October to December 2009 absence from work. Reshotko diagnosed Kinds as having a “severe depression episode” and recommended further counseling. Kinds saw Reshotko for counseling again on November 10th and 19th and saw her family physician, Dr. Suzana Sarac–Leonard, also on November 10th.

On November 24, 2009, Sedgwick sent Kinds a letter explaining that her claim for short-term disability benefits was approved “for the period of November 10, 2009 through December 14, 2009” but was denied with respect to “the period of October 20, 2009 through November 9, 2009.” Sedgwick determined that Kinds did not have disability status until November 10th based on both a review of the medical records furnished by Reshotko and additional information that Reshotko provided in a November 20th telephone call with Sedgwick.

Sedgwick's approval of disability benefits for a portion of Kinds's absence prompted two actions by Ohio Bell: (1) it approved the first week of Kinds's absence (October 13th to October 20th) and the period for which she was determined to be disabled (November 10th to December 14th) for FMLA leave, and (2) it asked Kinds to submit an FMLA medical certification for the period that was not approved for disability benefits (October 20th to November 9th). The first action was taken pursuant to Ohio Bell's leave policy and the programming of its electronic payroll system. Under that policy, Ohio Bell automatically approves as FMLA leave the first seven days of an employee's period of absence whenever any part of that absence is approved for disability benefits and the employee is otherwise FMLA-eligible. The second action (requesting an FMLA medical certification) was taken when Kinds returned to full-time work on December 29, 2009. Kinds was given until January 13, 2010 to submit the requested certification.

The deadline passed without Kinds or her healthcare providers submitting any documentation to support FMLA leave for the period in question. On January 20, 2010, Kinds asked for an extension. Ohio Bell agreed to the extension and gave Kinds until January 27th to submit the medical certification. That date also passed with no submission to Ohio Bell of a medical certification, although Dr. Leonard did send a letter to Sedgwick on January 22nd certifying that she was providing Kinds “medical assistance ... from October 20th to November 11th, 2009.” Sedgewick did not forward a copy of Dr. Leonard's letter to Ohio Bell, however, due to the restrictions on the sharing of private health information imposed by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Moreover, Dr. Leonard's letter did not indicate what condition constituted Kinds's alleged disability. On February 2, 2010, Ohio Bell denied Kinds's FMLA leave request because it had received no medical certification verifying her need for leave.

The denial letter explained that “[i]f this request for FMLA has been final[ly] denied due to circumstances beyond the employee's control, [the FMLA Operations Department] must be advised of the reason and provided a valid medical certification form accompanied by proof of extenuating circumstances within 15 days of the date of [the] final denial letter dated February 2, 2010.” Dr. Leonard submitted a “FMLA4” medical certification on February 16th, but neither Kinds nor Dr. Leonard provided any explanation for why this certification could not have been submitted prior to the January 27th deadline. The FMLA Operations Department notified Kinds on February 22nd that her FMLA leave request stood as denied.

Ohio Bell determined that Kinds's absence from October 20th to November 9th of 2009 was unexcused, putting Kinds at risk of termination due to her prior history of unexcused absences. She was not actually terminated, however, until March 30, 2010, after she lost her administrative appeal with Sedgewick regarding the denial of her disability claim for the period in question. Ohio Bell's reason for awaiting the outcome of that appeal was that the FMLA denial would have been automatically rescinded had Sedgwick ultimately allowed Kinds's disability-benefits claim. But once Sedgwick denied Kinds's appeal, Ohio Bell proceeded to terminate Kinds's employment the following day.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 388 (6th Cir.2010). “Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. The central issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

B. Ohio Bell properly requested a medical certification under the FMLA

To establish a claim for interference with her FMLA rights, Kinds “must prove that: (1) she was an eligible employee, (2) the defendant was an employer as defined under the FMLA, (3) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) she gave the employer notice of her intention to take leave, and (5) the employer denied the employee FMLA benefits to which she was entitled.” Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 669 (6th Cir.2008). Only the fifth element of Kinds's FMLA-interference claim is in dispute. More specifically, Kinds's claim is based solely on the alleged failure of Ohio Bell to timely request the medical certification as required by the applicable FMLA regulation.

The FMLA gives an eligible employee “a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12–month period for ... a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). An employee...