Rembrandt Vision Techs., L.P. v. Johnson

Decision Date07 August 2013
Docket NumberNo. 2012–1510.,2012–1510.
Citation725 F.3d 1377
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit
PartiesREMBRANDT VISION TECHNOLOGIES, L.P., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON VISION CARE, INC., Defendant–Appellee.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jacob M. Holdreith, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., of Minneapolis, MN, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Ronald J. Schutz, Diane L. Simerson, Ryan M. Schultz, Brenda L. Joly, and Samuel L. Walling.

Gregory L. Diskant, Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, of New York, NY, argued for defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were Eugene M. Gelernter, Michael J. Buchanan, and Kathleen Crotty. Of counsel was Charles D. Hoffmann. Of counsel on the brief were Timothy Joseph Barron, Sr. and Alexander Rozenblat, Jenner & Block, LLP, of Chicago, IL.

Before DYK, CLEVENGER, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Rembrandt Vision Technologies, Inc. (Rembrandt) appeals from the district court's judgment that Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. (JJVC) does not infringe Rembrandt's U.S. Patent No. 5,712,327 ('327 patent). Rembrandt challenges the court's grant of judgment as a matter of law and its denial of Rembrandt's motion for a new trial. Because the district court correctly granted judgment as a matter of law that JJVC does not infringe, we affirm.

Background

The technology at issue in this case relates to contact lenses. Two important characteristics of a contact lens are its permeability to oxygen and the wettability of its surface. '327 patent, col. 1 ll. 18–21. By the 1980s, those skilled in the art had developed both “hard” and “soft” contact lenses that were permeable to oxygen but lacked a highly wettable surface. Id. col. 1 l. 25–col. 2 l. 7.

The contact lens claimed in the '327 patent has both a highly wettable surface and is permeable to oxygen. The patent discloses a soft gas permeable lens that contains an acrylic layer on the surface of the lens body. '327 patent, col. 3 l. 65–col. 4 l. 45. The addition of the layer increases the wettability and comfort of the contact lens. Id. col. 4 ll. 38–45. Claim 1 of the '327 patent is representative and is directed to a “soft gas permeable contact lens” with certain properties:

A hydrophilic soft gas permeable contact lens comprised of a polymerization product ... said lens comprising a hydrophilic lens body and a tear-wettable surface layer integral therewith, said lens body being comprised of said polymerization product and said tear-wettable surface layer being comprised of polymeric material containing hydroxy acrylic monomer units....

'327 patent, claim 1 (emphasis added). Rembrandt sued JJVC, alleging that its Advance® and Oasis® contact lenses infringed the '327 patent claims. JJVC prevailed at trial, and the district court, in the alternative, granted judgment as a matter of law that Rembrandt failed to prove that the accused lenses were “soft gas permeable” contact lenses. Rembrandt Vision Techs., L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 655, 668 (M.D.Fla.2012) (JMOL Order ).

The central issue in this appeal is whether Rembrandt proffered sufficient evidence that the accused contact lenses were “soft.” The court adopted the parties' agreed construction of “soft gas permeable contact lens” as “a contact lens having a Hardness (Shore D) less than five.” JMOL Order, 282 F.R.D. at 657. Due to that specific construction, the court excluded Rembrandt's evidence that the accused contact lenses were generally known as “soft” lenses because that evidence was not probative on whether the accused lenses had a Shore D Hardness of less than five. Id. at 664; J.A. 41–42.

At trial, Rembrandt relied on expert testimony from Dr. Thomas Beebe, Jr. to prove that the accused lenses had a Shore D Hardness of less than five. But Dr. Beebe's trial testimony did not match the opinions disclosed in his expert report, and the district court ultimately struck his testimony. Dr. Beebe testified in his expert report that he performed the Shore D Hardness test by stacking the accused lenses around a stainless steel ball and then probing them. JMOL Order, 282 F.R.D. at 657–58. He testified that he stacked 24 individual hydrated contact lenses to achieve a thick enough sample to allow full penetration by a probe that is 2.54 mm in length. Id.

JJVC moved to exclude that expert testimony on the basis that Dr. Beebe's Shore D Harding testing did not comply with industry-standard testing protocols. Id. at 658. JJVC contended that the applicable standards required probing a thick button of dry lens material on a flat surface and do not allow for testing a stack of hydrated contact lenses around a steel ball. J.A.1941–42. JJVC also moved for summary judgment on the grounds that no reasonable juror could conclude that the accused lenses were “soft” based on Dr. Beebe's testing. JMOL Order, 282 F.R.D. at 658. The court denied JJVC's motion for summary judgment and deferred ruling on JJVC's evidentiary motion until after Dr. Beebe testified at trial. Id.

Dr. Beebe testified on direct examination that he had performed the steel ball Shore D Hardness test described in his expert report. JMOL Order, 282 F.R.D. at 658. During cross examination, JJVC's counsel asked Dr. Beebe whether he had tested a sufficiently thick sample of stacked lenses to comply with the industry-standard Shore D Hardness testing protocols, which required a stack with a thickness of 6 mm or more. Id. at 658–59. Dr. Beebe responded that he had tested a stack of lenses that was 6 mm thick, not 2.54 mm as he had disclosed in his expert report. Id. at 658–59. He testified that the error in his report “might be a typo.” Id. at 659.

JJVC pressed Dr. Beebe on his testing methodology. Despite the “typo,” Dr. Beebe confirmed that he had tested a stack of 24 contact lenses. JMOL Order, 282 F.R.D. at 658–59. JJVC then asked Dr. Beebe how a stack of 24 contact lenses, each with a thickness of .07 mm, could add up to 6 mm. Id. at 659. Dr. Beebe agreed that one would expect such a stack to have a thickness around 1.68 mm. Id.

JJVC then asked Dr. Beebe to confirm that he did not test flat samples of the lens material. JMOL Order, 282 F.R.D. at 659. At that point, Dr. Beebe “suddenly changed course in the middle of cross-examination and testified that he did not follow the procedures listed in his expert report.” Id. He testified that he performed the Shore D Hardness testing by cutting the lenses into quarters, stacking the lens quarters on a flat surface, and then probing them. Id. at 659–60. This procedure explained how he was able to create a stack of lenses that was 6 mm thick. Id. at 660. None of this procedure was in his expert report. Id. Dr. Beebe claimed that his expert report's disclosure of the wrong Shore D Hardness test procedure was a “typo.” Id.

JJVC renewed its motion to exclude Dr. Beebe's testimony and moved for judgment as a matter of law, and the court granted the motions. JMOL Order, 282 F.R.D. at 657. The court struck Dr. Beebe's testimony under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37 because his expert report was “woefully deficient” to support his trial testimony. Id. at 663–65. The court also excluded Dr. Beebe's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because nothing in the record established the reliability of the testing methodology that he testified to at trial. Id. at 665–67. Because Dr. Beebe's struck testimony was the only evidence that Rembrandt advanced at trial to prove that the accused lenses were “soft,” the court granted judgment as a matter of law that JJVC did not infringe. Id. at 668.

Rembrandt appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).1

Discussion
I.

We apply regional circuit law to review the district court's exclusion of evidence and its grant of judgment as a matter of law. ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc., 668 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2012); Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1390–91 (Fed.Cir.2003). The Eleventh Circuit reviews de novo the grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Christopher v. Florida, 449 F.3d 1360, 1364 (11th Cir.2006). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when, after a party has been fully heard on an issue, “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). A district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Goodman–Gable–Gould Co. v. Tiara Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 595 F.3d 1203, 1210 (11th Cir.2010).

II.

Rembrandt argues that the court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law. It contends that the district court improperly excluded Dr. Beebe's trial testimony. Rembrandt asserts that the mistakes in Dr. Beebe's report were unintended and did not harm JJVC. It further contends that Dr. Beebe's actual testing methodology was reliable because he followed industry standard testing protocols. Rembrandt argues that, because the court erroneously excluded Dr. Beebe's testimony, we should reverse the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law.

Rembrandt also argues that its circumstantial evidence that the accused lenses are generally known as “soft” precludes entry of judgment as a matter of law. It contends that the district court erred by categorically excluding that circumstantial evidence. It further argues that the circumstantial evidence that was admitted in evidence shows that the accused lenses meet the “soft” limitation.

JJVC counters that the court properly granted judgment as a matter of law. It argues that, regardless of Dr. Beebe's intent, there was no justification for Dr. Beebe's late disclosure of his testing methods. JJVC argues that Dr. Beebe's change in testimony significantly impaired its ability to prepare a noninfringement defense and prepare the case for trial. It asserts that Rembrandt failed to show that Dr. Beebe's undocumented testing methodology was sufficiently reliable. Lastly, JJVC argues that ...

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