State v. Andrews
| Decision Date | 09 March 1999 |
| Citation | 248 Conn. 1,726 A.2d 104 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | (Conn. 1999) STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DWAYNE ANDREWS 15551 |
Donald Dakers, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant). Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Gary Nicholson, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
OPINION
A jury convicted the defendant, Dwayne Andrews, as an accessory for aiding and abetting a murder in violation of General Statutes §§§§ 53a-54a (a) 1 and 53a-8. 2 The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict, 3 from which the defendant appealed to this court. 4 The principal issue on appeal is whether the trial court improperly prohibited the defendant from cross-examining the state's key witness, Richard Dawkins, regarding possible undue pressure arising out of the trial court's admonishment to Dawkins that he could not avoid giving further testimony without facing incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At all times relevant to this appeal, the defendant, a New Haven resident, worked for his brother, Edward Andrews, supervising Edward's marijuana distribution business. The defendant's responsibilities included collecting money generated by the organization's marijuana sales. Gerald Royal also distributed marijuana for Edward Andrews, as did another individual, identified only as "Butchie," who worked closely with Royal. Butchie owed Edward Andrews approximately $900, but because Butchie was incarcerated, the defendant had tried on several occasions to collect the debt from Royal. The defendant, however, was unsuccessful, and had become "fed up" with Royal as a result.
On the evening of July 19, 1993, the defendant and another individual visited the defendant's cousin, Thad Stanley, at his place of employment. At that time, the defendant told Stanley that he was going to visit Royal again to attempt to collect the $900.
At approximately 10:20 p.m. that night, Royal was drinking with several friends, including Dawkins, on the porch of 17 Hurlburt Street in New Haven. Two African-American males, both of whom had hoods over their heads, approached the porch. One was dressed in black and the other wore a camouflage jacket. The man in black purchased two "nickel bags" 5 of marijuana from Royal for $10. He then asked Royal for five more bags of marijuana at a price of $20. Royal, however, refused to sell him the additional marijuana at that price. The man in black, who was armed with a handgun, then shot Royal once in the back as Royal attempted to run inside the house.
Immediately thereafter, the man wearing the camouflage jacket pulled out a gun and held it to Dawkins' head. The man then told Dawkins to "run it," a street term meaning that Dawkins was to empty his pockets. Dawkins, however, had nothing in his pockets. The man in black, who had run across the street, called to the man wearing the camouflage jacket, telling him to "let [it] go," whereupon the man in the camouflage jacket fled with the man dressed in black. Thereafter, Dawkins found Royal in the house, lying on his back, unable to speak and short of breath. Dawkins called an ambulance, which transported Royal to the hospital. Shortly thereafter, however, Royal died from injuries sustained as a result of the gunshot wound to his back.
When the police arrived, Dawkins described the two men and their attire. Dawkins then accompanied the police to the station house, where he gave the police a tape-recorded statement regarding the incident. Dawkins indicated that he did not know either of the two men.
On July 26, 1993, Dawkins returned to the police station and was shown a single photograph of eight African-American males and an enlargement of a portion of that same photograph. The defendant appeared in both the photograph and the enlargement. Dawkins identified the defendant as the man who had put a gun to his head on the evening of July 19. On July 28, 1993, the police showed Dawkins a different array of individual photographs depicting eight different African-American males, including the defendant. Dawkins again identified the defendant as the person in the camouflage jacket who had put a gun to his head on July 19, and gave the police a tape-recorded statement to that effect. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the trial court violated his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution 6 by precluding him from cross-examining Dawkins regarding the fact that Dawkins had agreed to resume his testimony only after the court had warned Dawkins that he would be incarcerated if he failed to do so; and (2) we should invoke our supervisory authority over the administration of Justice to grant him a new trial due to certain allegedly improper comments made by the prosecutor during his closing argument to the jury. We reject the defendant's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant's primary claim is that the trial court violated his confrontation clause rights under the United States constitution by barring certain cross-examination of Dawkins, the state's key witness. We disagree.
The following additional facts are necessary to our resolution of this issue. In February, 1996, the defendant and Dawkins, who has an extensive criminal record, were incarcerated in the same cellblock at the New Haven Correctional Center (correctional center). On February 10, an inmate approached Dawkins and asked him for a written statement exonerating the defendant in connection with the events of July 19, 1993. Dawkins agreed, and prepared a handwritten statement that differed from his previous statements to the police in two important respects: First, he indicated that the defendant was not the individual in the camouflage jacket who had held a gun to his head on the night of Royal's murder, and second, that he was intoxicated that night. Dawkins gave his handwritten statement directly to the defendant. Later, on June 13, 1996, after Dawkins had been released from jail, an investigator working on the defendant's behalf visited Dawkins and took a signed, sworn statement from him that was identical in all material respects to the one that he previously had given to the defendant in jail.
At trial, the state elicited Dawkins' testimony regarding his version of the events taking place on the evening of July 19, 1993, including his contradictory statements about the defendant's culpability. In attempting to explain those statements, Dawkins' testimony was confusing and, at times, inconsistent. 7
Before the Conclusion of his testimony on direct examination, Dawkins, out of the presence of the jury, stated that he no longer wanted to testify and that he wished to speak to an attorney. 8 The trial court informed Dawkins that he was required to testify and, further, denied Dawkins' request for an attorney. 9 Dawkins then sought to assert his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United States constitution. 10 The trial court, however, ruled that, in light of Dawkins' testimony up to that point, there was no legitimate basis for his invocation of the privilege. 11 The defendant then inquired as to whether he would receive jail time if he refused to testify. The court confirmed that Dawkins would be incarcerated if he persisted in his refusal to provide testimony and, furthermore, that the amount of time that would be imposed for his refusal to testify depended upon how many questions Dawkins refused to answer. 12 The trial court then took a brief recess so that Dawkins could decide how he wished to proceed. At the Conclusion of the recess, Dawkins informed the court that he was willing to resume testifying.
The jury was recalled, and the prosecutor proceeded with his direct examination of Dawkins. During the course of his testimony, Dawkins positively identified the defendant as the person in the camouflage jacket who had held a gun to his head on the night of Royal's murder.
On cross-examination, the defendant highlighted the fact that Dawkins had given two statements, one on February 10, 1996, and another on June 13, 1996, stating "unequivocally" that the defendant was not the man who had held a gun to his head on July 19, 1993. The defendant also elicited testimony from Dawkins that, at that time, there were several charges pending against him, including assault, violation of probation 13 and violation of a protective order. The defendant then asked Dawkins whether he previously had indicated to the court that he wished to assert his fifth amendment privilege and refrain from testifying any further. The state objected to the defendant's question and the trial court sustained the objection. Thereafter, the defendant asked Dawkins if he had been threatened with contempt if he failed to testify. The trial court sustained the state's objection to that question as well. The defendant, however, was permitted to ask Dawkins why he had informed the court, outside the jury's presence, that he did not wish to provide any additional testimony. Dawkins responded: "I just didn't want to testify no more." When pressed further about why he did not wish to testify, Dawkins stated: "Because I got my own problems." Although Dawkins admitted that his trial testimony would not have any effect on his "own problems," Dawkins nevertheless insisted that his reluctance to testify was the result of his desire to "take care of my business." Dawkins thereafter testified that his unwillingness to testify was due to the fact that he thought that he had been summoned to court in connection with his own pending cases, which he wanted to...
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