United States v. Lynch

Decision Date13 August 2013
Docket NumberDocket No. 12–4222–cr.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gregory LYNCH, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Stephanie M. Carvlin, New York, NY, for DefendantAppellant.

Rahul Kale (Sandra S. Glover, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for David B. Fein, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT, for Appellee.

Before: POOLER, WESLEY, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

DRONEY, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-appellant Gregory Lynch was indicted on one count of escape from a correctional facility. Following Lynch's arrest in New Jersey, his arraignment in Connecticut, and a continuance obtained by Lynch's first attorney without Lynch's consent, Lynch moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to commence trial within seventy days as required by the Speedy Trial Act (“STA”). The district court (Chatigny, J.) denied Lynch's motion on the bases that the seventy-day period did not begin until his arraignment and that his consent was not necessary for the court to grant a trial continuance that satisfied the “ends-of-justice” provision of the STA. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND
I. The Offense Conduct and Arrest in New Jersey

On June 19, 2009, Lynch was sentenced by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dorsey, J.) to forty-six months' imprisonment for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Lynch was designated by the Bureau of Prisons to the United States Penitentiary Canaan, located in Waymart, Pennsylvania. On December 7, 2011, Lynch applied for a furlough for a halfway house. His furlough request was granted on February 3, 2012, allowing him to transfer to Watkinson House, a halfway house in Hartford, Connecticut. That day, Lynch was dropped off at the Scranton bus terminal and given a ticket for a bus to Hartford, which was scheduled to arrive at 7:00 pm. Lynch was given until 8:00 pm to arrive at Watkinson House.

On February 4, 2012, Watkinson House notified the Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Marshals Service that Lynch had not arrived. On February 23, 2012, the U.S. Marshals Service arrested Lynch in Camden, New Jersey, on an arrest warrant from the District of Connecticut for escape issued pursuant to a criminal complaint. That day, he appeared before a magistrate judge in New Jersey, who ordered Lynch detained. Lynch initially demanded a hearing to contest his identity, but he subsequently waived that hearing, and on February 28, 2012, the magistrate judge in New Jersey signed an Order of Commitment to Another District (the “Order of Commitment”) transferring Lynch to the District of Connecticut. On March 8, 2012, Lynch arrived at the Wyatt Detention Center in Central Falls, Rhode Island, which is used by the District of Connecticut to house detainees.

II. The Indictment and Subsequent Proceedings in Connecticut

On March 13, 2012, a federal grand jury in Connecticut indicted Lynch for one count of escape in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751. On March 23, 2012, Lynch was arraigned on that indictment before a magistrate judge in Connecticut, and entered a plea of not guilty. Jury selection was set for May 8, 2012.

On April 16, 2012, Assistant Federal Defender Deirdre A. Murray, as counsel for Lynch, moved to continue jury selection for thirty days. Murray stated in the motion that she was unavailable on May 8, 2012, because she was scheduled to start another trial and because Lynch had requested transcripts of prior proceedings, which had not yet arrived. The Assistant United States Attorney did not object to the continuance. The motion for a continuance also stated that a “waiver of speedy trial will be provided to Mr. Lynch and forwarded to the Court upon its receipt.” That same day, Murray sent a letter to Lynch explaining her scheduling conflict and the need for additional preparation and providing a speedy trial waiver form. In response, by letter dated April 25, 2012, Lynch refused to sign the speedy trial waiver form.

Meanwhile, on April 19, 2012, the district court (Chatigny, J.) granted the motion to postpone jury selection. The order noted that the STA “generally requires that the trial of a defendant commence within seventy days after the filing of the indictment or the date the defendant first appears in court, whichever is later,” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). However, a continuance may be granted if the “ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial,” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The district court found that the defendant's request for transcripts satisfied the “ends-of-justice” provision and granted the motion. The motion provided that the “period May 8, 2012 through June 12, 2012 will be excluded under the [STA] subject to the filing of a waiver of the defendant's rights” under the STA. The district court then rescheduled jury selection for June 12, 2012.

On May 22, 2012, Murray filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, citing an “irretrievable breakdown in the relationship between Mr. Lynch and [her].” The motion also stated that Murray expected “that Mr. Lynch will pursue a claim against [her] for violation of his speedy trial rights” because of his dissatisfaction with her “performance thus far, in particular [her] motion to continue the trial date which was scheduled to begin on May 8, 2012.”

On May 25, 2012, Lynch filed a pro se motion seeking to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. On June 7, 2012, a magistrate judge held a hearing on Murray's motion to withdraw and granted the motion on June 12, 2012, noting that Attorney Richard Reeve had already entered an appearance as substitute counsel. The district court also returned the pro se motion to Lynch because he was represented by counsel.

On June 11, 2012, Reeve moved to continue jury selection from June 12, 2012, to July 10, 2012. That motion was granted, and was not challenged by Lynch as a violation of the Speedy Trial Act in the district court or on this appeal.

III. The Speedy Trial Act Motion

On June 20, 2012, Lynch, through Attorney Reeve, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act's provision requiring trial within seventy days of indictment or initial appearance. In the motion, Lynch argued that in Murray's motion for a continuance, “Murray did not represent that she had consulted with Mr. Lynch about this continuance request, and it appears that no such consultation occurred prior to either the filing of the Motion or the subsequent Order of the Court, which was based in large part upon counsel's trial schedule.” He asserted that thirteen days between the filing of the Order of Commitment in New Jersey on February 28 and his arraignment in Connecticut on March 23 should be counted because his transportation time from New Jersey to Connecticut had exceeded ten days. Lynch also argued that because he had never approved Murray's motion for a continuance, the period covered by that continuance (from May 8 to June 12) could not be excluded. On this basis, Lynch argued that as of June 12, 2012, ninety-one days of countable time had elapsed, and so the seventy-day speedy trial period had been exceeded. 1 As the remedy, Lynch sought dismissal of the indictment with prejudice. The Government opposed Lynch's motion.

On July 24, 2012, the district court issued an oral decision denying Lynch's motion to dismiss. The court noted that Lynch “makes two basic arguments”: that “travel time in excess of ten days must be included in the calculation” under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), and that “the speedy trial clock is not tolled by a motion for continuance filed by defense counsel without the defendant's informed consent.” The court rejected Lynch's first argument based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), and stated that the statute requires that the trial “shall commence within seventy days from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” As Lynch was not indicted in Connecticut until March 13 and not arraigned on the indictment until March 23, the district court concluded that his seventy-day period did not begin until March 24, and thus none of the travel time before March 24 counted against the seventy-day period.

As to Lynch's second argument, the court held that consent for a motion for a continuance is not necessary because “if the defendant is not bound by the representations of his lawyer, the Speedy Trial Act could entangle everybody in proceedings focusing on the issue of informed consent.” The court further explained that “requiring express assent from the defendant himself for such routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations [as motions for continuances] would consume time to no apparent purpose.” The court did note that the continuance excluding the period from May 8 to June 12 had been granted “subject to the filing of a waiver,” but that the court had “made a finding that a continuance was in the interest of 27 justice.” The court thus found that only forty-one includable days had passed under the Speedy Trial Act and denied Lynch's motion.

On September 12, 2012, Lynch entered a conditional plea of guilty to the escape charge pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in which he reserved the right to seek appellate review of the district court's ruling regarding his Speedy Trial Act motion.This appeal followed.2

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

We review the district court's findings of fact as they pertain to a speedy trial challenge for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Lucky, 569 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting United...

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