Jenkins v. State
Decision Date | 03 April 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 02S00-9810-CR-538.,02S00-9810-CR-538. |
Citation | 726 N.E.2d 268 |
Parties | Rodney Kinta JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Mark A. Thoma, Deputy Public Defender, Fort Wayne, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas D. Perkins, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
On Direct Appeal
The defendant-appellant, Rodney Kinta Jenkins, was convicted of felony murder for the killing of Timothy D. Thomas,1 the robbery of Darrick C. Lawson,2 and two counts of criminal confinement.3 In this direct appeal, his arguments concern: the applicability of the felony murder statute; sufficiency of the evidence; and double jeopardy.
The defendant contends that his felony murder conviction should be vacated on grounds that the felony murder statute does not impose criminal liability for murder when the resulting death is that of a co-perpetrator. The defendant's felony murder conviction was based on the death of Timothy D. Thomas in the course of a robbery of Darrick C. Lawson committed by the defendant and Thomas, during which Lawson fatally shot Thomas. The defendant argues that he neither shot Thomas nor engaged in conduct that caused his death. This Court has recently rejected the same argument. Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ind.1999).
The felony murder language of our murder statute provides: "A person who ... [k]ills another human being while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, consumer product tampering, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, robbery, or carjacking; ... commits murder, a felony." IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1. In Palmer, we held that the statutory language "kills another human being while committing" does not restrict the felony murder provision only to instances in which the felon is the killer, but may also apply equally when, in committing any of the designated felonies, the felon contributes to the death of any person. Palmer, 704 N.E.2d at 126. In Palmer, we echoed the observation of our Court of Appeals:
[A] person who commits or attempts to commit one of the offenses designated in the felony-murder statute is criminally responsible for a homicide which results from the act of one who was not a participant in the original criminal activity. Where the accused reasonably should have ... foreseen that the commission of or attempt to commit the contemplated felony would likely create a situation which would expose another to the danger of death at the hands of a nonparticipant in the felony, and where death in fact occurs as was foreseeable, the creation of such a dangerous situation is an intermediary, secondary, or medium in effecting or bringing about the death of the victim. There, the situation is a mediate contribution to the victim's killing.
Palmer, 704 N.E.2d at 126 (quoting Sheckles v. State, 684 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ind.Ct. App.1997)). In deciding whether a person may be convicted of felony murder for an allegedly indirect or remote death, we have applied the felony murder statute when the designated felony was "the mediate or immediate cause" of the death. Reaves v. State, 586 N.E.2d 847, 854-55 (Ind.1992) ( ); Pittman v. State, 528 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind.1988) ( ); Sims v. State, 466 N.E.2d 24, 25-26 (Ind.1984) ( ). See also Thomas v. State, 436 N.E.2d 1109, 1111-12 (Ind. 1982)
( ); Booker v. State, 270 Ind. 498, 502, 386 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (1979) ( ). In Palmer, we upheld the felony murder conviction based upon the fatal shooting of the defendant's co-perpetrator by a correctional officer during a kidnapping. Holding that the State need not prove intent to kill in a felony murder, only the intent to commit the underlying felony, we found that by engaging in kidnapping using a handgun, the defendant had created a risk of death to persons present. Palmer, 704 N.E.2d at 126-27.
The statutory language "kills another human being while committing" does not restrict the felony murder provision only to instances in which the felon is the killer but also applies when, in committing any of the designated felonies, the felon contributes to the death of any person. See Id. at 126. We reject the defendant's claim that the felony murder statute does not apply.
The defendant challenges his felony murder conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the mediate or immediate cause of the co-perpetrator's death and that the defendant was committing or attempting to commit robbery before, during, or after the co-perpetrator's death. The defendant also contends that his convictions should be reversed because the jury was not presented with any substantial evidence that he knowingly or intentionally used a firearm during the commission of the robbery and confinements, an element that had to be proven for the defendant to be convicted of these offenses as class B felonies.
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we will affirm the conviction unless, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment, and neither reweighing the evidence nor judging the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Webster v. State, 699 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Ind. 1998); Hodge v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1246, 1247-48 (Ind.1997).
The felony murder count was based on the killing of Timothy D. Thomas while the defendant committed or attempted to commit robbery. The robbery count charged the defendant with robbing Darrick C. Lawson while armed with a deadly weapon, a firearm. The two confinement counts charged the defendant with confining Darrick C. Lawson and Shalia R. Rogers while armed with a deadly weapon.
The facts favorable to the judgment show that the defendant's co-perpetrator, Thomas, grabbed Lawson and that the defendant held a gun to Lawson's stomach. Thomas then told Lawson to lie on the floor and asked the defendant for the tape in the defendant's possession. The defendant and Thomas then taped Lawson's ankles together and his hands behind his back. They instructed Lawson to lie on the floor on his stomach. Both the defendant and Thomas wore gloves. The defendant retrieved Rogers, Lawson's girlfriend, from the second level of the apartment. Rogers saw a small gun under the defendant's jacket when he came upstairs. The defendant brought her downstairs, where Lawson was lying on the floor. As Thomas was standing on Lawson's back, the defendant handed the gun to Thomas, and the defendant taped Rogers's eyes, mouth, and hands and instructed her to sit in a chair. Thomas demanded money...
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